WAR MEMOIRS

Evening Post, Volume CXVIII, Issue 109, 5 November 1934, Page 11

WAR MEMOIRS

THE YEAR OF CRISIS MR. LLOYD GEORGE'S ATTACKS "A PALSIED ADMIRALTY" (From "The Post's" Representative.) LONDON, September 26. In the third volume of his war me- • moir.', Mr. Lloyd Gooi'go evidently thoroughly enjoys the evening of his life in smiting all Iho big chiefs of tho war years. Ho bitterly assails the conduct of operations during 1917, both on land and sea. Hero are quotations ironi the review in the "Morning Post":— The "severe criticism on the action of men whose memory is honoured by their fellow-countrymcn•'' to which Mr. Lloyd George confesses may have been undertaken, as he protests, only in the interests of a truthful record, but he has thrown himsolf into the dis-j charge of this stern duty with the zest: and energy of Gideon smiting the Midianite. "Military obscurantism, and political irresolution," "the pessimistic timidity of a sullen and recalcitrant Admiralty," "tho obtuseness and obstinacy of the military -and naval commands"—to quote some of tho geina from the jacket—these obstructors of "the inspired intelligence and fierce administrative- energy" of "the greatest War Minister of modern times" come- up here for- conviction and sentence. If those concerned retain a rag of credit, they must thank the clemency of the jury rather than the forbearance of the prosecution. It is impossible to read this volume without carrying away tho impression that Mr. Lloyd Georgo ought to have been, as well as Prime Minister, both Generallissimo .and Lord High Admiral. Then the war would have been over in no time. But alasl his inspired strategy >vas obstinately obstructed until the appointed hour had passed. f 'MUDDLE-HEADED ADMIRALTY." • As for the fighting men, it is difficult to . decide whether Mr. Lloyd George's disparagement —dictated only, be:it remembered, by dovotion to tho truth—is more intensely directed to the admirals or, to the generals. Thus, ho refers to "the.fear-dimmed eyes of our admirals," to the "stunned pessimism of the Admiralty," and to their "sullen recalcitrance." He records that "'the blunder on which their policy was based was an arithmetical mix-up which would not have been perpetrated .by an ordinary clerk in a shipping office," and ho writes of "the cold storage" of the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow. To crown this censure, he remarks that "there is no wrath liko the- cold fury of the professional spirit proved wrong" by outsiders." The admirals were "horrified at the notion that brass buttons should be ordered about by bone," he says; and exclaims at tho "sorry exhibition of nervous impotence on the part of the Lord High Admirals of the biggest Navy in the world." These criticisms are uttered in an aucount of the submariuo menace, and of the opposition of ,the Admiralty to the adoption of .the convoy system. GENERALS' "PLANOMANIA." In a striking passage Mr. Lloyd George asks why offensives were not broken off as soon as it'was scon either that the enemy was well prepared, or tha£ the 'hoped-for' ?'-break through"' was denied:...' ' "Therois but one answer. These great offensives, once they fired the imagination of a' commander, ceased to be 'plans for the winning of victory. They became,a passion which could not be resisted. Like all passions which possess men, this one banished caution, prudence, and fear. The more Joffre, Niyelle, and Eaig were criticised and opposed, the more fierce was their infatuation for. their cherished, plans. ■. . The plan became- an intoxication, and the intoxication a delirium. When the craving is on him the planoraaniac is blind. General Nivellc in December was a cool and competent planner. By April ho had become a crazy plunger. .... He was stimulated to a pitch of infatuation by constant dram drinkings from the inexhaustible puncheons of autieipated victory." EARL JELLICOE'S REPLY. ; Earl Jellicoe, in an interview with, 'the. "Morning Post" correspondent;, answers Mr. Lloyd George's accusations against the Admiralty. . i Mr.' Lloyd George, said' Lord Jollicoe, Seemed to be obsessed with the idea that there-was nothing but opposition in the Admiralty to the adoption of a general convoy system,1 a system which, he inferred, -was suggested by himself. The principle of convoy was a matter of naval history, and its general adoption as a means of countering 'attack on trade by submarines was suggested by many., naval officers, but the difficulty in the case of submarine ■warfare was the provision of the necessary, escort vessels. Hence Mr. Lloyd George's, statements /that the Admiralty were uncompromisedly opposed to the introduction of the convoy system because it had been suggested by;'" a civilian were 7 mistaken. SHORTAGE OF MATERIAL. There was, certainly, Lord Jellicoe continued, a considerable difference of opinion among high naval officers witli regard to the adoption of tho general convoy system. But, .those differences were concerned with ways and means, and not with the advisability or otherwise of the system itself. Ways and means were, in fact, the only reason why a general system of convoy was not instituted at a much earlier date. This Mr. Lloyd George appeared to recognise, since he referred in one or two places to the extreme shortage of small craft. On tho other hand, he appeared to grudge a number of destroyers for tho protection of the' Grand Fleet, and blamed lira. f6r refusing to part with many of these. The necessity for tho retention/of numbers of destroyers with the :■ Grand .Fleet was upheld even more strongly by Admiral Beatty than it was Toy him.(Admiral Jellieoe). MAJOR STRATEGY. '„■ The. first responsibility of the Admiralty, emphasised Lord Jellicoe, was the maintenance of the Grand Fleet "in being" *nd in adequate superiority so long as the German High Sea Fleet remained "in being." '; "If this responsibility had been lost sight of for a moment," he declared, ."our fate would have been worse and more rapidly achieved than could ever have been brought about by the submarine blockade. Yet ' Mr." Lloyd George takes no account of this major strategy." : ,: : ■;■ . -From first to last, what Mr, Lloyd George characterised as opposition on the-part of the Admiralty was nothing more, said Lord Jellicoe, than lack of material necessary to carry put the approved policy, and a very right refusalto divert ships from, an even more essential task. ,