THE MEDITERRANEAN

Evening Post, Volume CXXIV, Issue 108, 3 November 1937, Page 32

THE MEDITERRANEAN

BRITAIN AND ITALY

PROBLEM OF RELATIONS

To achieve any lasting improvement in Anglo-Italian relations it is necessary for the two Governments to face the main question which divides their countries and to solve it, writes Paul Cremona from Rome to the "Christian Science Monitor." To solve the issues of British recognition of Italy's conquest of Ethiopia, formal assurances from Italy that she will respect the territorial status of Spain, reaffirmation by both Britain and Italy of the "Gentlemen's Agreement" concerning the Mediterranean is not sufficient to restore Anglo-Italian friendship. These are mere obstacles which have to be removed if a permanent understanding is to be reached between Rome and London, but there are other more serious problems that have to be settled if amity is to be re-establish-ed between the two Powers. The question is: Who is to be supreme in the Mediterranean? . Can this supremacy be held by two Powers?

There has been a tendency an' both Italian and British political quarters to over-emphasise the importance of the exchange of friendly assurance between Premier Chamberlain and Premier Mussolini. These were undoubtedly significant, for they have helped to clear the Anglo-Italian atmosphere! which was thick with suspicion and ] propaganda. A prominent Fascist! statesman recently told me Britain believed that Italy was preparing'an attack on her, while Italy believed that Britain was feverishly arming herself to attack Italy. These mutual suspicions have how apparently been removed. LIGHT ON SITUATION. Interesting light on the problem of Anglo-Italian relations as seen in this country is thrown in an article which appeared in "RelazionMnternazionali," organ of the Milan Institute of International Political Studies. Anglo-Italian relations, it says, have now entered their conclusive and decisive phase and have assumed the aspect of a historical problem which must be resolved. The time has arrived to determine definitely whether In the present century it is possible for Britain and Italy to collaborate or hot. If they) fail to do: so, the consequences would be obvious. There would then be established between the two countries relations, of a purely formal nature, with ups and downs, until the time when, for reasons accidental or desired, the situation would degenerate into a "bloody and useless war." As regards this "real and existent possibility" the writer of the article holds that the British affirmation that British re-armament -represents a practical contribution to. present and future world peace is "one of the most formidable paradoxes which a country nas ever sustained." The more States arm and the more thay approach the realisation of their programme, the more in the diplomatic discussions for the pacific regulation of their respective relations there will be manifest an Intransigence and rigidity directly proportionate to their own military capacity for offence and defence. "British re-armament," the writer adds, "particularly that part which regards the' Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and taking into consideration the British alliance with Egypt and Irak and the projected partition of Palestine, far from being a coefficient for peace is for Italy a factor for war. Furthermore, British re-armament differs from the Italian in that the former in spite of its being defined defensive, is for all practical purposes effectively and substantially aggressive." COULD ENCIRCLE ITALY. It should be remembered that Britain alone could encircle Italy in the Mediterraneaan with the passive collaboration of one of her satellites in that sea. Consequently, it is maintained here, the importance of the Mediterranean for the vital exigences of the Italian people cannot be compared to the political and economic interest which Britain has in the Mediterranean, however great these may be. Italy now appears to be satisfied thjt the British Prime Minister is showing a greater appreciation of Italian interests in the Mediterranean and is endeavouring to rectify British policy in this direction, but she is not yet entirely convinced Of the good intentions of Britain and she still suspects that the approach to Italy is simply a manoeuvre for gaining time in order to complete the British re-armament programme. Italy is ready to collaborate with Britain to settle their common problems, but she does not want to be misled by "illusions." Italians consider that in order to settle satisfactorily the Anglo-Italian problem it is necessary for Britain to abandon that Innate conviction that in the European problems there are two weights and two measures, according to whether the questions concern the British Isles or the European Continent. "The British find it perfectly normal that their own tranquillity is synonymous with world tranquillity. They accordingly consider it a perfectly justifiable act to make a military alliance with Egypt which enables them to reinforce the entrance to the Suez Canal with several heavily-armed divisions, while at the same time they find that a few guns placed along the Spanish coast are a menace to world peace." No agreement may be lasting if it ia concluded for political exigencies, ahd is-not the result of mutual confidence between the contracting parties.