DRIVE BY FRANCO

Evening Post, Volume CXXV, Issue 131, 6 June 1938, Page 3

DRIVE BY FRANCO

THE EVENTS BEHIND IT

LOYALIST RECKLESSNESS

TERUEL INFLUENCE

To understand the military situation in Spain as it is today one must understand what it was at the opening of the conflict, for wars like plants grow out of seeds and each separate kind varies in its creative powers (wrote Major-General J. F. C. Fuller in the "Chicago Tribune" on March 19). So far as war is concerned, these seeds are represented by opposing political policies and ■ once they have developed into plants their fruit is represented by opposing strategies which, in this war, have been poles apart.

On one side stands General Francisco Franco, the rebel leader, whose policy is largely Falangist (National Syndicalist rather than Fascist or National Socialist), and on the other is an opponent whose policy is internationalist and therefore multiform in thought and action. . Now, to understand the strategies which have been developed from these policies it is essential to grasp, this fact: Falangism, like the kindred political creeds of Germany and Italy, finds its origin in four great lessons from the World War, namely the increasing necessity for political authority, national discipline, economic selfsufficiency, and the use of scientific weapons in war. While Franco has built on these from the very start, his opponents (the Loyalists) have, instead, built on the theories of social revolution which strike at authority and and render economics chaotic through lectivisation, etc., and by committee command emasculate the weapon oi power. True, they are realising their mistake today, but such a bungle has sprouted out of the mixed seeds they are sowing that before they can sow a different crop they must first clear it away. In short, they have got to reverse their strategy, an almost impossible task during a war. FRANCO'S THREE PROBLEMS. While they have been fostering social revolution, rather than getting on with the war, Franco has been faced by three major problems. They were:— First.—How to raise, equip, and train an army. Second.—How to hold the main eastern front while he reduced the subsidiary northern front—the Biscay provinces. . Three.—Once he had organised an army and cleared that front, how to reduce the eastern front, and so win the war. M , As regards the first, of these problems, the early foreign support he received was invaluable, for it enabled him to gain time wherein to create an army. From the start he realised though that hastily raised levies are well capable of holding trenches and fighting behind walls, but thfey are incapable of assuming the offensive until they are highly trained and efficiently led and equipped. True, enthusiasm is a great asset, yet it does not enable a general to manoeuvre and like soda water—unless it Is well corked by discipline—it is apt to grow flat rapidly. When I first visited Nationalist (rebel) Spain last March I saw this army in formation, when I did so again in October I found it formed. With this army Franco reduced the Basque Asturian front, and then at length his main task confronted him. . That he had to launch an attack on the Aragon (eastern) front was obvious, but where? In order to answer this question on my last visit I travelled afong that front from Huesca north of Saragossa to Teruel. And having done so I came to the conclusion that an attack down the Ebro River, either north or south, afforded the best chance. Incidentally I found the defences of Teruel insignificant. Yet at the time it struck me most forcibly that if the Repoblicans. (loyalists) had pulled themselves together as one heard they were doing under the direction of Indalecio Prieto their Defence Minister, and were .they to put up a strong defensive in the Ebro Valley the advance of Franco was not likely to be a. rapid one. ' .

FRANCO AWAITED ATTACK. Then, asfrequently happens in war, the unexpected took place. As in Ethiopia just two years ago when-the Negus delivered his army into the hands of Marshal Badoglio, so December last the Republican higher command delivered Prieto's army into the hands of General Franco. Why and how? Because one thing _ he wanted was to be attacked and above all not in the "Ebro Valley, where he was going to attack yet notso to away from it that he would be compelled to shift troops a great distance For this attack no place _ could be more suitable to him than in Teruel, which was not of strategic value _ and which was less than J'H Saragossa, the advanced base of his Ebro .operations, and which was linked to Teruel by good railway and a first-class road. Why then did the Republicans launch their attack upon Teruel. First, because the economic collapse due to sovietisation and, collectivisation was threatening them in the rea . i Second, something had to be done if only to moralise their cause. Third, Teruel obviously was an easy objective to attack, being the tip of a salient lightly held and indifferently en What he the Republican command could not and' did not see was this. That the worm on Franco s hook was the obvious Ebro offensive. -I do not suggest Franco had planned it such. He may have, yet I know nothing of this. Nevertheless,, once the attack on Teruel was launched, he, being an ardent Catholic. must have seen in it the finger of God, for it was in every aspect a suicidal I operation. At length /he could pulverise his enemy, throw in his reI serves, and so clear the ground for his own attack down the Ebro. OFFENSIVE TOO COSTLY. - According to the "Journal" of January 28, a member of Senor Prieto s entourage spoke, to its correspondent as follows: "This Teruel business is too I costlv. We used our best shock troops there and abundant material. We have suffered considerable losses, 18,000 wounded and nearly 14,000 killed. Our international' troops have been decimated. The Fascists dispute the field with unheard of stubbornness,, If we had to fight like this to recover all the revolted territory we shouldnt have a single man left half-way through the campaign." . Thus it came about that, it was this act of suicidal folly, both strategically and tactically so, which opened the sluice gates for the Ebro offensive and now the Nationalist stream- pouring eastward. Attacking from a base of more than seventy miles in width, well protected on the north by the Ebro and on the south by the prestige of Teruel and the hilly region surrounding that shattered city, and pinning his faith on weapon power rather than on numbers, Franco's advance so far has proved an overwhelming success, as it would have done at Guadalajara a year back if he had been able to draw the enemy's reserves before his decisive attack was launched. Will it continue? That depends on

two things—his intentions and the staying power of his enemy. Speaking as a soldier, he should go: just as far i:s he can with-the present attack, and then as resistance stiffens suddenly launch a second attack north of Ebro towards Lerida. For a general, like a boxer —especially so in mototised warfare —wants a right and a left hand punch as well as plenty of space to punch' in. Should he possess the means to do so, the probabilities are the war will end this summer. Finally as to his enemy: His powef of endurance, both economic and moral, does not appear to be high and daily is being lowered by air, bombardments, the aim of which is not to kill people, but to prevent work of all kinds from being carried out in such great power centres as Barcelona. That the Republican economic conditions are bad may be judged from the fact that when a few days back the Nationalists advanced into the fertile lowlands of the Aragon they found vines run wild dnd fruit treei not pruned. There were signs of neglect everywhere. That the Republican-moral solidarity is in an even worse state is illustrated by the fact that only a few days ago the Government in Barcelona called up fresh classes of conscripts and 100,000 men to construct "adequate fortifications and air raid refuges" and is now requisitioning every type of vehicle for the transportation of troops. Why were all these things not done eighteen months ago? Because the Government was so busy. winning the social revolution that it had no time left for winning the war. Now it is pleading for French assistance, and should the French step in, what shall we see? The chances are another European war. So I think I can conclude this survey *>y saying that whatever the military situation in Spain may be to General Franco and Senor Prieto, to the rest of the world it is a highly perturbing one and, above all, not one to take sides in. .. : .