DEFENCE PROBLEM

Evening Post, Volume CXXVII, Issue 91, 19 April 1939, Page 6

DEFENCE PROBLEM

NEW ZEALAND'S SAFETY

POSSIBILITY OF INVASION

NEED OF ARMED

F X QRCE

(By the New Zealand Defence League.)

The land forces of New Zealand on which we would have to depend in case of invasion seem to be the Cinderella of the services, and ,one of the reasons, and there is no justification for it, is that people have the impression that the Navy and the Air Force constitute all that is required for the protection of New Zealand. They overlook the fact that wars are not won, and countries are not conquered by naval power alone, nor by air power alone. As far back as 1805 we have Trafalgar. When Nelson's victory at sea broke the sea power of Napoleon it was not until nearly ten years later

that Napoleon was finally vanquished

at Waterloo. History provides manysuch examples. If wars could be won by air power alone, it would not have been necessary for Japan with her overwhelming superiority in the air to have sent a single soldier into China —but she has a million of them there. Nor would it have been necessary for Franco with his superiority in the air to have a single man at arms but he

had thousands of men engaged in his land forces. The truth is, that no country can be conquered until the last man is dug out of the last trench with the last bayonet.

The essential requirement of New Zealand at the present moment is trained man-power. We are firmly convinced that if we had in New Zealand an efficient army of some 30,000 fully-equipped and welltrained troops, no country in the world would try to attack us. . No country would try to attack New Zealand because the prize would not be worth the price.

Consider the position of Samoa in 1914. Had there been 5000 fullytrained and well-equipped German soldiers in Samoa in 1914 New Zealand

would not have tried to take it, because the prize would not have been worth the price. THE LESSON OF SOUTH AFRICA. Consider, further, the South African War. It took Great Britain together with troops from the overseas Dominions nearly three years and cost her from £300,000,000 to £400,000,000 and the tise of between 400,000 to 500,000 men to subdue the Boers of South Africa. And how were the Boers eventually subdued? By that vast encircling movement on the vast veldt whereby they were surrounded. The circle contracted and contracted until it closed in on them; and they had to surrender. That could not happen in New Zealand. • The conformation of the country would not lend itself to it. New Zealand could be made into a hundred Gallipolis and if defended by 30,000 fully trained and well equipped and determined men fighting on their

own ground and for their own country

could not be taken by fewer than 300,000-400,000 men fighting along, lines of communication. To*repeat, if^ we had : 30,000 fully equipped and trained men no Power would attempt to attack us because such a force would act as a deterrent. It may seem to be fantastic to talk about the possibility of a large scale

land raid or an invasion of New Zealand, but let us examine the position.

We rely for our protection primarily on the British Navy or that portion of it known as the Pacific Fleet based on Hong Kong or Singapore. Where was our Pacific Fleet in the Abyssinian crisis? It, or a large part of it, was in the Mediterranean—where it should be in the event of trouble in European quarters. Where was our••.Pacific Fleet in the September crisis? It was not in the Pacific, it, or part of it, was on the way to the Mediterranean and the North Sea. And on these two occasions, if a war had been in progress between Britain and France on the one side—assuming for the moment that the United States had not come in—and Germany, Italy, and Japan on the other, Newt Zealand and Australia would have been laid bare to attack. And in the September crisis, it is a published fact that Japanese cruisers were cruising off the coast of New Guinea. Does that not open up a vista of the danger which we face in New Zealand in . the event of that alignment of Powers being arrayed against us? You will say that if Japan tried to invade New Zealand she would have to fight too far from her base and it would be impossible to move transports all that distance. JAPAN IN THE PACIFIC. Before the last war the Marshall Islands belonged to, Germany. Early in the war, Japan seized them on behalf of the Allies. After the war she was granted a mandate over them by the League of Natioris. But Japan has possession of the Marshall Islands, and she intends to retain possession of them.

At Geneva, in 1932, when Japan was a member of the League her members were asked whether or not Japan was fortifying the islands in breach of the mandate. At first they gave evasive answers, and then their spokesman said:—"Japan is in possession of the Marshall Islands—Japan intends to retain possession of the Marshall Islands —if you want the Marshall Islands send your guns and your gunboats and take them." The islands are approximately 2500 miles away from Auckland, and approximately 2100 miles from the east coast of Australia. Two thousand five hundred miles is not a great distance for a bombing plane to travel. Late last year British Vickers-Wellesley bombers flew from Ismailia in Egypt to Australia—a much greater distance — in about 2£ days. Certainly they did not carry bombs, but in the event of war in which Japan may be aligned against us, what is to prevent her from assembling a number of aircraft carriers in the islands and sending them forth with their aeroplanes to bomb Australia and New Zealand; our Pacific Fleet being elsewhere? They could loose their aeroplanes 500 miles out from New Zealand, and they could bomb Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, and Dunedin and be back to their carriers in time for lunch. This is not exaggeration, it is within the bounds of probability. Again, let us assume that our Pacific Fleet, or a large part of it, is not in the Pacific, but on the other side of the world helping to defend the heart of the Empire. Japan assembles transports in the Marshall Islands—about eight days' steam at 15 knots per hour from New Zealand— and sends them across the unprotected Pacific. What is there to deter them except our air force? And our own trained and equipped man-power in New Zealand? Let us says that Australia does not consider this possibility fantastic, as is proved by the fact that the whole basis of her defence policy has been changed since the September crisis. The whole of Australia's defence celicy at the present moment is based upon the fear of invasion, and if there is a fear in Australia of the possibility of invasion, then we suggest that there is even more ground for fear in New Zealand of the possibility of invasion.