LIMITING NAVIES

Evening Post, Issue 25, 30 January 1935, Page 6

LIMITING NAVIES

THE WORK OF TREATIES

IMMENSE SAVING MADE

' STOPPING A KACE

" Throughout the preliminary naval discussions between Great Britain, the 'United"-,States, and Japan tho fumla■mcntaTissuo at stako has been the fate of^tiTe/washington FivePoi\er Ticaty "signetf^in 1922, wi'ites Hector By water in the-" i( Daily Telegrapn.'*, 'jFrom their beginning the1 London: talks, now adjourned, have be'en conducted, under tho shadow of Japan's avowed,indention, of denouncing tho treaty/ on'^'the' grounds that vit has ceased to ensure her adequate security, besides being derogatory to her prestige. tho-Washington Tieaty, 'in dts present form, at any rate, must lapse on December 31, 1936. On the same date the- London Treaty of 1931, which\ supplemented the Washington] agreements, ■ automatically expires. When it is remembered that these two covenants form the only barrier against unbridled, > world-wide-' competition in naval armaments, their extraordinary significance becomes plain. To allow them to lapse without substituting somo alternative but-equally effectual safeguard against competitive i,e-aimam.ent at sea would bo nothing less' than calamitous for the world. f Fully to appreciate the gravity of the niatter, it is essential to recall tho nav ( al situation, existing^on the eve of the'" Wasiingion* Conference thirteen years ago. America-and Japan were developing their naval armaments on a tiuly formidable scale. Together they iwere,building or preparing to build 32 (iapital ships of the- greatost dimensions, ranging from 33,000 to 43,000 tons and costing about £9,000,000 each.

i BRITAIN'S MASTODONS. , Side by side with these monster ships whole fleets of ancillary craft were I ,about, to. be laid down, and both Powers wero establishing new war bases in the Pacific. ' , Great Britain, weary of war and burdened with'ctebt, held aloof from the face as long as possible, only to bo thrust into it eventually by tho inexorable 'urge of self-preservation. It wns impossible for her to remain idle while the future control of thoJPacific, where British interests aTO second to none in importance, was in dispute. Therefore, in 1921, Parliament was asked to approve the building of four battlecruisers of 48,000 tons ea«h, to be followed in 1922 by four battleships of still gi eater tonnage. These eight mastodons, which would 'havo cost at least £64,000,000, were to bo but the first instalment of a brandnow battlo fleet. * At a very Conservative estimate tno three Powers* were, in 1921, already committed -'to" an axpendituro of £320,000,000 on Dreadnoughts alone. Completion of their existing _ programmes, of capital ships, auxiliary craft, ana naval harbour works would have entailed a minimum outlay of £500,000,000. This immense sum was to bo spent on naval weapons only a few years after tho bloodiest and most costly war in history. Drastic action, was needed to stop the ominous race. Credit for taking the initiative must be divided between the United States ana Great Britain, though, it fell to President Handing formally to summon, the first Naval Conference" at Washington.

SUBSTANTIAL SUCCESS. , It-opened on the morrow of Armistico Day, 1921, after the delegates of five nations had paid homago' at the tomb of America's Unknown Warrior. The subsequent proceedings, whilst not devoid of friction—inevitable when so many nations were bargaining for what they deemed to be tho minimum of national security—were crowned with a substantial measure of success. Not only were the great battleship programmes "of ' the* United States, Japan, ana Britain cancelled by a stroke of the pen, but scores of ships already afloat were consigned to tho scrap-heap. Actual ana potential war bases were abandoned or left in statu quo and a fixed scale of Telativo strength in tha big ship categories was established. , Japan agreed to restrict her battle | fleet tonnage, to three-fifths of the i British and American maxima, wlnlo' Franco and" Italy each accepted a quota ' of slightlyimore than one-third. _ Thus was born tho famous 5 —3 —1.75 formula. i •Linked up with the naval, treaty was , a series of political covenants all de-, signed to consolidate peacc'in the Far East, and, in the American view at1 least, these supplementary agrepments' must stand'or fall "with the fleet limita- j tion compact. Such, then, arc the inter- f locking safeguards which Japan's denunciation threatens to overthrow. _ To impartial observers Japan's action does not lend itself to explanation on any" logical ground. That the three-1 five ratio continues to give her absolute security in -'her own domain is easily demonstrated. • , : JAPAN'S SECURITY.

1 So long as that ratio endures, it -would be physically impossible for either Great Britain or tho United Btates to molest Japan's territory, or .seriously to, interfere with her, vital lines of communication., So'fa.r,from prejudicing her security, the Washingiton ratio, coupled -with the elimina'tion of foreign bases within striking 'range of her shores, has given her al'most complete 1 immunity from attack ! overseas* i As to 'prestige, why Japan should ,'lfcgard the three-five ratio as an implication of inferiority when France and Italy have remained content with U much smaller quota of naval tonnage, is difficult to fathom.

'' Japan, in fact, has signaljy failed to make good her case for full, naval equality. With' the Washington Treaty denounced, the outlook would bo undeniably sciiou's but for the saving interval of two years which must elapse before abrogation becomes effective. Thanks to that wise provision, amplo time r«v mains for further negotiations, which' mavj nay, must break the temporary deadlock and establish somo future scale of relatw-o naval power acceptable to all parties* '■ Despite th'eir, inconclusive outcome, tho London naval talks have served a useful purpose by clearing tho air. Japan now kno-»s the precise attitude of Britain and the United States. While the former is not unwilling to concede Jnpanqso equality in principle, America has made clear her, inflexible opposition to any, Tadieal change in the existing ratio. Obviously, therefore, issuo is joined between Washington and'Tokio.vFurreflection' may bring home to Japan the.Yolly bt ebnrting a new naval race" in which she |-would- inevitably l»e Vprated,''■''' It -would 1 be impossible for her to compete with the vastly superior resources of. tho United States. once •thepe were mobilised/'as mobilised they would be if public opinion were aroused by a Japanese "challenge." Even though war -were averted,"the end of such a race w"6uld find Japan much less secure than she is today. •WILli COME" IN TIME.

As a sensible folk, the Japanese cannot remain blind to tho facts of tho case, and for that reason some modification of their Government's naval pol-

icy is probably only a- question of time. - . . Great Britain has a vital interest m current naval discussions. ' For her the issue is complicated by the magnitude of the British Empire and its peculiar dependence on sea power, However fair a balance of relative strength may bo gtriick in tho Pacific^ there wil} remain for her the ever-pre-sent problem of security in Europe, a problem to which America and Japan are for geographical reasons largely indifferent. At present tho Continental nations are free of all restrictions on tho build-ing-of submarines. While that freedom continues, it would surely bo unwise f6r this country, to perpetuate any covenant —such as - tho London Thrco'-Power Treaty—which, divest? her of the right to maintain adequate antisubmarino defences. ~ The London Treaty must, in any case, expire two-years hence. Confined kt> Great Britain,"1 the U.S.A. and* Japan, it'avo*E,ect-wM_,to set up ratios oi strength in1 cruisers, other light craft, nstfisubmnrines, all of, which Hsd remained outside tho scope of the Washington Treaty. Under the London Pact, Japan received a slightly increased "quota -of cruiser tonnage, and was granted absolute equality in submarines. Wjliile renewal of the London Treaty would, in British naval opinion, be disadvantageous to this country, the perpetuation of tho Washington Agreement in some more or less mortified form would appear to be one of the most urgent tasks awaiting the statesmen of the great maritime Powers,