A BIGGER NAVY

Evening Post, Volume CXXV, Issue 20, 25 January 1938, Page 9

A BIGGER NAVY

AMERICANS MOVING

ANSWER TO THE JAPANESE

PRESERVING MARGIN

A decision to increase next year's naval construction programme as the first step in a general programme of American re-armament at a faster tempo than during the past five years has been reached by the Administration (wrote the Washington correspondent of the "Christian Science Monitor" on December 22). Admiral Villiam Leahy, chief of naval operalions, was summoned to the White House and the White House secretariat stated that the purpose was discussion of naval construction plans.

1 The information confirms dispatches published in the "Christian Science .Monitor" beginning on December 17. Formal announcement is expected the first of the year. Whether it will be accompanied by immediate steps to increase the material efficiency of the navy to implement diplomatic policy towards Japan and whether the army will share in bigger arms budgets is not known. But both these other features of re-armament are known to be under consideration in high quarters.

The decision to increase next year's programme has been reached subsequent to the sinking of the Panay. Previous to that incident on December 12 the 'Bureau of the Budget had approved the following programme: Two battleships, two light cruisers, eight destroyers, six submarines, four auxiliaries.

. This original programme is now being considered by the House appropriations committee. It is in keeping with the regular naval construction programme which was adopted under the Vinson-Trammell Act and which had as its objective the achievement by 1941 of a fleet at the limit of the expired Washington and London Naval Treaties.

NEAR TREATY LIMITS.

. It is not certain as yet whether the increase in this programme will be designed merely to speed the date of completion' of a full.treaty navy or whether it. will mark the first deviation from this policy which has been the controlling factor in American naval plans throughout the Roosevelt Administration. Indications are that the latter is the case since the treaty limit has already been reached in two important categories—aircraftcarriers and heavy cruisers—and the two light cruisers contemplated in next year's regular programme would ail that' category also.

Particular emphasis is laid in naval quarters on the importance of increas-i ing America's aircraft-carrier fleet. The navy now has six such ships of which two—the Wasp and Enterprise—are still under construction. The total is 135,000 tons, which is the treaty limit. Britain has eleven—six built and five building—totalling 229,350 tons, an excess of 94,350 tons over the treaty limit. Japan officially has six carriers, four complete and two building, amounting to 88,470 tons, or 7470 tons in excess of Japan's treaty limit More important, it is believed here, is that Japan has more carriers, not officially reported, under construction.

Also, the navy experts feel that the existing cruiser fleet of 37 ships is inadequate. Britain's cruiser objective has been increased to 70. The United States Navy.hopes to have 50. The existing fleet consists of 18 heavy cruisers mounting eight-inch guns and 19 light cruisers armed with six-inch guns.

ELEVEN MORE CRUISERS,

The two more light cruisers in next years' programme are theoretically replacements, but it appears likely that when, completed the two oldest light cruisers which they should replace would be retained, bringing the total to 39. Between that figure and 50 is a gap of 11 which naval opinion generally would like to fill in with the new programme.

''Other factors than the Panay■ Inci: dent are behind the new expansion decision. While this incident has provided the impetus necessary to overcome final resistance to the increase, the other considerations had moved it within striking distance, of official White House approval previously. Important among these other factors was the recent, publication in the "Giornale d'ltalia" in Rome of what purported to be the current new Japanese naval construction programme. In itself this might not have commanded general credence. But it tended in almost all respects to confirm what previous information American sources had gathered regarding the Japanese programme. The fact that it was published in a semi-official Italian newspaper following Italian adherence to the anti-Comintern Pact previously enr tered into by Japan and Germany was considered significant.

-This combination of circumstances led to the conclusion that Japan actually has under construction today a total of 294,640 tons of new naval ships beyond what was officially known and reported at the end of 1936. This would give Japan a total fleet, built and building, of 1,119,000 tons as compared with the total current American fleet, built and building, of 1,418,895.

