REVIEW IN COMMONS

Evening Post, Volume CXXVI, Issue 78, 29 September 1938, Page 10

REVIEW IN COMMONS

The Earlier Stages

MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S NEGOTIATIONS

(British Official Wireless.) (Received September 29, 2.30 p.m.)

RUGBY, September 28

Referring to the negotiations towards the end of August, Mr. Chamberlain said that events then occurred which increased the seriousness of the situation. As a result the British Ambassador was recalled to London for consultation, and/a meeting of Ministers was held on August 13. Next day Sir Nevile Henderson returned to Berlin and gave the State Secretary at the German Foreign Office a strong personal warning regarding the probable attitude of the British Government—already defined, as Mr. Chamberlain had reminded the House in his speech pf. March 24r—in the event of German aggression against Czechoslovakia and particularly if France were; compelled to intervene. Two days later Sir Nevile Henderson repeated the warning to '.he German Foreign Minister. =Mr, Chamberlain explained that the British Government desired to impress the seriousness of the situation upon the German Government without risk of" further aggravation of the situation by any. formal representations, which might have been interpreted by the German Government as a public rebuff; as Had been the case in regard to-the representations made on May 21. Al the same time, with the Nuremberg conference in prospect, the British Min-ister-at Prague saw the President of Czechoslovakia and impressed on him the vital necessity^ of further concessions..

: SITUATION MORE ACUTE. Dealing with the Nuremberg speech and the immediate deterioration which followed it, Mr. Chamberlain came in turn to the first meeting with Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden. "At this conversation, which lasted for three hours," he said, "I very soon became aware, that the situation was much more acute and urgent than I had realised. In. courteous but perfectly definite -, terms Herr Hitler made it plain that he had made up his mind that the Sudeten Germans must have the., right, of: self-determination. and of returning, if they wished, to the Reich. lEthey Cbul.d not ; achieve this by their o#n efforts,"' he said, Germany' would assist them, arid he declared categorically that rather than wait he would be prepared to risk a world war. So strongly-did I get the impression that the Chancellor was contemplating an immediate invasion of Czechoslovakia that I asked-him why he had allowed me to travel all.that way, since it was evidently wasting my time. He said that if I could give him there and then an assurance that the British Government accepted the principle of self-determination he was quite ready to discuss ways and means of carrying^ it, ;Out.", SOLE HOPE OF PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

;'"t was, of course, in no position to give there and then such an assurance, but I undertook to return at once to consult my colleagues if he would refrain from active hostilities until I had had time-to obtain their reply. That assurance he gave, provided, he said, nothing happened in Czechoslovakia of such a nature as to force his hands, and that assurance has remained binding eyer since. I have no doubt now, looking back, that my visit alone prevented ban invasion for which everything had. been prepared, and it was clear to me that with the German troops in the positions they then occupied nothing that anybody could do would prevent that invasion unless the right of self-determination wasb granted, and that quickly, to the Sudeten Germans. That was.the sole hope of a peaceful solution." , .__' _ .. Mr. Chamberlain then described his return'to London to consult the Cabinet, which received the views of Lord Runciman, and the discussions with the French Ministers and the advice which the: French and British Governments tendered at Prague and which was accentedunconditionally on September 21. He added that the British Ambassador in Prague was instructed to inform Czechoslovakia next day that Britain was profoundly conscious of the immense sacrifice which Czechoslovakia had agreed to, and the immense public spirit they had shown.

SHOCKED BY NEW PLAN. The Premier then described his second meeting with Herr Hitler at Godesberg. "I thought I had only to discuss; quietly with him the various proposals already submitted," he said. "I was shocked when at the beginning of'these conversations he said these proposals were not acceptable, and I learned that there were other pro-posals-which I had not contemplated at all. I felt that I had to. consider what I had to do. Consequently I withdrew with my. mind full of foreboding as'to the success of my mission." After his exchange of letters for the purpose of clarifying the position, Mr. Chamberlain visited the Chancellor to say good-bye and remained for over three hours with him. He received a memorandum of Herr Hitler's final proposals and a map for transmission to Prague.

"For the first time in the memoranda I found new proposals," he said, "and I spoke very frankly. I dwelt ■With all the emphasis at my command upon the risks which would be incurred by insisting on such terms. I declare* that the language and the manner of the document, which I described as an ultimatum rather than 3, memorandum, would profoundly shock public opinion in neutral countries, and I bitterly reproached the Chancellor on his failure to respond in any way to,the efforts which I had made to secure peace.

"In spite of these frank words, the conversation was-carried on on more friendly terms than at that which preceded it. I think I should add that before saying farewell to Herr Hitler I had a few words with him in private which I do not think are without importance. In the first place he repeated to me with great earnestness what he had already said at Berchtesgaden, namely, that this was the last of his

The parts of the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons which were sent earlier were preceded by a recital of events in connection with the Sudeten question from July onwards, leading up to the situation today, which Mr. Chamberlain described as one with no parallel since 1914.

territorial ambitions in Europe and that he had no wish to have in the Reich people of other races than Germans. "In the second place, he said again very earnestly x that he wanted to be friends with England, and that if only this Sudeten question could be got out of the way he would gladly resume the conversations." THE FINAL CHAPTER. The memorandum was communicated to Czechoslovakia and decisively rejected. The French Ministers came. to London. Finally, Mr. Chamberlain revealed that in the course of the conversations between the French and British Ministers the latter informed the British that if Czechoslovakia were attacked France would fulfil her treaty obligations. "In reply," said the Prime Minister, "we said that if as a result of these obligations the French forces became actively engaged we should be -pledged to support them." This announcement was received with cheers, and led on to the description of the Prime Minister's final bid for peace, resulting in the invitation for the four-Power talks at Munich.