GUNS AT GIBRALTAR

Evening Post, Volume CXXIV, Issue 62, 10 September 1937, Page 7

GUNS AT GIBRALTAR

INSTALLED BY . GERMANS is

A THREAT TO ITALY?

Tlie massive calm of the Rock of Gibraltar in its exposed and isolated position on the Mediterranean w*; front is not disturbed by reports o! the construction of big-gun erit-sis**'f ments by Spanish insurgents on. rtii sides of the British garrison, writo Anne O'Hare McCormick in the "New York Times." Military observers stationed on the fortified rock at the western entrance of the Mediterranean miss nothing that goes on in their neighbourhood. They know precisely to what extent German experts have aided General Franco's forces in setting up long-range. and anti-aircraft guns on the adjacent coasts, and they have no illusions as to the impregnability against modern weapons of their strategic sentry-box at the gates of Europe.

Nevertheless, the little garrison is calm. To the sound of gunfire lore, aft, and almost amidships, the old-fashioned guard in the old-fashioned barracks performs its daily drills without the flicker of an eyelid. Its nonchalance is equalled only by the apparent indifference of the British Government when a question of the new batteries threatening Gibraltar is raised in Parliament Mr. Eden's response makes it evident that the report neither surprises nor alarms the Cabinet.

BRITISH REASONING.

Constitutionally averse as they are from meeting trouble half-way, this display of phlegm does not mean mere-' ly that the rulers of Britain refuse to worry until there is nothing else to da Bather it signifies a deep-seated conviction that if the Germans are erectting guns to rake the straits, the fire will neither be trained on Gibraltar nor prove of much benefit to Germany. From the beginning of the Spanish conflict the British have based their policy on a single line of reasoning. In crisis after crisis, and particularly in the present impasse, they have feared a complete . breakdown of the flimsy facade of non-interyentionism arid an open free-for-all that would turn a good part of Europe into a larger, and more chaotic Spain. But they have never wavered in the belief that if the war can be kept from spreading the interventionists will' not profit by it. Whichever side wins or loses, the English argue that in the end the exhausted and embittered Spaniards will recognise as friend, ally, and favoured nation , only the Power that has remained" neutral in the fight. .

Another factor in the situation has increasing -weight in. British calculations.' London is perfectly aware'that the-erection of German guns at a strategic point in the Mediterranean is as much Italy's affair 'as England's. That the two latest wars have'centred around the two narrow doors to the Mediterranean is no more a coincidence than'it is that there is repeated at Peking a performance first staged at Mukden. . : •

COLLAPSE OF A SYSTEM

The historian of this decade, of reaction will trace a direct connection between Manchuria,-Ethiopia, Spain, and what is still to develop on the Danube or Dneiper. All signify the collapse of an attempt to organise an international system .on purely nationalist lines.

Neither is it coincidence, although of more immediate significance, that in the recent weeks responsible spokesmen for Great Britain and Italy have been heard saying privately that the two Powers have a paramount interest in common in the Mediterranean. That common interest is to keep the gate» open, and, by inference, to guard them ~ against interlopers. Probably no foundation exists for rumours that Franco is negotiating private loans in London, but: the rumours reflect certain potent realities. One is that the insurgent junta strongly desires to dilute its dependence .on its allies. Another is that these allies neither like nor trust each other. The third is that England is not unwilling to demonstrate to whom it may concern the possible consequences of German penetration in tha Mediterranean area.

The Power this threat most concerns is Italy. When someone recently reminded iMussolini that' German guns opposite Gibraltar were more dangerous to Italy than British guns, he ;ruei fully admitted it. The Rome-Berlin axis was not devised for Spain. It was devised primarily as a. counterweight to the French-British front, arid .secondarily to enable the two dictators to keep a joint watch on the Danube.

ECONOMIC FAILURE,

It evidence were needed to prove that this axis is like the line on which the earth turns, an imaginary line, on which to base other calculations, it is to be found in the failure of the effort / to extend political co-operation into the economic field. A recent visit of an Italian trade delegation to Berlin to translate the agreement into commercial terms was fruitless. The'widelyadvertised German-Italian collaboration in exploiting .the ; resources: of Ethiopia has been so slow in developing that the Italians have almost given up counting on German aid. It is said in Borne that Dr. Schacht has neither released credits for .the, contemplated enterprises in Africa nor evinced any intention of conceding Italy her share in liie Balkan markets.

Since this part of the bargain goes unfulfilled, what confidence has Italy in the other part—that "Germany," as Mussolini, has declared in an interview, "has no ambitions in the Mediterranean"? And how far can Italysponsor another aggressive claimant to a place in "Mare Nostrum"? These questions suggest why the British garrison at Gibraltar is calm as it watches the guns set up at Algeciras and Tarifa. One British officer, far from Gibraltar, remarks that in the end they may serve to point the way 10 a more realistic Italian understanding with En^ land.