BELGIAN DEMAND

Evening Post, Volume CXXIII, Issue 112, 13 May 1937, Page 22

BELGIAN DEMAND

GREATER sicURITY

OLD PACTS, NEW DANGERS

COMMON AGREEMENT

During his three days* visit to London Kin "r Leopold of the Belgians may take the opportunity of explaining to British statesmen"the role which his country desires 'to -play in the future scheme of European affairs, wrote V.: Gordon Lennox, 'diplomatic correspondent of the "Dally Telegraph," in that journal on March 23. He will, I assume, tell them something of Belgian anxieties, her motives in seeking a return to complete independence, her-conception of how this will affect Western European security, • Bnd the practical measures which Belgium hopes to see realised. Just a year has'passed since Germany shook the confidence of the world by marching under cover of darkness into the demilitarised Rhineland zone, and denouncing the Locarno Treaty next day. By that double act the very foundations of Locarno were destroyed- -\ ' 1 Faced with the urgent need for firm aqtion short of punitive war the remaining Locarno signatories—Britain, France, Belgium, and Italy—it will be recalled, made arrangements to reinforce one another's security by, obligations of mutual assistance, whose effectiveness should be ensured by technical preparation between General Staffs. At the same time Germany was invite/1 to translate ' professions of peaceful intention into practical instruments^ of security on lines drawn up in London by tee Four Powers. Unless this "effort,'at conciliation" failed the mutual assistance arrangements were not to be. regarded as established ~-but the technical preparation by Staff Talks was undertaken in London during April. > LITTLE ACHIEVED. So Wgidly were these talks circumscribed that little of direct, practical value was achieved and they were soon ended] But to Belgium' they conveyed an .'interpretation of her signature to the: moribund, Locarno Treaty., har.dly distinguishable from a commitment to enter a defensive alliance with France and Britain against Germany in certain foreseeable circumstances. That is the position from which Belgium now desires to escape, and without much further delay. King Leopold himself '-gave the first clue in laying new defence proposal before his Council of Ministers last' October. It should, he explained, be the aim of Belgium; to place herself outside the conflicts' of her neighbours. The reoccupation; of the Rhineland and the tearing up of Locarpo had thrown her back to her pre-1914 international position. Hei- geographical situation compelled her to maintain a military equipment on a scale,which would dissuade any of her neighbours from borrowing her territory in order to attack another. On that, basis the King of the Belgians asked his people substantially to increase their effort for national defence; and there seems little doubt that on no other 'basis could the great majority of the Belgian people be united to make the sacrifices-' demanded of them. Today Belgium has obligations under two headings: Those under the League Covenant and those under what remains of Locarno, as temporarily maintained in force by, the agreements reached ■■in London on7March 19, 1936. DOES NOT SEEK ESCAPE. From'the. obligations she has in common with every;other.member of the League,lßelgiumdbes not seek to escape. sKe! no" longer places full reliance on League action as a guarantee against violation of small States.' She is deeply interested in thp possible future working of Article 16' of the Covenant, and particularly that portion which requires member States "to afford 'passage through their territory to the forces of any members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League." Belgium todijf would quite certainly maintain that she cannot precisely define" her position under Article 16 in some hypothetical set of circumstances until the League. States themselves have thrashed out and decided what practical applications of the Covenant are practicable.} ; / , Belgium's desire for release from the' remnants of. Locarno can be explained rather'by the changes which, have taken place beyond her frontiers than by a change of the national mind. The rebirth of a highly-armed and aggres-sively-spoken Germany and the implications 'of the' Franco-Soviet Pact, itself a child of' German militarism, have both played, a part. Western Europe had a different aspect in 1926 when little Belgium, lying half across the path between France and Germany, entered the Rhineland Pact of Locarno which imposed upon her substantial obligations. ' Germany then was disarmed; others were to follow suit \as the requirements of national safety permitted. German territory to an average depth of 100 miles east of the Belgian frontier was demilitarised for; all time. Any violation: would' bring' England, France, and Italy hastening to counteraction. ,'t All the world was bent on peace. Locarno was hailed as the latest and greatest single contribution. It is difficult to cbnceive of circumstances more radically (changed. Belgium feels she must, adjust her policy, as best she may, to accord with them, COOLLY RECEIVED. It is riot accurate to pay that she wishes to go back to her.old,neutral- ;- ity. She does riot./ Because, the latest proposal made by Germany to guaran-, tee Belgium's integrity is understood to be accompanied by the proviso that Bhe should accept permanently the obligations of absolute neutrality it bas had a cool reception in Brussels. When in 1839 Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia signed identical treaties with Belgium', and Holland, they recognised Belgium as "an independent and ■ perpetually neutral State." That was the notorious "Scrap of Paper." Belgium todayy has no desire to return to a condition iii which neutrality, is imposed upon her. Apart from the limitation'-of her sovereignty which it would imply, she feels that she lived in a sense of false security during the 75 years which followed 1839, and must not repeat that experience. Her statesmen declare their, determination to provide the country with the best means of defence which it can maintain. They report that their army jj good, their equipment in defensive weapons making satisfactory progress, and their war chest well stocked for so small a Stale.--?.,. They give the most precise assurances that they-will" resist any violation of .their territory, no matter whence it comes. ' They would regard the passage of foreign military aircraft over Belgium as an act of war, I have been assured. They consider that their defensive s:^tem should be flexible, so that itimay be, brought to bear with its maximum ■resistance in" : whatever quarter might-be menaced. It is convenient to interpret that point immediately. Belgium.does not believe that Germany will repeat her mistakes of 1914. Though Belgium then was feeble and British intervention uncertain, Germany, it is stressed by

