NAVAL POSITION

Evening Post, Volume CXXI, Issue 17, 21 January 1936, Page 3

NAVAL POSITION

SURVEY OF THE WORLD

OUTCOME OF CONFERENCE

THE BRITISH LINE

Armaments are the instruments of national policy in a world of Sovereign States, and the probability of success in any Disarmament Conference depends upon the possibility of agreement on policy, writes the Marquess of Lothian in the "Daily Telegraph." The Washington Naval Conference of 1922 reached agreement to limit the main categories of naval armament for two reasons. The first was because the European group, Great Britain, France, and Italy, were broadly satisfied with the peace settlement they had imposed, and through exhaustion wanted peace rather than change. ■ The second was because the naval Powers fronting on the Pacific were willing to agree upon the maintenance of the integrity of China and the "open door" therein, and "equality of security," as the basis of policy in the Far East. The latter was to be achieved by stabilising their fleets on the ratio of 5—5—3, which represented roughly their then relative strength, and by demilitarising the seas between the three main naval bases of Hawaii, Singapore, and Japan. The General Disarmament Conference which sat for so many years recently at Geneva, and the Three Power Naval Conference which met a year ago, failed because there was no agreement about policy. In the Pacific Japan was no longer willing to accept the political principle of the integrity of China, and demanded "parity," not in security, but in naval armaments. In Europe, France was unwilling to concede arms equality to a resurgent Germany without guarantees for security more potent and- more prompt than those contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Locarno Treaties. Germany, on her part, was unwilling to continue legally "defenceless" fifteen years after the Armistice and in view of the rapidly rising military and air power of Soviet Russia. INACTION IN CHINA. Is there, then, a political basis on which a successful naval, agreement can now be arrived at in London? We can only speculate, as the Powers have not yet declared themselves. The main centre of controversy is the British-American-Japanese triangle. The British and the Americans are still satisfied with the Washington principle. They want the integrity of China and the "open door" and "equality of security" in the Pacific. Neither of them is willing to connive at the partition of China by Japan, partly for reasons of commercial self-interest, partly because, as unrepentant democracies, they both believe in the liberal international principles which prevailed in the World War, and were so eloquently set forth in President . Wilson's speeches. But neither of these Powers has so far been willing to intervene with Sanctions blockade, or naval action under the Covenant of the League or the Nine-Power Washington Treaty to resist Japanese aggression against China, either singly or together, or in co-operation with the other members of the League, or signatories of the Kellogg Pact. That has become clear since 1931, though there is still , controversy as to which Power bears most responsibility for the failure to take common action. Both the British Empire and the United States seem adamantly resolved not to yield in the matter of "equality of security." They say that the history of the past five years proves that Japan already has security, because her co-signatories have not felt strong enough to interfere with her violations of the Nine-Power Treaty; that the United States has two oceanic fronts to protect, one in the Atlantic and the other in the Pacific, while Great Britain has the immense line of her Empire communication running from the North Sea to New. Zealand, through the Mediterranean or round the Cape of Good. Hope, while Japan has only the single "front" facing the Pacific. PACIFIC SUPREMACY. They consider, therefore, that Japan's demand for naval parity is, in fact, a demand not for "equality- of security," but for decisive supremacy in the Pacific. There is no reason to suppose that either of these Powers who accept parity between themselves, will not continue to insist on the ratio of five to Japan's three, by agreement or without agreement. Japan, on the other hand, is afraid that an Anglo-American combination, especially if supported by Russia, might force her to abandon or limit an expansion on the mainland, and her desire to expel non-Asiatic Powers from influence in the Far East. Japan demands naval parity as necessary both to national honour and to ensure absolute security from possible pressure or attack from the sea. Probably no Japanese delegation or Government could remain in power if it accepted by treaty any lower "ratio" than that of parity. At this moment there seems to be little hope of agreement about "quantitive" limitation between these opposing points of view. Eventually the governing factor is likely to be the purse. It may be easier for Japan to acquiesce in the ratio if Great Britain and the United States in practice each lay down 5 keels to 3. But in this revived era of power politics, financial resolution is as important as naval moral, and Japan may decide to put the issue to the test of practice before abandoning her attempt at parity. TONS AND GUNS. If "quantitive" agreement is out of reach, it may well be possible to reach agreement as to "qualitative" limits on maximum tonnage and gunnage. That would reduce the cost of competition, and prevent all naval nations having continuously to renew their navies owing to new types and inventions being adopted elsewhere which make existing vessels useless. In Europe the position if not easy is less acute. The much-abused but fundamentally sound Anglo-German Naval Agreement has exorcised the spectre of that naval competition which was principal provocation to the World War. The political policies of France and Great Britain rule mutual naval rivalry and hostility out of the question. The position in the Mediterranean is more difficult to assess, because of the Abyssinian crisis, though it is certain that for financial reasons alone neither France nor Italy want to spend more on naval preparation than they need. Here, also, in default of fundamental agreement about policy, the purse will call the tune. But when I mention the Abyssinian crisis I bring in the biggest and most uncertain factor of all. If it ends, as I hope it will end, in proof that the idea of collective security has enough vitality in practical action to prevent unprovoked aggression from achieving its ends, while yet opening the way to the satisfaction of legitimate national needs by revisions of the status quo by pacific means, a new;- principle affect-

ing naval armaments will have emerged into practical diplomatic life. THE FINAL TOWER. Common naval action, reinforced from the air, is—or ought to be—the ultimate power behind the collective system, and if enough naval Powers came to support the League system effectively, limitation and reduction of naval armaments should certainly be easier to reach. But if the Abyssinian crisis were to end in proof of the impotence of the League collective system, either to prevent war and i aggression or to end it on terms which L are just and fair to all, there is bound , to be a "sauve gui peut" into alliances, 'or isolation of competitive building, • according as each nation believes ita . own national interest is best served.

So the present Naval Conference is likely to be, fundamentally, an interim gathering. It will probably reach agreement on minor" points, and especially on qualitative limits to the size of ships and guns. But the ultimate question, whether navies and their satellite services are to be used merely as instruments of national policy or as the instruments for the prevention of war and the service of peace, will be determined, not by the Conference, but by events going on elsewhere.

If the League succeeds, the United States, the balancing factor in the world today, now wholly, devoted to a policy of highly-armed isolation, may gradually come to consider whether co-operation to prevent, war may not be a surer method of out of war than a neutrality which, however perfect negatively, can have no effect in preventing vital changes to the detriment of the. strategic security of the United States as a result of wars in which she is not herself engaged.