Evening Post. MONDAY, JANUARY 10, 1938. EXHAUSTED APOLOGETICS

Evening Post, Volume CXXV, Issue 7, 10 January 1938, Page 8

Evening Post. MONDAY, JANUARY 10, 1938. EXHAUSTED APOLOGETICS

Before Japan appealed to the sword, die principal sin of the Chinese Government, in Japanese eyes, was its inability to have its orders carried out. The Japanese complained that provincial ami local leaders in China followed thejr own courses; therefore, Japan could not rely on the undertakings of the l Chinese. (Nanking) Government; | therefore, Japan would make (and did make) local ■ agreements with local Chinese (example, the HopeiChahar Political Council) in belittlement of the Nanking Government's sovereignty. Now that the boot is on the other foot—Tokio's orders being non-effective in the Japanese theatre of war—-should Japan be given a dose of her own medicine? Logically, the Japanese1 local commander who—against Tokio's orders—attacks the sol-j diery, police, and civilians of third Powers is in a position similar to that of an apparently undisciplined Chinese provincial leader. The list "<" Tokio apologies speaks for itself. Doi> not Tokio confess the very sin with which it charged the Nanking Government—inability to execute its own orders? And if there he a presumption that Nanking sometimes used the provincial Chinese General as a stalking-horse—to play a game that Nanking favoured, but disavowed—is not such a presumption equally applicable to Tokio? Tokio has apologised time and again, but British and American tails continue to be twisted.

To speak about giving Japan a dose of her own medicine is not to suggest that third Powers or their representatives will make "local settlements" with Japanese leaders in the field. That would be like appealing to the tiger when the tigertrainer cannot or will not use the whip. The parallel between the apparent helplessness of the Nanking Government before the invasion and the, apparent helplessness of the Tokio Government today to control Japanese acts in the field breaks down when it comes to any matter of "local settlements." Nothing illustrates more clearly the difference between national unity as it exists in China and national unity as it exists in Japan than the fact that there are Chinese, who .arc ever willing to compromise with the enemy, while the set: purpose of the Japanese soldier is to die for Japan —and in some cases, judging by the Panay incident, to lie for Japan. Protests lodged by .military commanders on the spot are routine and have their value, but if the frictions in the field are to be settled peaceably at all, it is through Tokio that the settlement must come. But how? If "incidents" like the new violence at Shanghai occur and recur, and if Tokio's control of disciplined armies produces no more results than Nanking's control of undisciplined provincial Chinese forces, in what way can third Powers secure the relief that Tokio itself sought by invading China? In the current issue of the "Round Table," in an article on "The Mind of Japan," appears the following:

For international purposes, Japan is unanimous; and it is a corollary to this proposition that any hint of outside criticism, not to speak of pressure or intervention, tends to make the Japanese sink their differences and close their ranks. This is an important point to bear in mind when considering what steps may be usefully taken by any country that wishes to see the Sirio-Japanese dispute brought to a speedy end. Sympathetic criticisms may in the long run have some effect, but moral condemnation and halfhearted threats of pressure or inters vention are not merely useless but positively harmful.

Obviously, the above was written before the sinking of the American gunboat Panay; and possibly before the wounding of the British Ambassador. What the writer has in mind is what attitude would serve a third Power offerings its good offices to shorten the Sino-Japanese dispute. Events have now passed far beyond that point. Two of the third Powers are now more immediately concerned with shielding their forces from the next Japanese blow than with reconciling a Tokio Government (whose orders are riot heard by Japanese commanders in China) with a

Nanking Government whose orders have never been heard by millions of outlying Chinese. Reconciliation of Tokio and Nanking is still the major purpose to be aimed at by diplomacy. But meanwhile the fighting and the military and police administrations in the, war zones are continually throwing up incidents too urgent to be pigeon-holed pending the ultimate general peace. So long as the "Daily Mail" continues to have ground for stating that "there seems to be little connection between the orders of Tokio and the acts of its armed forces," the | danger of some field incident "touching off" an explosion between Japan and a third Power will be much more imminent than the wished-for cessai lion of Sino-Japanese hostilities. This is not a comfortable situation. Threats of pressure, economic or otherwise, will, in the opinion of the "Round Table" writer, draw the Japanese people together, and will reduce the |power of the Japanese minority who 'consider the invasion ol China an

economic blunder, and who favour careful treatment of foreigners in China. Care must be taken not to make a bad situation worse. Yel it has to be admitted that the resources of the art of apologetics seem to be exhausted. In Shanghai and along the Yangtze-kiang are scores of Japanese military despots each of whom has in his control a machine that can precipitate a wider war. It is not comforting to think that in the hands of such lies to a large extent our prospect of a happy New Year.