DOWN TO DANGER

Evening Post, Volume CXVIII, Issue 13, 16 July 1934, Page 9

DOWN TO DANGER

BRITAIN'S SEA POWER

GROWTH OF OBSOLETE SHIPS

POSITION EXAMINED

"With the talks on disarmament drawing to an abortive conclusion, it is high time that we rovicwed our own defences —such as they are, writes the naval correspondent of the "Morning Post." It has long been admitted that ive have disarmed to "the edge of risk," and statesmen have promised a strengthening of our position should the Disarmament Conference fail.

These promises have been concerned chiefly, with air« power. .What of sea power? Surely it is futile to tremble at the threat of air inferiority without ever; thinking of the. consequences of inferiority at sea. This would mean starvation—nothing .less. The. Services are-complementary. Air and sea run parallel in these days. But there is this difference. No belligerents would risk the ignominy which would result from wholesale slaughter of civilians from the air, if it was in their power to force a nation into submission by tightening its* belts through legitimate methods. It is for this reason that sea power must remain the first line for a nation which is wholly dependent upon sea-borne trade for its existence.

The ''Treaties of Washington and London havje placed the' .Navy of this country in'a position of.'weakness unparalleled since the days of the Stuarts. Immediate steps must bo taken-to. make iip-'sonie, at least, of the ground that has been lost.

OVER-AGE BATTLESHIPS.

Let us consider the most important needs, of the Navy and the war in which they can best lie met.

(1) Battleships—Treaty obligations do not allow us- to lay down, the keel of a battleship until 1937.' By that time eleven of our fifteen-capital ships will already be over the agreed age limit of twenty years. The postponement of urgent'replacements in this class of ship by the terms of the Naval Treaties has created a situation whibh" will involve the nation either in great financial sacrifice or the acceptance of a battle-fleet far more obsolete ; than- : those -of other .nations. We cannot lay down replacements in this category immediately, but we can ; set aside money in the form"of.a sink-1 ing fund to help to pay for these re-1 placements as, soon as they are per; mitted, and some fund of this sort should immediately.be created. ■ (2) Cruisers—Those familiar with the naval commitments of the British ■Empire have said that our cruiser needs amount 'to seventy, ships as " aii irreducible minimum." ■'•..'..'

This number was" cut down at the Treaty of London to fifty. Actually in 1937 we'shall have forty-nine cruisers, and fourteen of these will be obsolete vessels unfit to nieet ; the eoi-rdsponding ships; of possible adversaries.' Moreover, the manner.in which we haveshackled ourselves to a total tonnage limitation as weli; as • a numerical limitation means that, so long as we are so shackled, the building of a new cruiser automatically cuts down the numbers allowed to us.

CRUISERS AND TRADE ROUTES.

..; It must be remembered also that the limits laid. down are not only for the .Boyal Navy, but apply to the whole British Empire. Moreover, it is linked by 85,000 miles of trade routes without which, the .Empire cannot live. The 193-1 Navy Estimates have' provided;, ■ for ;tiio,' construction ■of four cruisers, but these arc not likely to be laid down until well into 1935. We are cntitle4-by.;treaty to-lay dowaa further fonr cruisers. These and those of this year's programme should be comineneed...without delay, so that' buildlag : slips and, above all, money, will be available for expansion when the tune comes to increase our numbers to those required for bare necessity, k .. (3) Aircraft Carriers.—So long as these craft, form an- integral part of 1W Fleet we seed at least two with each of our three major fleets—that is, six in,.a11,. , ... , . . ' _ . _

On paper we have six" already, as well as one authorised by the 1034 Xavy Estimates. But one at leasSt is so obsolete as to be useless, and others are'rapidly n'earing the end of their useful life. Some' provision should be made for their replacement in the hear future. "-" : .-•'•.

(4) Destroyers.—Our fleet is at present saddlod with a very large number of over-age destroyers. These may he comparatively efficient in peace-time, but. that reliance upon them in the event of war involves undue risk has been amply demonstrated by- their inability to take part in exercises in heavy weather without incurring serious damage.

Under treaty limits we' can still lay down nearly forty of these vessels, and it i» -time that we did so in order to leave our resources clear for the major tasks of battleship and cruiser construction whenrthe time comes.

(5) Submarines.—The abolition' of these craft appears to be as far away as over. Our policy does not require very large numbers of these craft, but we should at least replace boats that are extremely obsolete and prone to de-feets.N-Many.of: the submarines still in service have been in commission for fifteen years, and cannot conceivably be reckoned as efficient fighting units.

MOKE FBBSONNEL.

(6) Sloops, and Small Craft.—The present replacement programmes of these vessels are satisfactory, sinca they are. police vessels rather than fighting units of the Navy.

(7) Personnel.—The 1934 "JSavy .Estimates increased the maximum strength of the naval personnel by some 2000 men.-'But it is a well-known fact that even so the manning of the Fleet is a matter of extreme difficulty and leaves no margin for the formation of even nucleus ■■ crews >of trained men to man ships of the Besorve Fleet should they he required in emergency. It takes longer today to-train a .man'to bo an efficient member of the Navy than it does to build a; ship. ' y It is therefore a matter of the greatest importance that the strength should .be increased to allow of any possible emergency being met. • These then are the requirements-of the-.Navy;-in-.the immediate future. ■They may seem formidable. Certainly they will cost money. But they will noT cost one-hundredth, of the sum -which would be involved' if only one of the.Empire?s network of trade routes fell into other hands! ••