THE SUEZ CANAL

Evening Post, Volume CXX, Issue 111, 6 November 1935, Page 27

THE SUEZ CANAL

AN ARTERY OF EMPIRE

ITS PLACE IN STRATEGY

MUST BE ENLARGED

In the public life of Britain, as doubtless in that of the United States,' there is a small but noisy section of people who have been justly described as "bloodthirsty pacifists," writes Hector Bywater in an overseas paper. On the one hand ;hey fight tooth and nail against adequate defensive armaments; on the other they are constantly meddling in the affairs of foreign nations and demanding "sanctions," which is a euphemism for war, against any country of whose actions they disapprove. These people have been urging that the Suez Canal be closed to Italian transports and supply vessels should Mussolini make war on Ethiopia. That such action would have been the most effective deterrent' to the threatened outbreak is undeniable. If the canal were closed against the ships of Italy it would be well nigh physically impossible for her to maintain her communications with East Africa, which could only be reached by the Cape of Good Hope route—a voyage of 11,000 miles or more. Italy, however, had no reason to be alarmed. All the great Powers except the United States solemnly pledged . themselves to uphold the freedom of the canal in peace and war. This pledge is implicit in the convention signed at Constantinople on October 29, 1888, which declares, inter alia, that the canal shall "always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag." Great Britain, it is true, made certain reservations at the time, arising out of her special position in Egypt; but in the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 these reservations 'were withdrawn. During the Far Eastern war of 1904-05 Russia took advantage of the convention to send part of her Baltic fleet through the canal, and though Britain, then the ally of Japan, may have wished to prevent this movement, she was powerless to interfered CAUSE OF ENMITY. Closure of the canal against Italian shipping could no doubt be effected if Britain and France were in absolute agreement, in that case a fiat of the League of Nations would be invoked to override the agreement of 1888. It is, however, in the last degree ■ unlikely that France would acquiesce in this drastic move, which would instantly turn Italy into a bitter enemy. In fact, there is little doubt that Italy, in her present temper, would treat the closing.of the canal as an. act of war. As for Britain, she would think twice before using such a two-edged weapon. To her, more than to any other nation, the Suez Canalis a vital artery of commerce and strategy. Once the precedent was established whereby the waterway was barred against one Power, in the future a combination of Powers might conceivably attempt to bar it against British traffic. For this, if for no other reason, the British Government will almost certainly continue to turn a deaf ear to the demand—raised mainly by pacifists —that the Suez Canal be denied to Italian shipping proceeding to East Africa. From the point of view of Britain, the Suez Canal is. as vital a factor in her system of defence as the Panama Canal is in American naval strategy. It shortens the route from England to Bombay and Calcutta by 4500 and ' 36G0 miles respectively, besides substantially reducing the distance to Aus- j tralia. Without the canal, Britain could not have conducted her campaigns in : Irak and Palestine during the World War. In peace it has multiplied ten- . fold her trade with the Far East. Of ' the 30,000,000 tons of shipping which, in a normal year, pass through the canal, more than half flies the British I flag; DEBTORS OF DE LESSEPS. To France and Italy also the canal is of first-class importance. Marseilles, : Genoa, Brindisi, and Trieste all owe their prosperity mainly to the creation of de Lesseps. Without it Italy, as we have seen, would be geographically blockaded from the east, while France could no longer hope to maintain the integrity of her vast colonial empire. To Germany, whose Eastern and Far Eastern trade is growing enormously, the canal is scarcely less indispensable. With all these great Powers united by the bond of common interest there is little fear that the Suez Canal will ever become a pawn in the game of j world politics. For all practical purI poses it is an international highway, the neutrality of which is secured by a multilateral agreement of the most binding description. Even Japan is I deeply interested in the canal, which her merchant ships now use in ever- ! increasing number. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that in certain eventualities an attempt might be made to block the Suez Canal. If, for example. Great Britain were at war with an Eastern Power, ' , even a temporary stoppage of traffic j. j might well have disastrous conse- ! quences: Let us suppose the enemy were | threatening Hong Kong or Singapore. j Using the canal the Brilish Mediter- '. Jranean fleet could reach Singapore in three weeks or less, while fast ocean liners bearing troops and military supplies could cover the 8000 miles from England in the same period. But if the canal were blocked the defence or relief of these Far Eastern territories i would become infinitely more difficult, i for the British line of communication i would then have to be diverted around i the Cape of Good Hope, adding nearly i 4000 miles to the distance. "" ' . BRITAIN'S PROBLEM. ; Britain would, therefore, be con- ' fronted with the problem of waging j a big campaign at a distance of al- i most 12,000 miles from the home base, ■ and during the last quarter of this'] route her transports and supply ships would be well within the striking : range of hostile cruisers and subma- 1 rines. Thus Ihe enemy would have the ' strongest possible incentive to attempt ' i something against the canal, even ' though the absence of locks would rule ' out anything in the nature of a perm- \'i anent interruption of traffic. It is a | ' safe assumption that at the first threat |' of hostilities a rigorous control of ship- 1 ping would be instituted at each end 1 of the canal. ' Unlike the Panama Canal, the Suez waterway is unfortified. Britain has ( undertaken Ihe responsibility of pro- C tccting it. but she has not mounted a single gun on its banks. She mairi- [ i tains garrisons at Cairo. Alexandria. ■ I Ismalia, and Part Said, and in an emer- t

