SPANISH FIGHTING

Evening Post, Volume CXXIV, Issue 62, 10 September 1937, Page 18

SPANISH FIGHTING

ROLE OF AEROPLANES

EFFECT ON CIVILIANS »

An Englishman who was with the Thaelmann Battalion of the International Brigade in Spain has sent home the following impressions, says the "Manchester Guardian": —

I have moved from the Jarama sector north of the front on the Saragossa main road. Our immediate enemies here are Italian Regulars, whereas in the Jarama sector they were. Moors and Legionaries. .

War takes a long time. It seems indefinitely long that I have been here. A sort of deep-down conviction of the Tightness of our cause, and of the great courage of the Spanish people and their Government, inspires me to the best I can. Without such a conviction I do not believe it is possible for men (unless sub-normal or perverted) to wage war for a long period. In any case the experience of the past week : goes to confirm this. Spain is not Abyssinia, as the Fascists are beginning to learn to their cost. Here we have seen,the collapse and rout of a large force of Italian conscripts. They had been only a few weeks in Spain. They were superbly armed, yet a few days of rain, cold, and artillery fire, then a,strong attack by Spanish troops sent them running. They left behind batteries of artillery, lorries, ammunition, flame-throwers, and very heavy casualties. Prisoners taken by us speak of unrest in Fascist territory and the belief that they were going to be sent to Abyssinia, not Cadiz. " . I

HOLDING THE BRIDGE

They have landed large, numbers here. I arirnot so optimistic as to believe that they are not going to press us harder than they have up to date. The Fascist Powers are sailing too near the wind! Their own populations arc not going to endure enforced hunger and enforced fighting much longer. It is apparently necessary and vital to clean the world of Fascism before Fascism is ready to wage general war. The only way I see to kill Fascism is to stop it at every point from gaining strength from the outside world. To bar by force of arms the Fascist appropriation of, Spain has a great significance to the entire world.. We must not forget that in the present nearwar world situation only a threat of overwhelming force will put a stop to Fascism expansion plans. In Spain we can "hold .the bridge" till that ultimatum is given—if the world is not too long arguing about it. But we can't fight unaided two large European Powers indefinitely. .

We have been having heavy, rain. It is still raining. In. 'the. intervals the aviation has been busy. With, this particular village (unnamed) we have been lucky. About five tons of bombs were dropped, the great majority falling harmlessly in nearby fields. I be : lievea couple of disused agricultural irachines lying there were mistaken for artillery. The modern bomb, of about 2501b. is immensely powerful if you drop it in the" right place. This is apparently so difficult that the Fascists have used big bombs chiefly to try to produce terror among town populations. !,'..

LIMITS OF AIRCRAFT.

On the front we have turned their own guns on the Fascists; and their guns are good. They have suffered great losses. It is interesting that rifles, etc., of 1900 or earlier are still more or less effective, whereas aero-planes-of 1918 would be useless in even this little war. Our aeroplanes are •good. Our pilots seem superior to those of the enemy. In any case our .losses have been about a. quarter of theirs in the last three months. Mr. Baldwin rightly says that bombers will always get through,, but not without losses, especially on the way back. The military • effect. of. one- - raid is limited. Aviation is not so disproportionately more lethal now than it was in 1918 as a military weapon—i.e., as a weapon against objectives other than enemy aeroplanes. The limitations of the efficacy of aeroplanes for bombing are not being overcome -■nearly to thu extent that they are being improved for.fighting each other. This -should mean that in a war where both sides have aeroplanes (as in Spain, in the last' three months) the losses get very large and> the military efficacy remains small. I believe this to be the case— so long as the psychological'effect ;s not taken into account. ■ ■

As a -weapon of civilian and military te'rrdrisation, the bombing plane is very important. But here again it is limited and has one very important aspect. For example, Madrid has been bombed more or less continuously (with recently a gap of three weeks, I believe) for months. The object of the bombing was almost entirely terrorisation. Yet Madrid was not full of crazed people. They were even returning as fast as they were evacuated. On the other, hand, I learn from the correspondent of an , English paper who was in Burgos that Burgos was put to panic by a few raids. If (on top of. this) you can take my word for it that Madrid is solidly loyal and Burgos is far fron. being solidly rebel-Fascist, my meaning, becomes clear, I. hopethat unpopular repressive dictatorships are going to be destroyed by their own pet weapon, that disaffection of their conscripted forces comes from terrorisation, while popular Government forces retain a degree of stoicism.

Anyway, our Air. Force is working well on the subconscious mind of Mussolini's conscripts in Spain. I do noi think that irrational propaganda (as in Nazi and Fascist Italian cases) survives long in the hard school of experience,- especially experience of wart Rational social propaganda seems to me to be an entirely good thing,