THE LIBYAN ASPECT

Evening Post, Volume CXX, Issue 96, 19 October 1935, Page 9

THE LIBYAN ASPECT

ITALY'S. AIMS IN AFRICA

(By S.K.Q.) While there is a temporary lull in military operations in Abyssinia due to the necessity in the north of consolidating the Italian advance in the Tigre Province and in the south to the fall of further rain, the news from Italian Libya and Egypt confirms the fears expressed in these notes early in the campaign. It is quite evident, as stated then, when General Balbo was reported to be in command of very considerable forces in Libya, that the possible closing of the Suez Canal was anticipated and that Italy was not likely to take this hamstringing of her | vital sea communications with Eritrea and Somaliland without a counter blow. This again the British foresaw | and in turn are massing forces on the western frontier of Egypt and re-1 inforcing the garrison of Egypt itself. ]

From a military point of view the whole coast from the frontier at Sollum to Egypt itself at Alexandria is quite easy for mechanised military movement. In 1915-16, as pointed out yesterday, there were extensive operations on the part of British troops in Egypt, including Dominion contingents, among them New Zealanders, against the Senussi tribesmen fighting the battle of Turkey. Not only did armoured cars play a prominent part in the successful campaign, but a small company of ordinary army lorries— American make—penetrated not only to Mersa Matruh and Sollum, but even far inland to the Siwa oasis. Just at present it is not likfily that rains will have fallen, but these should come next' month and there will then be no I difficulty about water. The country is not o£ the ordinary sandy desert type, but more of a limy loam which, sols like concrete after rain and is ideal for rapid movement. Though the distances are not trifling, the peril of an Italian dash on Egypt and the Suez Canal is quite a real one.

Much will depend on,developments in Europe. If France comes in definitely with the League, it is hard to see how the Italians can hold out, unless Germany also enters the fray. This is hardly likely, as one of the cardinal points of Hitler's policy seems to be friendship with Britain. The whole position is delicate and any day now may see a genuine European crisis. Under these circumstances it is easy to understand a message from Addis Ababa to the effect that Signor Mussolini is not satisfied with General do Bono's progress in Abyssinia. On the other hand, any attempt to force de Bono into n premature advance might end in disaster.