Brussels, was seriously delayed in her deployment through Belgium. ■■B3y DETERRENT TO WAR. .Tomorrow Belgium would be much Stronger, her resistance certain, and British intervention in her support already pledged. Thus, argues Brussels, the new Belgian policy is a contribution to the general deterrent against another Western European war, for Germany would not come that way again. France should also be glad, for it shortens the front she must detend. ; .',,'.- What, then, does Belgium fear most? Not, I think,' an emergency 'which would invite the establishment of British air bases in her lowlands. Her new anxiety springs, I am convinced, from the knowledge that to implement. her alliances 'with East European States, should one of them be attacked by Germany, France might be most anxious to develop her attack on Western Germany by deploying through Belgium. Against any such plan the Belgian face is firmly set. Today- there exists between France and Belgium no more than a friendly relationship between General Staffs. In truth, no ' political engagement existed between the two even under the Military Agreement of 1920. But even the formal staff associations provided . for lin that instrument were wound up last year by M. Van Zeeland, unable by other means to conr vince the world that there was no more in it than met'the eye. Again, observe that this does not mean a Belgian orientation deliberately favourable to Germany, but a logical development of the desire to keep Belgium out of other peoples' wars. Belgian policy, was summed up, the other day by one of her leading elder statesmen like this: "We should do all that we can to make war less probable or more remote.- Should war break out we should try to limit it, and, in the last resort, to keep it away from our own frontiers." .. TWO YEARS OF EFFORT. In the endeavour to procure a general European settlement, two years of diplomatic discussion have been expended. At intervals attention has been fixed on the possibility, or desirability, of making a start on the more limited objective' of a Western Pact We are entering upon another such phase. I fancy that the Belgian contribution to the next discussions will be to propose j a .sfUl 7 mpreilimited first 7 aim; namely, a" treaty to guarantee the independence of Belgium. Around this, it will ,be suggested, bigger and bettersecurity systems could be built as time went on. Belgium will suggest that, Britain, France, Germany, and' Italy should join in a common declaration that they will rfespect the -of Belgium anc( will never violate, her territory. Further," it will be suggested that they should add to this declaration a guaranteethat should one of their number 'violate this pledge they others will conieto'the assistance of Belgium on being requested by her to do so. In other words, Belgium would be the judge of*,whether she had; been violated, ahd whether she required help. It is perhaps questionable whether the Great Powers would delegate to the Belgian Government their sovereign right to determine for themselves whether the merits of the case ■ required them to declare war on the alleged violator. Btit this at least is a new basis on which to discuss the problem of the Low Countries, and one which will claim attention in the immediate future. -1.