gency could concentrate a strong force at any threatened point. Only twice in its history has traffic through the canal been interrupted 'by the threat of hostilities. In 1882 the Arabi rebellion brought a British force to Ismalia, and all movement was stopped for two days. Again, in February. 1915, a forlorn hope was undertaken by a Turkish detachment stiffened by German officers and artillerymen, the object being to cut what! had become one of the British Empire's main lines of communication. . This force reached the Asiatic bank of the canal and isolated detachments • even managed to get across in flat-bot- ! tomed pontoons; but the attack was [ easily repulsed and all who crossed were killed or captured. MEMORY OF DISRAELI. I Originally the canal twisted and . turned in a disconcerting fashion, . while its maximum width of 72 feet and depth of 27 feet forced ships to proceed at a snail's pace. As time went on the passage was widened and deepened until today it has a width of 198 feet and an average depth of 37J feet. Moreover, the bends have been so far straightened out that they occupy barely 13 miles of the total length of 106 miles, measured from the jetty head of Port Said to that of Suez. At night high-powered arc lamps illuminate the whole length of the canal and ships are able to proceed as safely and as surely as by day. Outside England and France the impression is widespread that the Suez Canal is either entirely or mainly controlled by Great Britain. That, however, is incorrect.' It is true that 44 per cent, of the Suez Canal Company's shares —176,000 —are held by the British Government. These were purchased in 1875 from the Khedive of Egypt at the price of £4,000,000, the Khedive having had most of them given to him by the canal company. Their present market value is £72,000,000, and up to now they have enriched the British' Treasury by more than £40,000,000 in the form of annual dividends and interest. When the purchase was made the I British Government nominated three members to represent it on the canal board. Eight years later an agitation was started by British ship owners against what they considered to be the bureaucratic methods of the canal administration, and still rt.ore against the dues levied, which were denounced as exorbitant. Failing redress, they threatened to build a new canal. In the end the board gave way. Dues were reduced and seven more Britons representing shipping and other commercial interests were appointed to the board. CONTINUES TODAY. That arrangement has continued to the present day, the board consisting of twenty-one French and ten British members, with one Hollander. It meets periodically in Paris under a French chairman. Although Frenchmen subscribe for 50 per cent, of the shares, the French Government owns none, but receives around 70,000,000 francs in taxes from the canal company, and the French element predominates in the canal administration. In an average year 5500 ships use the Suez Canal, bringing in dues of moire than 200,000,000 gold francs. To this sum must be s-ided revenue from the company's large reserves. Financially, therefore, the canal is a plum of the first magnitude, and the British Government, apart from the shipowning community, has reason as the principal shareholder to bless the memory of Benjamin Disraeli, Lord Beaconsficld, who, as Prime Minister in 1875, acted chiefly on his own initiative when he bought for a mere song the Khedive's big block of Shares. What is to be the future of the canal? Two issues are involved, the commercial and the strategic. As regards the first, the canal has up to now satisfied all-reasonable demands,, but with the ever-growing volume and importance of Eastern trade a time may, and probably will, come when larger ships than have hitherto operated on that route will be needed. The biggest vessel to pass through the canal to date was 27,000 tons displacement, and that is believed to be | the maximum size which can be naviI gated through the "cut" with' safety. Already there are liners running to India, the Far East, and Australia which approach this limit, and the insatiable demand for luxury and speed in ocean travel must almost inevitably lead to the building of still larger ships. MUST BE LIGHTENED. Turning to the strategic aspect of the question, we meet the significant fact that the displacement of Britain's battleships averages 30,000 tons, while that of her strongest unit, H.M.S. Hood, is no less than 42,100 tons. These ships would be needed urgently if trouble were to develop in the Far East. Most, if not all, of them could negotiate the canal if they were sufficiently lightened, but the process would involve considerable delay, and in war—especially- in the war which would send British squadrons racing to the Far East —every hour is precious. It is, therefore, a warrantable conclusion that sooner or later the Suez Canal must be enlarged, for in the last analysis considerations of strategy outweigh all others. There would be neither point nor purpose in creating a great naval base at Singapore, i complete with docks capable of taking naval mastodons up to 55,000 tons, if the most powerful ships of Britain's Navy were debarred from using the short-cut route to the base. The cost of widening and deepening the Suez Canal to make it accessible to the largest vessels of war and commerce which the present generation can envisage would not be prohijbilive, but neither would it be trivial. '•Who will pay the bill?" is doubtless one of those questions of high policy which are discussed behind closed doors in the palatial board-room of the Paris headquarters of the Suez Canal Company.