A NARROWER MARGIN

While this leaves the United States still with a margin of superiority, it is a far narrower margin than that represented by the old 5-3 ratio of the naval treaty period and it is a margin narrower than is considered adequate by the navy, particularly since the proportion of modern ships in the Japanese navy would be much higher on completion of the two programmes.

Of more specific concern is the fact that, according to this information, the new Japanese programme includes three super-battleships of 46,000 tons mounting 12 big 16-inch guns each. The largest ships in the American Navy.are rated officially at 33,000 tons and mount only nine of the 16-inch guns. The two new battleships now under construction, the North Carolina and Washington, conform to the quantitative limits of the new London naval treaty of 35,000 tons. Ships of the larger 46,000-ton size are definitely aggressive weapons capable of operating at long distances from their bases and their adoption by the Japanese navy is, if true, a departure from the previous emphasis in new Japanese construction on smaller types of less long-range effectiveness.

Whether the United States will, in the new programme, accept this assumed Japanese challenge and depart from the 35,000 limit is not yet certain. Navy opinion is pushing strongly in this direction. At the time of the Washington Naval Conference which followed the World War the United States had 15 , capita] ships of 45,000 tons under construction. All were scrapped under the. treaty with the exception of two which were converted into the aircraft carriers Lexington and Saratoga. But it is felt in naval quarters that it would be impossible to answer the Japanese challenge without departing from the treaty limit.

INTEREST THEEATENED,

Another factor which has generally afTected. the decision to step up Ihe tempo of American naval construction is the general unsettled condition of the world which is increasingly threatening to American interests. The recent development of Fascist movements in Latin America has revived the longforgotten early nineteenth century threat of the holy alliance to- South

America. . Despite the generalisation of the Monroe Doctrine at the Buenos Aires conference it is clear that American diplomacy would no more tolerate German or Italian colonial ambitions in South America now than it did when the Monroe Doctrine was first drafted to meet similar inclinations. .

The feeling is growing that since in the world of today force appears to be necessary to make diplomacy effective, the United States should have the force necessary to defend itself simultaneously against any hostile move from Japan in the Pacific and against any disposition to challenge the Monroe Doctrine in the Atlantic by Japan's current European friends, Germany and Italy. If the new construction programme is drafted with an eye to any such possibility as, this, it is certain to involve an early departure from the standard of 15 battleships fixed in the old naval treaties.

So far as official Japanese information is concerned, that nation's new naval construction consists of two small aircraft carriers, four light cruisers, 14 destroyers, and three submarines. The unofficial information which is increasingly believed in official quarters here is that since January 1, 1937, Japan has laid down in addition three super-battleships, seven light cruisers, eight submarines, 43 destroyers, and five aircraft tenders.

WITHIN TREATY PROVISIONS

The United States could meet this challenge in battleships, destroyers, and submarines without departing from the quantitative limits of the expired naval treaties or the limits of the Vinson-Trammell Act. Under the original 20-year-age limit for battleships replacements, 13 of the existing 15 could now be laid down, while under the 26-year-age limit (not legally binding) of the new naval treaty, seven could be under construction now.

In under-age destroyers, the United States is still 60,000 tons short of the Vinson-Trammell limit, and it could lay down 22,600 tons of submarines without exceeding the same limits.

What is left still uncertain by the disclosure of the decision to increase next year's naval construction programme is the immediate question of improving the material preparedness of the existing fleet and a pending army programme for mechanisation which is urgently desired by the War Department. From the point of view of immediate implementation of Far Eastern policy arising from the Panay incident both Navy and State Departments considered that the most effective and significant step which could be taken would be to put the navy more nearly on a war footing than it is at present.

The possibility is accepted in informed quarters that steps to this effect are being taken, but that they are being kept secret for the time being to avoid excessive alarm at home or undue provocation to Japan.

Army mechanisation has been progressing gradually for the past three years. Its immediate limited objective is the outfitting of the standing army and the national guard with modern equipment nt a cost, of approximately 300,000,000 dollars (£60,000,000),,