FRANCE'S FENCE

Evening Post, Volume CXXI, Issue 83, 7 April 1936, Page 11

FRANCE'S FENCE

DEMILITARISED ZONE

A STRATEGIC SAFEGUARD

ITS RECENT HISTOEY

The origin of the Demilitarised Zone is to be found in the French search for security during the Paris Peace Conference, writes Major-General A. C. Temperley in the "Daily Telegraph." When the delegates met the French argued that the proposed League of Nations and the limitation of German armaments only provided doubtful guarantees for the future security of France and Belgium against the renewal of German aggression. ■.-' They pointed out that certainty could only be secured by placing the Allied troops on the Rhine, which was the one natural barrier against invasion. They accordingly proposed that -the western frontier of Germany should end at the Rhine and that the bridges should be held by Allied troops. ~ Marshal Foch remarked to British delegates how much more security the British Empire had extracted from •the Peace Treaty than France. Our guarantees, the destruction of the German fleet, and the surrender of their mercantile marine, were permanent, whereas theirs, disarmament, military occupationJ of the Rhineland and the Demilitarised Zone, were only temporary and would in course of time disappear. He, too, pressed strongly for a Rhine frontier. NOT.READY. The British and Americans, however, were not prepared to place millions, of Germans west of the Rhine under any form of Separatist republic, to which the vast majority of them Would be hostile. It was recognised, on the other hand, that France was entitled to some permanent guarantees against German aggression, and especially some big zone of safety which would delay an invading army and give time for her allies to come to her aid. Accordingly a joint guarantee was offered by both Great Britain and the United States that they would come to the immediate assistance of France in case of aggression. With this guarantee would be combined the demilitarisation of Germany from its western frontier'to a line drawn 50 kilometres east of the Rhine, accompanied by the military occupation of the three main bridge-heads. The occupation was to last for 15 years. The French were forced to accept this compromise, and it was incorporated in the Peace Treaty. Article 180 provided that all fortified works, fortresses, and field works west of this 50-kilometre line were to be disarmed and dismantled, and the construction of new ones was forbidden. This prohibition was repeated in Article 42; and Article 43 forbids in this area — "The maintenance and assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and manoeuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilisation." Unfortunately for France —and her grievance was undeniable —the- AngloAmerican guarantee failed owing to the repudiation of President Wilson by his fellow-countrymen and the rejection of the Peace Treaty and the Guarantee Pact by the U.S. Senate. It was, perhaps, too much to hope that the guarantee, in particular, would p~rove acceptable to . :the United States, who from long tradition had instinctively shrunk from European "entanglements." MADE GOOD. Our own guarantee was subsequently made good in a somewhat different form in the Locarno Treaty, which by German unilateral action now joins another historic "scrap of paper" in the mouldering obscurity reserved for broken international agreements. The connection between the " Demilitarised Zone and the Locarno Treaty is to be found in Article^ of that document. A prior article, No: 2, states that "Germany and Belgium, and . also Germany and France, mutually undertake that they will in no case,attack or. invade each other or resort to war against each other." Article 4 prescribes the procedure to be followed by the guarantors, Great Britain and Italy, if Article 2 is broken. The normal procedure is an appeal to the Council of the League. But, the article goes on to say* "In case of a flagrant violation of Article 2 of the present Treaty or a flagrant breach of Articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles by one of the High Contracting Parties, each of the other Contracting Parties (i.e., the guarantors) hereby undertakes immediately to come to the help of the party against whom a violation or breach has been directed." It then defines this as a case in which by reason "either of the crossing of the frontier or of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed forces in the Demilitarised Zone immediate action is necessary-" BOUND TO ASSIST. A violation of the Demilitarised Zone by the "assembly of armed forces" constitutes an "unprovoked act of aggression," and we are bound by the Treaty to come to the help of France and Belgium without waiting for the verdict of the Council of the League if it is decided that, "immediate action is necessary." There are two other articles in the Locarno Treaty which are relevant to the present issue. In Article 3 the signatories agree that "if the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights" they will submit the question to judicial decision. Details of the exact procedure are laid down in an annex to the Treaty. There is no doubt about Germany's obligation to submit her contention with regard to the FrancoSoviet Pact being incompatible with the Locarno Treaty to the Permanent Court of International Justice, as, indeed, M. Flandin recently suggested. -Article B'provides that the Treaty shall remain in force until the Council of the League, acting if necessary by a two-thirds majority, decide otherwise. The "fait accompli" presented by Herr Hitler is in direct violation of this article. The military value of the' Demilitarised Zone to France was considerable, though, of course, neither the Zone nor the river was any barrier to aeroplanes, and the former could rapidly be crossed by mechanised forces. Numerically France is in a position of considerable inferiority to Germany, and her mobilisation would be comparatively slow. Germany is rapidly re-arming, and we may expect that in two years' time the 36 divisions which Herr Hitler announced would constitute the army will be ready and fairly well equipped. France will then-be confronted by a much stronger army than her own, and the disparity will increase as years go by and more reserves are trained and more material provided. Anything, therefore, that would impose delay upon a German Invasion would be for France a priceless gain in time while her mobilisation was being completed and her decond-line divisions formed.

-So long as the Zone remained demilitarised Germany was denied the use of her network of strategic railways in the Zone and in the EhlneJend for the forward concentration of

her armies. She was forced back to the line Cassel-Wurzburg, which might have meant that the first clashes be-, tw'een the two armies would be on German territory, which has always been the great aim of the French General Staff. Now the Zone is reoccupied perhaps the most scientificallyplanned system of military railways in the world is once more in German hands. The French must have realised that the Zone could not last for ever, and they could well have afforded many years ago to have offered a similar Zone on their own side of the frontier. This would have undoubtedly reconciled the Germans to their own, and removed any feeling of inferiority. . Such a solution is now impossible, as the immense system of French frontier fortification, constructed at a cost of some £35,000,000, runs close to the frontier, and it is hardly to be expected that they should abandon it. The offer of Herr Hitler to France of a mutual Demilitarised Zone is therefore an empty gesture, for he must know perfectly well that it is no longer possible on the French side. We are told that the reoccupation is symbolic, and that only a few regiments have been sent into the Rhineland. This removes the actual fear of war for the time being or the necessity for the guarantors to provide military assistance to France, but it may still be held that the German Government has, juridically, resorted to war, with all the consequences that it may entail. , NO NEED TO REOCCUPY. One can understand that the continuance of the Demilitarised Zone involved some sacrifice of self-esteem in a people that has become acutely conscious of nationality and determined to remove. the last traces of the inequalities of rights imposed by the Treaty. Yet, apart from prestige, Germany has no need for reoccupation. If she meant peace, the continuance of demilitarisation was a demonstration of her pacific intentions and a guarantee of security to her neighbours'. It is only if she is intent on war that reoccupation confers upon her any material advantage. If it had become unbearably irksome, the remedy of diplomatic negotiation was open to Germany. There is already a Western Air Pact waiting to be discussed, and the two subjects might have been taken together. The tearing up of the Locarno Treaty, which Herr Hitler has on more than one occasion undertaken to accept both in letter and in spirit, will not inspire much confidence in the stability of future agreements.

Less than a year ago the Council of the League solemnly recorded their view that Germany had "failed in the obligation which lies upon all the members of the international community to respect the undertakings which they have contracted, and admits no unilateral repudiation of international obligations." She cannot be surprised if she -again stands condemned by world public opinion.