JAPAN'S GAMBLE

Evening Post, Volume cxxiv, Issue 148, 20 December 1937, Page 18

JAPAN'S GAMBLE

THE STAKES IN CHINA

PLANS FOR AFTER THE WAR

A CHANGED ASIA

The stakes for which Japan is playing on the mainland of Asia are steadily increasing, writes the Tokio correspondent of the "Manchester Guardian." As the scope of the conflict with China has widened both the rewards of victory and the penalties of failure loom larger.

This conflict has already passed through three distinct phases. From the first firing at Lukouchiao on July 7 until the forcible occupation of the Peking-Tientsin area in the last week of July foreign diplomats and Japanese of moderate views hoped against hope that the whole affair might be only an unusually severe local "incident," capable of adjustment without serious fighting. Until fighting set in ground Shanghai in mid-August there was still the possibility that the undeclared war might be. on a limited scale, restricted to North China. Now all such illusions must be discarded. Japan and China are engaged in a major test of national power., The humpty-dumpty equilibrium in the Far East, •. always precarious, has broken down and can never be restored in its original form. BALANCE OF POWER. The balance of power set up in the Far East by the Washington political and naval treaties of 1922 was upset by the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931, which was more recently followed by Japan's repudiation of naval limitation on the basis which had been accepted at Washington. Up to July it had seemed that a new balance of power, based not on paper treaties but on new elements of national strength in the Orient, was coming into being. Japanese aggressive expansion had evoked counterforces—a growing sense of Chinese national unity, an impressive concentration of Soviet military and air power in Eastern Siberia, the acceleration of the mighty Singapore naval base and the sweeping British programme of naval construction. These counter-forces have not, however, proved' strong enough to restrain Japan's military leaders from embarking on what is in fact, if not in name, a major war of conquest which is likely to make some striking changes in the map of Asia. British preoccupations nearer home and the internal demoralisation in the Soviet Union which is reflected in the last year's extraordinary crop of executions, arrests, and demotions in the higher ranks of the Soviet bureaucracy and the Eed Army seem to assure Japan against intervention from either of these sources. The United States' passive mood in regard to foreign adventures is reflected in the decision to withdraw from the Philippines within the next decade and in the Neutrality Act which waives in advance many of the traditional neutral rights, the assertion of which led to American participation in the World War. JAPANESE HOPES. As for China, Japanese military men are confident of their ability to smash its military power within a few months provided there is no outside intervention or extensive foreign military aid to China. What does Japan expect to gain from the largest and most' expensive military enterprise in which it has engaged since the RussoJapanese ,War of 1904-05? . A seasoned Japanese publicist recently summarised to me the optimistic view of the course and results of the present conflict in the following way:— Within six months the Nanking Government will see itself so completely defeated on all fronts that it will face "the alternative of losing all power and witnessing the dissolution of China into several separate regimes or coming to an agreement with us. I am confident some Chinese statesmen, at least, will prefer the second alternative. While the costs of the campaign are heavy, part of the expenses of occupation will be paid by the Chinese. A peaceful and friendly local administration in North China offers us several advantages. There will be no further sabotage of our schemes of economic development in that region. Within a decade, if not sooner, North China can make us much more independent of America and British India as regards our supply of cotton. . . . A development of the transportation system in North China and exploitation .of coal and iron resources by modern methods will supplement the continental heavy industry which is already being built up in Manchukuo. If; is also an Important consideration that our left flank against the Soviet Union will be vastly strengthened by the change of regime.in North China ajid the possible emergence of a friendly autonomous Mongolian State. HIGHER AMBITIONS. An ebullient Japanese diplomat, Mr. Toshio Shiratori, former Minister to Sweden, .recently set forth a still more ambitious plan—namely, China's total disarmament, with Japan altruistically assuming the burden of "defending the country." Mr. Shiratori's arguments on behalf of his scheme are almost as strange and naive as the idea itself. As he wrote in the magazine "Diamond":— To speak of a greater ideal, I would like to suggest that China abolish all the armaments throughout the country and entrust Japan with the maintenance of peace and order. ... It is my belief that, if left in charge of Japan, China will certainly find herself more strongly defended than otherwise. She is in danger of being beaten by Japan only when she maintains troops, but Japan will have nothing to beat if China has no troops. For China it is dangerous to keep troops, and it is safe to give up armaments. Along with these extravagant hopes of turning China north of the Yellow River into a second Manchukuo and reducing the remainder of the country to complete subservience, there are apprehensions which beset the consciousness of sober and realistic Japanese, even in the present atmosphere of flag-waving salutes to departing conscripts, loud "banzais" at every railway station, wholesale contributions to the army and navy, and general militant patriotism. The wounding ' of the British Ambassador to China by a machine-gun bullet from a Japanese aeroplane, the shell of unknown origin that struck the American flagship Augusta, causing one death and a number of injuries, the raid on the Soviet Consulate in Tientsin are examples of the kind of war-time "incidents" that may lead to friction with foreign Powers. DANGER IS GROWING. The danger of such occurrences increases in proportion to the scope and duration of the struggle. ■ The problem of preventing war supplies from reaching China without either declaring a formal blockade, and thereby inviting the application of the American Neu-

trality Act, or becoming involved in disputes with foreign Powers over searches of their vessels is likely to become increasingly perplexing.

Moreover, it is by no means certain either that Nanking will submit or that its submission would mean an end of Chinese resistance. "Asahi," a leading Tokio newspaper, in a recent leader rather gloomily noted the possibility that the soldiers of the defeated ! Chinese armies might become "Communist bandits." The sequel to a short and spectacular organised military drive against the weaker Chinese forces may be a protracted, wearing, neverending struggle with elusive guerrilla bands.

Finally, Japan's economic and financial position is not favourable to a sustained large-scale war. The appropriations for hostilities which began only a few weeks ago almost equal the whole Budget for the fiscal year, a Budget which was, incidentally, badly out of balance before the fighting began. What is still more serious is the paucity of reserves in gold and foreign exchange. The present Japanese gold reserve is about £100,000,000 sterling. While this is probably sufficient to cover the special purchases abroad and the more unfavourable trade balance which are necessary results of the present conflict, it would be highly risky to dissipate all or even a large part of the reserve when a much more serious war with Russia may be the sequel to the present operations in China. For, while a great extension of the frontier contiguous with the Soviet Union and its dependency, Outer Mongolia, may spell security to the military mind, it greatly increases the possibility of border friction, of which there has already been so much along the SiberianManchukuo frontier.