Evening Post MONDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1936. THE VIRTUE OF CLARITY

Evening Post, Volume CXXII, Issue 131, 30 November 1936, Page 8

Evening Post MONDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1936. THE VIRTUE OF CLARITY

Mr. Eden's phrase, "no greater service to the cause of peace than clarity," recalls some recent history, and may create more history. Clarity is being applied, with the aid of the clearest English the Foreign Secretary can command, to the British attitude to Belgium; and for the second time within a week he has declared that Belgium, if the victim of unprovoked aggression, could count on British Jielp. In Belgium the comment is made that the same statement, if published with complete clarity by a British Foreign Secretary in 1914, would have prevented ; war; jn other woVds, Germany would not have entered Belgium in 1914 if the then British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, had informed 'the world (or had informed the .German Chancellor, Herr yon Bethmann-Hollweg) that a Belgium attacked, without having given ' provocation, could count on British bayonets. This Belgian comment is, of course, not new; it has been asserted frequently that neither the Kaiser nor yon Bethmann-Hollweg, would have entered Belgium in the face of such a British declaration. They gambled, as Signor Mussolini gambled in 1935, on Britain's abstaining from active intervention. . These two gambles ended with quite different results, .but with the same moral. ' Opinions may differ as to whether circumstances in. 1914 permitted, or did not permit, a greater clarity on the part of Sir .Edward Grey to the Kaiser's Germany; but Mr. Eden today is leaving nothing open to doubt in his intimation to the world . in general, and to Hitler's Germany in particular. With his eyes on both the recent past and the immediate future, the Foreign Secretary is pronouncing the virtues of a clarity that was not present in 1914, and he is stating with precision what will happen if Belgium is invaded without provocation. If war breaks out, British foreign policy in its relation to Belgium will not be open to the former criticism. Britain seeks, first and foremost, peace and good understanding but she also brings war if Belgium is violated, and—having in mind 1914—regards this promise of war as being in fact one of the buttresses of peace. Thus charity and clarity march hand in hand. It has not been the fashion hitherto -to regard clarity as one of the cardinal virtues. But clarity becomes a virtue in the European diplomatic situation today, as it might 'have been ir July, 1914. Signor Mussolini's successful manoeuvres with regard to Abyssinia in 1935 prove that gamblers still abound. It is different in 1936, and one of the factors in the changed situation is clarity in the matter of Belgium. It is unfortunate, however, that clarity in the matter of foreign policy —and particularly in the matter of making instant war—is not capable of indefinite extension. " The nations," says Mr. Eden', "cannot be expected to incur automatic military obligations save for areas where their vital interests are concerned." Belgium is an area within the region of British vital interests, and can count not only on League support but on British automatic military support. Military support by the League, in the event of unprovoked aggression, is problematical; but military support to Belgium by Britain is certain, for, in addition to the Covenant, and in addition to what is left of Locarno, Mr. Eden has added Clarity. So much for Belgium. Pass, however, to Eastern Europe, and there Mr. Eden can impart no clarity in the sense in which he has applied it to Belgium. Can Britain be. "expected lo incur automatic military obligations'' in Czechoslovakia, Russia, Poland, etc.? And unless she is prepared to undertake those huge responsibilities far from her base, how can she impart clarity in Eastern Europe? It is quite clear that the whole value of clarity as it appears in Mr. Eden's Belgian statement is that it means certainty—certainty that the military promise will be fulfilled. But British automatic military support of any nation in Eastern Europe would be a huge and problematical i commitment, cannot be undertaken with certainty as in the of Belgium, and therefore does not seem to be a fit subject for Mr. Eden's policy of clarity. This conclusion is the easier to irrive at because of the fact that the world has seen clarity in action —the ivrong kind of clarity. So far as international jurists can determine :he clarity of a document, it seems ;o be clear that the League Covenant puts League States automatically at ,var with a declared aggressor State. But whatever clarity there may be in something written or promised, it ails where there is not the physical ability and will lo implement the promise. Haile Selassie had, and ias, documental clarity entirely in lis favour, yet it avails not this

exiled monarch, who is the viclim of a lale that Sir Samuel Hoare foresaw last December. The clarity of the Covenant at that date was no different from what it is now; but the clarity of the situation (as perceivable behind the scenes) was that if Haile Selassie did not accept from Signor Mussolini a half-king-dom he would soon have none at all. The Covenant's promise or implied promise of military support met the requirements of clarity but not of practicability. Mr. Eden's promise of military support to Belgium meets both requirements. Yet his promise might fall short of practicability if it were extended to Eastern Europe. In that region the Governments affected must deal with the clarity of a Covenant that has not proved equal to its promises, and a total lack of clarity as to how the East European and Balkan Stales will be grouped in a sudden outburst, and how they will fare. To bring peace to the remoter regions of Europe, the British Government has never offered military help such as it offers Belgium, but—by a questionnaire addressed to Germany and in other ways —it has tried to prepare the ground diplomatically for a revived League with power to strike, and it has offered to explore the possibilities of a regional system whereby the States! of each region will lie empowered to act where their military action can be quickly effective. But civil wa,r in Spain, sectional agreements made apart from Geneva, anti-Comintern pacts, and other sectional activities! concern some of the Governments! more than strengthening, of the j League concerns them. Thus the European situation "deteriorates," and Mr. Eden's statement is one more evidence of this. If, as M. Litvinoff prophesies, Italy enters a pact ("really a military alliance") against the Comintern, the disruptive process will be continued. The League, "licking its wounds," is probably in no position to deal strongly with the Spanish problems that are likely to be hurled at it by the desperate Spanish Government. The League cannot deal with Europe with the ' firm touch with which the British Government deals with Belgium—and in the absence thereof, what effective clarity can there be?