BRITISH NAVY

Evening Post, Volume CIX, Issue 110, 12 May 1930, Page 9

BRITISH NAVY

REDUCTION OPPOSED

"ARE WE BEING PLAYED WITH?"

CHURCHILL'S SPEECH

(From "The Post's" Representative.) . LONDON, 4th March. Mr. Winston Church ill was in one of v.ia best oratorical veins when he ad- ■ Pressed a meeting organised by the j:svy League last week. Lord Linlithgow presided, and on the platform were Mrs. Churchill, Lord Howe, Lady Richmond, Lord and Lady Denbigh, and Ad-! •jniral Sir Sydney Fremantle. | Tho chairman moved a resolution expressing the opinion that no further reduction in our Naval Forces should bo sanctioned, and that adequate annual provision should bo made for laying I down vessels necessary to maintain existing strength. .Mr. Churchill seconded the' resolution. In the course of his speech Mr. Churchill contrasted the attitude of our own Government with that of the other Powers at the Naval Conference. "Every one of these Powers," he ■said, "has a clear idea of what its safety or its interest or its prestige requires. They know, or seem to know, what they want, and not one of them is in the least afraid of stating the requirements, courteously, no doubt, but at the same- time firmly. His Majesty's ■Government alone seemn to be unsure of themselves. They alone seem to wisli to apologise for tho existence of our Navy. They alone present an aspect of 'squeezability,' of shuffling retreat, or precipitately profered concessions. We know where Japan stands; we know the position of France and Italy. Every one is familiar with American desires. What we do not know is the principle upon which the British Government is proceeding, and tho relation of that principle to our national safety and Imperial unity; and whether there is any point, and, if so, at what point, His Majesty's present advisers will make a stand." Great Britain, who formerly .exercised an undoubted supremacy on the sea, went on Mr. Churchill, had been steadily reducing her Fleet from the pre-war period in ships, in guv power, and in men. Yet we were the only Power of those gathered at the Conference table to whom naval defence spelt national and Imperial existence, the only Power to whom naval defence spelt daily bread. ' Were the other nations wise in desiring to weaken an instrument from which in times, surely not 'forgotten, they had themselves derived enormous assistance and security? : EXTRAORDINARY CHANGE. He would only deal with two extremely simple .points. The -first was the number of cruisers we required to prevent our Empire being riven asunder and ourselves starved to surrender or death. What they wanted to know about the opinion of tlie Sea Lords was that it was professional opinion, scientific opinion, export opinion, and that it was based on tho marshalling of facts* and on making calculation's on those facts, and that it was not vitiated by all sorts of extraneous political considerations. During the time of the late Government the"Admiralty stated that 70 cruisers was the indispensable absolute minimum "of safety. Now they were told that the naval experts considered 50 cruisers sufficient. They wanted to know what had happened to make that extraordinary change of scientific judgment possible. The Prime Minister in the House of Commons said that it was the Kellogg Pact. But what had. the Kellogg Pact got to do with the strategic precautions of the Admiralty? The Kellogg Pact might be a vsry proper matter for Parliament to take into consideration, but it played no part in the technical question which the Admiralty was responsible for answering. I "We ask ourselves," Mr. Churchill continued, "Are wo being played with? Are we really being informed of the true opinion of the naval authorities, or have they changed their opinion, and, if so, why? Wo hope that if there is* a difference of opinion between the Admiralty* and the Government wo should be informed of the true Admiralty opinion; then, as a separate matter, of the Government reason for over-riding that opinion. . . . But if we accept the figure of 50 cruisers now vouched for by the highest expert authorities as sufficient for our needs how imprudent and unskilful was the diplomacy which announced this enormous British reduction before the Conference had even opened, instead of using it, aa it might well have been used, at the critical moment in the negotiations to secure similar concessions from other Powers. "Wo ought to build, after hearing unbiased' naval advice, whatever Parliament considered to be necessary for our safety. British naval requirements ought to be fixed y ourselves and by ourselves alone, because our life depended on them." PRACTICAL SUGGESTION. He did not wish, however, to end ■without associating himself with a practical suggestion made some time ago by Lord Bridgeman. They all wished theConference to reach an agreement. Instead of pursuing sterile discussions about parities, and ratios,, which were either misleading or invidious • reflections on the naval status of great Powers, let tho different delegations •table their programmes for the next five or six years in a spirit of neighbourly and sober goodwill. We seemed to be the only great nation which dared not speak up for itself, which had lost confidence in its mission, which was ready to resign its hard won rights. There was a feeling that England under - the Socialists was "down and out," and on the "dole." But we were still a considerable people, and our hope was that amid the froth and confusion of our present situation-the British nation would still havo the sanity and resolution to snstain that ancient naval power which across four centuries had so often defended good causes and had never defended good causes in vain.

The resolution was carried.