A BIG WIN—WHAT TO DO WITH IT!

Evening Post, Volume CXXV, Issue 36, 12 February 1938, Page 8

A BIG WIN—WHAT TO DO WITH IT!

Measured in terms of command of communications, the Japanese advance in China has been rapid and victorious. Not only does Japan command the sea and the coastal shipping; she also commands most of the railways. "The only trunk i lines that remain in Chinese possession, intact, are the Lung-hai and Canton-Hankow railways," writes Mr. H. G. W. Woodhcad in the "Sydney Morning Herald," "and these are frequently interrupted by bombing." But Mr. Woodhead adds I that while Japan, by astounding victories, is strategically in control of vast areas of China, the Japanese effectively occupy only a fraction. They have all they can manage in holding the lines of communication, and have no means of organising productively the strategically controlled areas, or even of organising them at .all. If China, after the Japanese forces have advanced rapidly through it, were to organise itself happily behind them in smiling production under local pro-Japanese administrations and carry on "business as usual," conquering China might be a simple matter. But it docs not seem to be working out that way. The Japanese armies are surrounded by Chinese chaos and unlimited suffering. Chaos and suffering bring the Japanese no benefit, except to the extent that they may be breaking the Chinese spirit, and paving the way for what Tokio hopes will be an unconditional surrender.

So long as the industrial life of whole districts remains dissolved in anarchy, Mr. Woodhead can see little advantage to Japan in occupying deserted cities and villages.

Conditions akin to anarchy prevail over enormous areas in North and mid China. In North China, as in Kiangsu, the newly organised Provisional Governments have been powerless to function outside 'the occupied areas. The unfortunate inhabitants, driven out from city and hamlet by a combination of looting and burning by Chinese soldiery and bombing by Japanese aircraft, are wandering over the countryside in countless numbers, terror-stricken, starving, and desperate. It is not surprising in these circumstances that law and order have completely broken down, and that the country has become a prey to armed bandits and remnants of defeated Chinese armies. The task of restoring order is beyond Japan's capacity while military operations continue. On this showing, a continuance of the war for two years,, as has been suggested, would be a tremendous drain on the ability of the Chinese to suffer and on the ability of the Japanese to finance a position that is militarily brilliant but economically a wash-out; Where productive life has ceased, the Japanese, according to this evidence, are powerless to restore it. Apparently the only way to restore it is to offer China peace terms that the Chinese Government can accept. Even military helplessness might not assure China's submission unconditionally. It seems' that the soldier has done his worst; the resources of strategy are unable to impose a finish; and some kind of compromise must be the way out from a situation mutually intolerable.