CORRESPONDENCE

Evening Post, Volume CXVI, Issue 33, 8 August 1933, Page 6

CORRESPONDENCE

NATIONAL DEFENCE

(To the Editor.) Sir,—A survey o£: the world situation fit the moment does not appear to- suggest that New Zealand is in imminent danger of attack. Nevertheless, it could very plausibly be argued, from the trend of events, that such au attack is a distinct possibility within the next ten years. It would surely be correct to assume that this possibility provides us with the only logical excuse for maintaining or adding to a system oC national defence. If, then, we admit the necessity for preparedness, simply and solely for defence against external attack, we are bound to carry the argument a step further by asking: What, all the circumstances considered, is the most effective means of dc r fending New Zealand? .We are an island nation, very remote from possible enemies. I should say, rather, that we are\ a twoisland nation with such a geographical configuration that; even if an enemy were ,to land and had only a feeb)e force to encounter, it would be extraordinarily difficult for him to make rapid progress in the military conquest of the c.ountryy unless his forces were stupendous. It is therefore extremely unlikely- that an "enemy': would attack us at all unless he could do bo on a really generous scale. If: he could attach us on a really generous scale, he would no doubt be master of the main Harbours before landing his troops. :• And it, under, cover of his naval guns,'his troops once j planted their feet firmly on the mam nerve centres of our communications, what more could our territorial forces do than set up an impregnable but ultimately useless defence of, the interior?- They would have no chance against aii~ enemy with mobile control of the .coasts; and; all the vital means of communication., Resistance in such circumstances would be resistance to the point of extermination. ■'".!. This line of/reasoning' could; be much more thoroughly- developed. ■ • But." jt. >■ is already clear that New ZeaAand* in. face of external attack, will be either beatenvbr victorious before ever her land forces can have fired a shot. Only a large .fleet, I repeat, would attempt to attack us. Once let that fleet get near enough to train its guns on us, bearing with mathematical accuracy on strategic points, and we are already lost. Therefore, if we are to regard our defence system as a defence system, and not as a fascinating toy, we must allocate our expenditure in the following order of importance:— 1. Bay five-eighths to the maintenance' of our proportionate share of a strong Pacific Fleet with base located at Singapore This will be our first line of defence. 2. Say one-quarter to an efficient military air force-with foucmairi bases. Should our first line of defence fail, a strong air force would have a very good chance, if not of destroying the enemy, then, at least of preventing his advance. ■. 3. Say one-eighth to the provision 11 of long-range guns at strategic poiutp along our coasts as has been suggested to the Australian Government. If-our air force should fail, to achieve its objective, these, "guns maysstill keep,the enemy- from doming within 'measurable, distance l: or our shores.''■::;' ::': :>:i ■ ■ '■'■-. ■'■ ■ V VU" •■-, If, however, the enemy is so numerousr so skilful in his movements, so powerful in his artillery that.his ships have sailed 'into our harbours and are ■ preparing^ to land troops, then, with due respect to 1 whatever territorial forces we may possess Jin such a crisis, their resistance would.be unavailing. Meanwhile, if we aore serious about defence, let-us consider the problem logically and allocate our expenditure where it will %tand; the best chance of serving our purpose; If we are not serious about defence, then scrap the system entirely and spend the' money in further measures to develoß our young: manhood to the utmost of its physique; or in some other useful and constructive direction. Whichever way. you look at it, change is necessary. The whole- problem, calls for clear, careful, and constructive thinking, with a strict eye to the realities of our geographical situation.—l am, etc., '"■•■'■ ;.; . / .." A: D: McKINLAY. (To the Editor.) j Sir, —Your correspondent, Mr. Seddou, is perhaps also aware that the quotation I used, "The strong man armed keepeth his house," can be found in .Mark 3, verse 27, though thewordingis somewhat different, jhis does away with any ambiguity, which, might tend to arise from subsequent verses. Mr. Seddon's sentiments are quite .well founded and logical in regard to the futility and senselessness of each nation striving to better the other in armaments. But there >is quite a distinction between offensive and defensive armaments. It is the latter which we need in a scattered Empire such as ours. We are in a most fortunate position', holding all the important gates of the seas, Gibraltar, Suez, etc. It is up to us to see that these gates are properly protected,' and are we not one of these gates in New Zealand? Should we not contribute a little to the expenditure? Surely it is riot asking too, much. Great Britain, in endeavouring to set a lead, Bas weakened herself while other nations are only toowilling to tender suggestions to weaken her still further. Thus we find ourselves being lulled into a false sense of security by such gospellers of peace. The total expenditure on armaments ;in the year ending March 31, 19U, was £205,000,000, and in the year endings-March 31,1933, it reached the staggering figure of £1,100,000,000. Russia contributed £188,000,000, France, approximately even with U.S.A., £170,000,000. Great Britain, controlling practically one-third of the land surface of the globe, is seventh on the list. The risks of armaments are great, (jut the risks of unpreparedness are greater. No longer will Britain be able to stand out as the arbitrator,of peace and tolerance, if such a recklesW'.policy is pursued, for there is no Kitchener's Army now.— i I am, etc., ■ P. MACE HUTCHISON. :