PROSPECTS AT GENEVA

Evening Post, Volume CXVII, Issue 127, 31 May 1934, Page 11

PROSPECTS AT GENEVA

SIMON'S FRANK REVIEW

THE FRANCO-GERMAN GAP

BRITAIN, BRIDGE-BUILDER

(British Official Wireless.) (Received May 31, 11 a.m.)

RUGBY, May 30. The prospects of the Disarmament Conference were frankly reviewed by Sir John Simon, Foreign Secretary, when, during a debate in the General Commission of the Conference at Gerjeva, he expressed the views of the British Government on the present situation. If speeches in debate were to be useful, they must, he said, deal with the realities that now faced them, and he proceeded to address' himself to some of them. He recalled that during the last six months, since the work of the Conference was adjourned to permit of parallel and supplementary efforts being carried on, the British Government had been very closely associated with these efforts, and he referred in particular to (1) the United Kingdom memorandum of January 29; (2) the visits of Mr. Eden to Paris, Berlin, and Rome; (3) the written statement textually approved by the German Government, which Britain obtained, of a modification in ; the memorandum which Germany was prepared to accept and which. included a concession to the heavilyarmed Powers that there should he, no disarmament for the first five years of a ten years' convention; and (4) efforts made to ascertain whether there were any conditions in which this combination of proposals could be made the basis of an agreement. - He was grateful for what Mr. Norman Davis had said as to the value of these efforts, but they had not produced a new basis of agreement,-and, as the President pointed out on Monday, "In view of opinion expressed in the French memorandum of April 17 it seemed that diplomatic negotiations between the Powers could hardly.be carried on any. further." CIRCUMSTANCES RECALLED. . Dealing with the circumstances in which these ' diplomatic negotiations were entered upon, Sir John Simon recalled that in November the Conference found itself unable to prqeeed to the second reading of tho draft convention with any solid hope of thereby reaching a universal agreement. Germany was absent and some method had to be found to keep her in touch in the hope of bringing her back within the ambit, of the discussion and negotiations with a view to' Ultimate agreement. For an international agreement about armaments necessarily , involved amongst other things that Germany should be party to it. The French Government, in the memorandum of March 19, expressed concurrence with thephrase^in the previous United Kingdom memorandum that a reconciliation -of tho points of view of Franco and Germany was an essential condition of a general agreement. What he asked were the essential differences which divided these two points of view as they emerged from' the documents exchanged between the various Powers. In its statement of views of April 1G the German Government defined rearmament, for which it stipulated in tho proposed convention, at the same time declaring that it would agree to a postponement of the reduction of armaments of other Powers until the end of the fifth year of a ten years' convention. If; therefore, international agreement was to be reached, cither this claim must be modified or conceded. If they really desired to do business in the Conference; it was essential that this issue should bo faced and dealt with now by those principally concerned. GERMANY'S CLAIMS. Germany claimed that a convention, if it followed tho general lines already approved by tho vote of the General Commission, should accept a level of German armament higher than that provided in the Peace Treaties to the extent indicated in the document of April 16. On the other hand, it appeared from the documents that-France would desire to stand fast by the limits suggested at the meeting of the Bureau on October 14 last, with a modification contained in the French memorandum of January J. The suggestions of October propounded a basis which would hare admitted no immediate rearmament of, Germany, other than an increase in the qualities, proportionate to the gradual transformation of the Beiehwehr, of the arms which she was by Treaty entitled to possess. Indeed, he would go further. Unless something like them was agreed upon then he did not believe a Disarmament Convention could be ' realised. His Majesty's Government was strengthened in that judgment by a most interesting memorandum put forward by the Danish', Spanish, Norwegian, Swedish, and Swiss delegations, the main conclusions of which seemed to be in close accord with those of the United Kingdom memorandum. ■ It was true that in view of these pow.ers security should go beyond the proposals of the- United Kingdom memorandum. That was a question not of principle, but of degree, and he pointed out that part one of the United Kingdom Draft Convention dealt with security along the lines on which they might hope for the sympathy and co-operation of the United States. REPLY TO SOVIET THESIS. Referring to M. Litvinoff's declaration that the Disarmament Conference, so far as tho direct object of disarmament was concerned, was manifestly dead, but should continue in being, becauso some pact of security could bo evolved, Sir John Simon recalled thut even in 1924, when the Protocol was under discussion, no instrument of security was contemplated as coming into operation until a disarmament agreement had been reached. It would therefore be an entirely new departure to transform a. Conference called for the purpose of disarmament into a Conference for devising plans of security on the basis that no disarmament at all was possible. Further, the value of security pacts depended not on the fact of a promise, but on the certainty, if need should arise,.of a positive performance by the signatories. From that point of view there might be a higher practical value in a limited undertaking by a guarantee like the Treaty of Locarno than in some new unlimited and world-wido assurance. And as to Locarno, he thought it was well understood that what the British Government had promised they would perform. They had to choose between the chance that remained of an agreement on the lines indicated, and •a breakdown in the whole of this peace

