Evening Post. TUESDAY, JUNE 16, 1936. A DIFFICULT RETREAT

Evening Post, Volume CXXI, Issue 141, 16 June 1936, Page 8

Evening Post. TUESDAY, JUNE 16, 1936. A DIFFICULT RETREAT

How to treat war-preventive sanctions, after the sanctioned aggressor has won the war, would be in any case a difficult problem, but it is complicated intensely by the weakness, in foreign affairs, of France. France's ambiguity in the matter of Abyssinian sanctions weakened both France and the League while M. Laval and M. Sarraut held the Premiership. The French General Elections were to cure all that. So far they have not done so. Instead of M. Laval, who rendered lip-service to sanctions and passive help to Italy, France now has at the helm the Socialist M. Blum, "a strict doctrinaire and internationalist," who is in theory a sanctionist, but who seems to be chained by anti-sanction influences around him. Frenchmen of the Right, anti-Communists, deem the Pact with the Soviets to be a pure matter of convenience; but M. Blum, ahd at any rate the more Leftward of his following, are supposed to love Russia for her own sake. Therefore, in consistency, they should accept the Pact and sanctions (which Russia strongly supported) not merely as a convenience, but as an enthusiasm. M. Blum showed his inclination when he re-echoed M. Litvinott's cry that "peace is one arid indivisible." Yet M. Blum dare not, as internationalist and sincere friend of Russia, sound a clarion call for staunchness to the League and to sanctions. Apparently he dare not sound the retreat from sanctions either, for, according to the "Daily Telegraph's" diplomatic correspondent, M. Blum "is reluctant that the French Government should take in public the initiative, and he desires to limit him l self to a promise of French support for British action." He sees that circumstances are stronger than consistency, but does not wish to parade ' his inconsistency if Britain will undertake to pull the sanctions chestnuts out of the fire. If the correspondent has gauged the situation with any accuracy at all, the French weakness has not been removed by substituting for a lip-server a chained sanctioiiist, but may have been increased. In fact, that conclusion is drawn in the following emphatic language, which is by no means reassuring: M. Blum's Ministers are absorbed in domestic problems. So far a clear idea of their views on the European peace and security has not been obtainable. Accordingly, London shares the views of Home and Berlin, which are echoed in smaller capitals, that internal difficulties at present render France negligible in the European equation. This is greatly regretted in London, as it is largely responsible for the stiffening of the German attitude.

M. Blum can meet such an indictment by firmly sounding a note in foreign affairs that is more consistent with his own personal standing as an internationalist and with the League's necessities, but there is no sign of such, though there is still opportunity. Had he been in power at the inception of the sanctions policy it might have been different. But, as things are, the finding that France is "negligible in the European situation" lacks rebuttal, and must be regarded with the utmost seriousness.

Within about ten days the League Council will meet, and the embarrassment of British Ministers, to whom the French are leaving the first word, is obvious. It is reported that the House of Commons will debate the complication on June 22, but there is no word of any proposed Chamber of Deputies debate. A sample of the confusion concerning France's position is found in the "Manchester Guardian's" comment that Mr. Neville Chamberlain's antisanctions speech conflicts with "the very policy M. Blum had hoped to pursue"; while the "Daily Mail's" Paris correspondent is equally sure that the French Government "regards the maintenance of sanctions as useless and dangerous." From such confusion, what other than weakness can arise? Another rather disturbing factor is that, in this drifting situation, the first Minister to speak pointedly in Britain was not the Prime Minister nor the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, but the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Neville Chamberlain. The subsequent explanation by the Prime Minister, Mr. Baldwin, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer delivered impromptu to "an exclusive and politically educated audience" mere "provisional reflections which had occurred to him personally" does not mitigate the fact that the first unequivocal statement that sanctions should go came not from Prime Minister nor from Foreign Secretary but from another Cabinet Minister of high position and prestige.

More encouraging statements in the cablegrams include the official denial that Mr. Eden will resign the Foreign Secretaryship. Mr. Eden announces a debate in the House of Commons in which, he says, he will slate the views of the Government "regarding action lo be taken collectively at the meeting of the League Council and Assembly." This statement will convey what the British

Government: thinks, not what the League will dccide; but it' French influence is as staled above, the British Government's views and the League's subsequent action may coincide. What those views are cannot be anticipated, but the cold, ringing tones of Mr. Chamberlain's speech—"it is no use shutting our eyes to realities: sanctions have been tried and failed"—may amount to what the Americans would call the keynote. France, it is said, has never divorced herself from realities; she has never relied on Geneva to protect her from Germany. Frederich Hammond in the "Fortnightly" can find no real League enthusiasm in the French masses.

In France the League is purely a mental conception; there is apparently not the slightest sense of devotion to that sort of League which is a brotherhood of nations; or of working, and if necessary fighting, for the glorious ideal.of a peaceful world.

Frenchmen will fight for the League "if the Lehgue opposes Germany"; not otherwise. And as he credits M. Blum with being as anxious "to abolish sanctions against Italy asto apply them to Germany," Mr. Hammond evidently thinks that the French Premier's academics have a realist side also.