THE CAPITAL SHIP

Evening Post, Volume CXXII, Issue 132, 1 December 1936, Page 9

THE CAPITAL SHIP

DAY NOT YET PAST

VULNERABILITY FROM AIR

BRITISH DECISION

While capital ships cannot bo constructed so as to bo indestructible fron; the air, their day is not over, says the "Daily Telegraph." This conclusion has been reached by the sub-committee of the Imperial Delence Committee, appointed under the ch?.rmanship of Sir Thomas Inskip, Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, to inquire into the vulnerability of j capital ships to air attack. The report of the committee has been issued. The other members of the sub-com-mittee were Viscount Halifax, Lord Privy Seal. Mr. Malcolm Mac Donald, Secretary for the Dominions, and Mr. Walter Runciman, President of the Board of Trade, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Ernie Chatfleld, the First Sea Lord, and Air-Marshal Sir Edward Elington, Chief of the Air Staff, acted as expert advisers. The principal findings of the subcommittee were: To assume that the day of the capital ship is over, now or in the near future, and to cease to build them, would lead to grave risk of disaster. Advocates of the extreme air view would wish this country to build no capital ships, while other Powers still continued to build them. If their theories turn out well founded, we have wasted money; if ill-founded, we would, in putting them to the test, have lost the Empire. In circumstances favourable to an air attack by a large and powerful force, the most heavily-armoured capital ship could no doubt be destroyed, or at least seriously crippled. On the assumption that capital ships are indispensable, the report continues, the real question is whether their design is such as to secure the maximum of immunity from air attack. The sub-committee is satisfied that, in this respect, everything is done that experience' could suggest, or skill and money could provide. CO-OPERATION ESSENTIAL. As developments in the power and range of aircraft take place, •; there should be no cessation in experiments which should reproduce as far as possible war conditions. To this end the fullest collaboration between the Admiralty and Air Ministry should take place. The sub-committee does not suggest that anything has been lacking in ingenuity or perseverance in the experiments that have been made, but adds that "the co-operation of the two services in an attempt to make the experiments as' realistic as possible would be fruitful." The possibility of heavy air attacks upon fleets in harbour requires attention, it is added, and a full scale of defence should be provided for the bases on which capital ships would have to rely in a future war. Much of the information placed before the sub-committee was of an "extremely secret nature." Immediately after the war, the report states, the Admiralty anticipated that there would be steady progress, not only in the size of the bomb, but also in the methods of carrying out atBombing trials on actual ships being generally impracticable on the score of expense, it was decided to attack the problem in a similar way to that employed for the problem of protection by armour against shell attack. Preliminary experiments were commenced in 1920. ~--. TRIALS BEGIN. Trials commenced in 1921, and had been continued to the present day, to ascertain the penetrating capacities of various bombs and the thickness of deck armour necessary to resist them. This process of experiments has been carried further by full-scale practical tests. The damage caused by a bomb after it has effected the maximum penetration of which it is capable has been considered, and "there is agreement between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry as to the defence properties of the new capital ships, in their constructional aspects, against bombs of various .weights." Experiments have been carried out 'by exploding bombs on various positions on deck to. ascertain the likely damage to superstructure, and also into the explosive effect of a "near miss" — a bomb detonating close to a ship's side.. The report refers to the American experiments in 1922 and 1925 in bombing scrapped warships. The report points out that "although the American Government is in possession of all the information regarding their own trials, they have not thereby been induced to cease building capital ships." Stressing the need for close co-opera-tion between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry, the report states:— '•We are assured that the lessons learned will be applied especially in the construction of the two new capital ships and that lessons arising out of later experiments, which will continue as a matter of course, will be embodied as found necessary. It may * be that the contact between the two departments is capable of being further developed, and we trust that no effort will be spared to do so. "Certain experiments have been agreed upon to take place in the autumn. We recommend the continuance of experiments, and we think that the provision of funds and material ■ should not be allowed to stand in the way." ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE. Discussing the effect of anti-aircraft fire on bombing, the sub-committee finds that, apart from the number of casualties which such fire would inflict, "there is bound to be some and perhaps considerable loss in bombing accuracy on the part of aircraft which have escaped material damage." The Air Ministry holds the view that the effect of close shell bursts is not likely to be appreciable, while the Admiralty believe that non-vital gunfire will have a physical effect not less serious than the "bumpiest" and most difficult weather conditions. The assessment of the probable results of anti-aircraft fire was the most difficult problem the sub-committee had 'to meet. The differences between the points of view of the Admiralty and the Air Ministry can, however, "be considerably narrowed down by making peace-time practice assimilate more closely to war conditions." "Those who rely for their criticisms of anti-aircraft fire merely on experience in the late war are working on a basis quite unreliable. While, apart from increased speed and power of manoeuvre, aircraft remain as vulnerable as before, and the target they offer increases with their size, there have been great developments in numbers and calibres of guns, weight of shell, accuracy and rapidity of fire." The Admiralty, it is stated, thinks that the capital ship of the future may be so designed that she will not be gubject to fatal damage from the air. Critics of the capital ship, on the other hand, maintain that a concentrated attack en shtps at sea or in harbour will be so effective that they cannot survive. "It is a point of view," the report slates, "that has yet to be tested. The truth at present probably lies between

these two opinions. Much will depend on the scale of attack that can be brought to bear. "An interesting feature of the evidence," the sub-committee adds, "of those who hold that the day of the capital ship is doomed by reason of its vulnerability to air attack is that they do not carry the argument to its logical conclusion. STRONGLY CONSTRUCTED. "The capital ship is much more strongly constructed and much better equipped with anti-aircraft guns than any other ship. Cruisers and light craft are necessarily far more vulnerable. Indeed, it can be said that the capital ship is the one remaining surface craft which, if hit severely by an air bomb, is not liable to be sunk. The sub-committee rules out the question of relative cost of aircraft and capital ships as having no bearing on the subject of inquiry: "If capital ships are essential to our security, we must havo them," it states. It is a favourite argument of air enthusiasts that for the cost of one battleship a great number of aircraft— estimates vary from 100 to 1000—could be built, comments Hector Bywater, the "Daily Telegraph's" naval critic. The con .littee, however, quotes expert evidence which reduced the figure to 43 medium bombers. It might have been added that whereas the battleship may have an effective life of 25 years, the average aeroplane, if in constant use, would become ineffective in a very few years. We are reminded that the Fleet may have to operate in the Atlantic or the Pacific, far beyond range of shorebased aircraft. "It would not be impossible for the capital ships of a hypothetical enemy, in the absence of a powerful British Fleet, to place themselves, without interference, across our trade routes in such a way that we should be powerless to do anything unless we could send a superior naval force, supported by capital ships, to drive the enemy off." Precisely that situation developed in November, 1914, when the German squadron under Admiral yon Spec, having defeated the only British force in ,the vicinity, was about to round the Horn and place himself across the Atlantic trade routes. It was only by dispatching two battlecruisers to deal with him that this most serious danger was averted. Were a similar situation to arise tomorrow we should again have to send out capital ships, since aircraft alone would be incapable of doing anything.