RUNCIMAN MISLED

Evening Post, Volume CXXVI, Issue 77, 28 September 1938, Page 10

RUNCIMAN MISLED

HENLEIN'S DECEIT

THE SHOCK OF NUREMBERG

RAGES OF HITLER

In the following article, a diplomatic correspondent of the "Sydney Morning Herald" explains how Lord Runciman, in Prague, and the British Government, relying on assurances from Herr Henlein that a negotiated settlement, and not an imposed secession of territory.- was the Sudeten policy, advocated further concessions by the Czech Government, and were j rudely undeceived by Herr Hitler's 'speech at Nuremberg. I Recently it was reported that the British Government had, without consulting Lord Runciman, instructed its representative at Prague, Mr. Newton, to call on the President of Czechslovakia and suggest new concessions to the Sudeten Germans. ! The extraordinary step which Mr. Newton took with Benes was, in fact, caused by Lord Runciman himself. It appears that Lord Runciman believed that Hitler did not seriously consider armed intervention, and that he would be satisfied with concessions, provided that Prague went far enough. Herr Hitler's speech at Nuremberg shocked him; he had believed the repeated assurances by Herr Henlein that he neither desired a plebiscite nor the uniting of the Sudeten German dis--1 tricts with Germany, and that Hitler agreed with him on these points. HENLEIN'S ASSURANCES. I In his conversation with the diplomats of other countries in Prague, Lord Runciman disclosed that he considered Henlein moderate, intelligent, and even sympathetic. The leader of the Sudetens had assured him that he would do what was in his power to make his difficult task easier. Probably, for that reason, Lord Runciman urged Herr Henlein to see Herr Hitler prior to the party day at Nuremberg. Herr Henlein returned beaming from Berchtesgaden, and said that he had expected a bad quarter-hour with Herr Hitler because of his own moderation and conciliatory attitude, but that, to the contrary, Herr Hitler had approved the continuation of negotiations for a solution for the difficulties within the frame of the Czechoslovakian State. To stimulate this march of events the British Government, informed of the position by Lord Runciman, instructed its Minister at Prague to take the step of urging new concessions upon President Benes. The greater, therefore, was the disappointment in London by the immoderate rudeness with which Hitler expressed himself at Nuremberg about the head of the Czechoslovakian State, and at the way in which he intentionally ignored all the concessions which Prague has granted already. Lord Runciman now asks himself whether Herr Henlein did not deceive him and his assistants. Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin, Lord Runciman's most important assistant, had also, and quite in good faith, assured the British Foreign Secretary that the Sudetens and their leaders, Herr Henlein and Herr Kundt, did not intend to demand a plebiscite or union with Germany. ASSUMPTIONS SWEPT AWAY. It appears to have been : understood, that Herr Henlein demanded only real autonomy • within the borders of | Czechoslovakia, agd, in respect to the foreign policy, an open break with Russia. The fact that the Sudetens were preparing for a3congress on Oc-; tober 6 was also considered by the British negotiators as evidence that they did not intend breaking off negotiations with Prague. All these assumptions were swept away by HenHitler's speech and the ultimatum of the Sudetens to Prague. London and Paris consequently began asking, more anxiously than ever before, what Hitler is really aiming at. The information which has been received during the last few weeks in the highest civil and military quarters firmly supports those who believe the dispute will lead to violence. Advice of caution to Herr Hitler only causes him to break out in a violent rage. Even General Balbo had to weather a storm when he made it clear, on behalf of the Italian Government during his recent conversation with Hitler, that Italy did not cherish the i idea of being drawn into a war in which it would have to face England. The warnings of Dr. Schacht, and those of leading German bankers — warnings which, perhaps, have not reached the ears of the leader at all, because the extreme elements of the Nazi Party favour a strategic isolation of Herr Hitler —have had no influence whatever. That great alarm, in view of a possible war, is felt in the German Navy does not concern the Fuhrer. Even the unequivocal warnings from the corps of senior army and navy officers have met with no response, although they have, perhaps, contributed to the delay. The results of the breaking out of a .war are feared nowhere more than in the quarters of the General Staff. But, woe to the officer who should dare to express such feelings. FUHRER AND HIS GENERALS. It is related in Berlin and Munich that recently, at Juterborg, a serious dispute arose between Herr Hitler and a few of his generals. This incident, which is kept secret in Germany, caused the rumour that the Chief of the General Staff (General Beck) had handed in his resignation, but this has been denied. General Beck proceeded on a tour of inspection to the eastern frontier, but it is assumed in wellinformed quarters in Berlin and Munich that things have passed which show that there are great differences of opinion respecting the military and political problems between the Fuhrer and a part of the General Staff. Herr Hitler has, in fact, considered it opportune to deliver on the military grounds at Juterborg a speech to his generals, the contents of which were roughly as follows:—"Had I listened to you, gentlemen, general conscription would, perhaps, not yet have been introduced; we should probably not have marched into the Rhineland, and we should certainly not have united Austria to the Fatherland. You have spoken repeatedly to me of unsurmountable difficulties, it has been repeated again and again that France and England would hit back. But who has been found to have been right, without a single exception? I. I only. In any case, I wish to declare emphatically and unequivocally that I, only I, shall decide about war or peace."

To show that he is, in fact, the supreme commander of the army, he ordered immediately after these discussions at Juterborg, a number of new military measures. Inter alia, he concentrated a great number of regiments near the French-German border in the Saar district, which, of all other measures, made the greatest impression in Paris and London.