CABINET CRISIS

Evening Post, Volume CXXIII, Issue 56, 8 March 1937, Page 18

CABINET CRISIS

f POSITION IN JAPAN

POLITICIANS V. ARMY,

Although it was regarded as quite certain that the Hirota Ministry would come in for severe criticism at the regular session of the Diet, it was not anticipated that any of the political parties would push their hostility to an extent that would compel the Government to resign, or bring about a dissolution, wrote H. G. W. Woodhead from Shanghai to the "Sydney Morning Herald" on January 27. The present Diet was only elected last February. It has only participated in one brief session since election. And it was expected, despite the unpopularity of the Government's foreign and domestic policies, that self-interest would prompt the members to refrain from any action calculated to lead to another appeal to the electorate. Competent observers therefore, predicted that while there Would be much tumult and shouting, neither the Cabinet nor the Diet would depart.- And this seems to have been the view of the Minseito, which is the majority party in the Lower House. At a party meeting it turned down a proposal to impeach the Ministry. A stronger attitude on the part of the other important party, the Seiyukai, seemed probable, though without the support of the Monseito it could hardly expect to precipitate a serious crisis.

It was, as a matter of fact, a Seiyukai speaker who was responsible for the attack upon the Ministry which led, first, to the suspension of the Diet—followed by premature reports that the Emperor had authorised its dissolution—and then to the resignation of the Hirota Ministry. Mr. Hamada. who has achieved a reputation as « "wrecker" of Ministries, at the sitting on January 21 delivered an outspoken attack upon the diplomatic policy of the Government and upon the continued interference of thej army in politics. He accused the Army of taking upon itself the role of "the propelling force of the nation." If the Hirota Cabinet was really going to enforce a renovation of the • general administration it must first of all undertake the disciplining of the Army. Instead, it' was attempting to establish administrative Fascism.

He accused the Army itself of being responsible for the alleged corruption that existed in political circles, stating that it had scattered money among the Diet members when it experienced difficulty in passing the " Bill to increase the Army by two divisions. He criticised the presentation of a War Budget "thrice the^ize prevailing prior ■to the' Manchurian incident." After dwelling on the Government's alleged diplomatic blunders, including the antiCommunist Pact with the Reich, and its relations with China and Russia, he called for a clear statement from the Premier in regard to his foreign and domestic policies.

The Minister of War, General Terau-1 chi, took umbrage at Mr. Hamada's remarks, accusing him of . using language that seemed "like an insult to some military men." But the redoubtable Cabinet-wrecker was-not to be choked off by military censure. Amidst scenes of tremendous enthusiasm from all sides of the House lie challenged General Terauchi to point out anything that was wrong in his speech, and even asserted that the. Army must rid itself of its superiority complex. The War Minister left the House in anger, and after an urgent session of the Cabinet, in which he is .reported to have insisted that the Army had been insulted, ■ Mr. Hirota proceeded to the Imperial Palace, and secured the consent of the Throne to a two-days' adjournment. The Minister of the Navy, much to the annoyance of the military leaders, attempted to bring about a reconciliation between Army and politicians, and when this proved impossible, Mr. Hirota tendered his resignation.

As usual, the Emperor sought the advice of the aged Prince Saionji, the sole survivor of the Genrd, regarding the nomination of a successor. The Prince's health did not permit of his coming to Tokio, but it is assumed that it was his recommendation that General Ugaki, former Governor-General of Korea, and several times Minister of War, was commanded to ' form a new Ministry. He has the reputation of being a liberal militarist, and his selection seems to have met with the approval of all but the military elements in Japan. A caucus of leading militarists assembled as soon as the nomination became known, and it was intimated to the prospective Premier that in the event ,of his accepting office he would be unable to find a Minister of War.

■ Although the Army denies that this action constitutes interference in politics, its argument is plainly specious. Under a recent Imperial Ordinance, it was enacted that only officers of the rank of general or admiral in active service are eligible for the posts of Minister of War and Minister of the Navy. ' We thus have the really extraordinary position that while, according to the Constitution,' "the Emperor has the supreme command . of the Army and Navy," and ; the Army makes a great point of its unswerving loyalty to the Throne, it can—and often does—obstruct Cabinet-making by refusing to permit ah officer of the required rank to enter the Ministry. At the time of writing, General Ugaki, in spite of the opposition of the military, is persisting in his efforts to form a Cabinet. It seems unlikely that he can succeed, however, unless the Emperor intervenes, and not only commands him to organise a new Ministry, but-commands the Services to co-operate. There are, of course, obvious objections to this course, which would bring the Throne into politics, but it seems to offer the only possible alternative to the nomination of a Premier acceptable to the Army chiefs.

The Army ' itself must be on the horns of a dilemma at the moment. It has insisted upon, the submission to the Diet of a record Budget,, with huge military appropriations. That Budget can only become effective if it- is approved by the Diet, which seems in no mood to submit to the Army's demands. The Constitution provides that "When the Imperial Diet has not voted on the Budget, or when the Budget has hot been brought into actual existence, the Government shall carry out the Budget of the preceding year." This, of. course, would not' suit the Army at all, as it',would involve the indefinite 'postponement of its enormous re-armament programme. But, if the political parties remain united, passage of the Budget by the present Diet must be regarded as out of the question, while a new Diet elected on a definitely anti-militarist programme may prove even less accommodating.

The unanimity displayed by the politicians on this occasion is very significant But it is idle to deny that it is also pregnant with danger. The Japanese Army has been accustomed to have its own way in the past. It is bitterly opposed to the political parties, and has strongly advocated measures which would have the effect of curtailing their authority, and that of the legislature generally. The question at the moment is whether these ends can be attained by constitutional methods. It seems extremely doubtful whether they can. If that be so it would seem that either the Diet or the Army must yield, or the present impasse must be solved by a military coup, the consequences of which must be extremely serious. _,