effort with the consequences of unlimited competition in armaments and dangers to the future of the world which no nian could measure, _ Germany had rejected that suggestion and the contrast between that proposal and the formulated requirements of Germany of April 16 was obvious. Wore those suggestions in the present circumstances a possible basis of international, agreement? The Conference would make no progress by avoiding or burying these crucial points beneath merely general observations. The only, thing that mattered now was agreement —to find out if there was a possible bridge to be built between the conflicting points of view and what was the contribution they must respectively make to construct that bridge. DONE ITS BEST. His Majesty's Government had done its very best to be bridge-builders. By the end of this general debate it ought to ses more clearly where foundations for such a bridge must be laid, if the gap was to be closed. It could see already how overwhelmingly' grave the consequences must be if, after all this effort and these prolonged debates, no bridge could be built. In the opinion of the British Government, the draft convention which the Conference had adopted as a basis still afforded the best solution. Bealising, however, the serious consequences of failure to reach agreement, it determined 'to formulate modifications which found expression m the memorandum of January 29. It contained proposals, regarded not as ideal but as most likely of acceptance. A close approximation between that memorandum and the German declaration showed that-the differences were being-narrowed. The British Government felt that the line of that memorandum was more likely to produce an agreement than any other concrete proposal. It was easy enough to say they were prepared to go on working. But if they were to do justice to themselves and to their responsibilities, those efforts must be such as could conduce to a successful issue of their work. If an agreement to go on was of value, they must be agreed upon what they were to go on to<do. If .the principles enunciated in the United Kingdom memorandum and in the memorandum of the five delegations were generally acceptable to the Conference as a whole, they .would be clearly, a basis for work, and they could consider what modifications or additions were called for or possible. WHAT OTHER BASIS? But if they were not acceptable, what other basis was there? Ho confessed he knew of none affording any possibility of leading to a convention which would be generally accepted. The "time was long past when they could deludo themselves into imagining that by the pious expression of-a desire to reach an agreement they were promoting agreement. "While we talk, the world does not stand-still. The British Government •is still as convinced as ever that an international agreement about armaments would be the greatest contribution which could be made to the, restoration of confidence and the consummation of peace and realises to the full the gravity of reaching no result." ' DANGERS OF DELAY. But while, he added, they; would still co-operate in any new effort which really contained propspects of producing a general agreement, they would not lend themselves to an indefinite continuance of the vague and inconclusive discussions justified by nothing bettor than a sanguine hope that-some-thing in the way of a solution might still turn up; firstly, because they were convinced that' such a procedure would inflict a great; and increasing ' injury on tho League of Nations, and on. the whole conception of effective . international action, and, secondly, because if a Disarmament Conference were kept in being purely for the - purpose of debate, but without any real hope or prospect of obtaining positive results they were in, effect debarring themselves from whatever new pffort might bo needed. ■