FAITH IN TREATIES

Evening Post, Volume CXXI, Issue 85, 9 April 1936, Page 16

FAITH IN TREATIES

SUGGESTION TO GERMANY

Sir Edward Grigg addressed his constituents at • Altrincham recently on the international crisis, says "The Times." The situation in Europe, he said, was extremely grave, and he thought it was; the duty of members of Parliament to set the facts before their constituents and do their best to interpret the facts. The breach of the Treaty of Locarno, he said, was only the latest of many acts of violent self-assertion characterising German policy during the last three years. What was our position? The whole country loathed war. Our only care was to avoid war if we could and to rule it out as a feature in international life. Isolation, however, was for us impossible, for the security of Belgium and the Low Countries had always been and was now more than ever a vital interest for this country, because from that quarter we could be so easily attacked. This danger, which nearly destroyed us in the war, was greater now because of the development of air forces and because we could not look to maintain our adequate security alone. Only by a system of pooled security could we feel secure. We were as vulnerable as if there were no Channel between us and the Continent. In such circumstances we must pin our faith in the League of Nations and in a system of pooled security under the League. This policy, however, could never become a reality except on two conditions; first, that we as partners in the system were able to play a part equal to our resources and that we put into the pool a strength worthy-pf our position in the world, and, secondly, that we were prepared to respect our bond and stand up to our obligations. THEIR RIGHT. France and Belgium and their friends in Europe were entitled to demand some readjustment in the Rhineland before they consented to negotiate, otherwise treaty faith would be gone. Perhaps the German view might be met by new suggestions. Herr Hitler had himself said that the troops in the Rhineland could' not be regarded as provocative because of the strength of the French fortifications by which they .were faced. That was true so far as it went,' but let it be remembered that the demilitarised zone extended into Belgium and Holland, and Belgium had accepted the demilitarised section of the Rhineland in return for the abandonment of her neutrality and so had every reason to fear the alterations of that guarantee of her inviolability from attack; Could it not be suggested to the German Government that Germany should at least withdraw from that position of the Rhineland which faced the Belgian and Dutch frontiers? To make such a concession to two of the smaller Powers which could not be supposed to threaten Germany in any way would surely be a gesture worthy of a national leader who was sincerely seeking peace. He trusted that by this or some other means conciliation might succeed, but if all else failed I Britain must stand firm side by side J.with .other members of the League.