THE NAZI DRIVE

Evening Post, Volume CXXII, Issue 74, 24 September 1936, Page 9

THE NAZI DRIVE

SECTIONS OF POLICY

THEIR PROGRESS REVIEWED

SHIFTING THE CENTRE

A characteristic feature of all strong dictatorships is that they are ambitious lwrites Otto Tolischus from Berlin to the "New York Times"). Their ambition is part of their strength because good ambition, properly presented, is apt to rally people behind them much more effectively than could bayonets.

It is impossible, however, to imagine a strong dictatorship based on the slogan "back to normalcy." Dictatorial ambition must be something tremendous, something to rouse love and hate, to make men do or die. Above everything else, of course, it must flatter the collective ego of the masses.

All the" strong European dictatorships have such an ambition and the others are acquiring one in order to become strong. The Bolshevist ambition is

world revolution, the Fascist is re-1 creation of the Roman Empire, the National Socialist is racial and national unification of all Germans in one Reich, under one Fuhrer, and within one spiritual outlook. Those are their "programmes." However, as Chancellor Adolf Hitler explained in his book, "Mem Kampf," ihere is a great difference between a political programme and practical politics. A programme is an ideal to strive after, but when, where, and how are matters for practical politics to determine. DEVIOUS STEPS TAKEN. The National Socialist programme as a matter of party dogma remains unchanged; the steps to its realisation, however, are devious, for the German Government is subject to political realities, the tactics of which may change from day to day. I Ultimately, of course, the programme calls for a complete redrawing of the map of Europe in such a way that Germany would bulk so large as to dominate the Continent. But so far this programme has been realised only to tho extent of the recovery of the Saar. The first attempts to carry it beyond these confines by frontal attacks on Austria and Memel —to "coordinate" them if not annex them— have been checked. The frontal attacks, undertaken in the first flush of home victory, having failed, the National Socialist regime adopted other tactics, in which the following are the principal elements:— First: Gradual shifting of the military centre of gravity in Europe from Paris to Berlin. Second: Propagandistic penetration and organisation of the German minorities in adjacent countries. Third: Economic penetration of Central Europe in the interest of regional economy, in which Germany, as the biggest economic unit, would dominate. OUTCOME OF TACTICS. The first aim is being accomplished by German re-armament of the Rhineland, which makes the French Army a' "prisoner" in its own country. As seen in Berlin, the effects of these developments are already visible in the weakening of the French system of alliances, in Central Europe, corresponding to the growth of German influence among France's Central European allies, especially Poland and Yugoslavia, which balk at becoming allies of Bolshevik Russia. The results of the second effort are visible in the continued strength of the Nazi element in Austria, the rise of Konrad Henlein's Sudeten Deutsche Party in Czechoslovakia, the German election successes in Eupen and Malmedy in the West and in Memel in the East. They are also seen in the virtual excommunication of the Netherlands by the Catholic Church, the trial of the German Nazis in Poland, the Nazis strength among the Transylvanian Germans of Rumania. The progress of the third effort is illustrated in the gradual shift of German trade from Western to Eastern Europe, in the interest of which Dr. Hjalmar Schacht toured the Balkan capitals to smooth out the difficulties arising over German foreign exchange. Interesting in this connection are plans to connect the Weser, Elbe, and Oder Rivers with the Danube through canals, which would make all Central Europe a hinterland of German ports. AUSTRIA STILL THE KEY. But the key to realisation of the whole programme remains in Austria, and Austria stubbornly insists on independence from the Third Reich, even at the price of becoming a virtual Italian protectorate. All National Socialist leaders, convinced that sooner or later Austria will fall into German's lap like ripe fruit, do everything they can to hasten the ripening process, but with Premier Mussolini at the zenith of his power and Germany not yet ready to risk war, there is little they can do except watch, wait, and try to avert a Habsburg monarchical restoration, which would complicate the problem considerably. Both Germany and Italy, however, are courting Britain: First, because Britain is still the decisive Power in Europe; second, because both want something from her—Germany colonies for one thing and Italy recognition of her new position in Ethiopia and the Mediterranean. But since Britain is coy, each is trying to stimulate' British love by flirting with the other. While London was curtsying to the Negus, Berlin was entertaining Countess Ciano, wife of Italy's new Foreign Minister, in what looked almost like an Italo-German love feast, its significance enhanced by the chance that Count Ciano might go to Berlin. It is believed that Italy may cancel her self-declared membership in the club of satisfied Powers and again work for revision of the status quo.

Cynics smile and predict that each will sell out the other at the first opportunity, but informed circles insist that the love feast has had at least one tangible result, namely a truce in respect to Austria that side-tracks the restoration question and leaves everything as it is. That, of course, is not the final solution of the Austrian problem, but the European situation is too much in flux to attempt a solution at present.