Evening Post. WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 1929. NOT AT THE CHARIOT WHEEL

Evening Post, Volume CVII, Issue 59, 13 March 1929, Page 8

Evening Post. WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 1929. NOT AT THE CHARIOT WHEEL

"Britain expects from the Labour Party," states Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, "a new diplomacy which would consider the whole European situation and relieve Britain of its subordination to France." A complaint of "subordination to France" comes rather strangely from the mouth of the ex-Foreign Minister whose successful diplomacy put an end to the bickerings and differences which had tinged Anglo-French relations, Possibly Mr. Mac Donald considers that Sir Austen Chamberlain is. right in his direction, but wrong in the pace at which he proceeds. The direction is the same as in the course charted by Mr. Mac Donald himself, but the AngloFrench Naval compromise undoubtedly went further than the Labour Prime Minister's commitments to France. Possibly, also, Mr. MacDonald is doubtful of the wisdom of agreeing with the policy of M. Poincare or M. Briand as he agreed with the Left Wing statesman, M. Herriot. Yet there is no doubt that many people are sharing Mr. MacDbnald's general view, concerning subordination to France. Whether they would apply his remedies we cannot say—because we do not know exactly what those remedies may be. . A policy which "would consider the whole European situation" may go much further than public opinion would desire, for example, in the direction of renewing relations with Russia while the latter still pursues her policy of undermining "capitalistic Government."

Some of the people who object, with Mr. Mac Donald, to subordination to France would, however, substitute a different subordination almost as fatal to the full exercise of British influence. They would in all things wait the lead and avoid offence to the State Department at Washington. Such objectors helped to swell the chorus of disapproval which greeted the Anglo-French Naval compromise. But that compromise was a mistake, not merely because it gave offence in America, but because of the manner of its disclosure and because it aroused the suspicions of Italy and Germany. Sir Charles Petrie stated concisely the objection to this and to the diametrically opposed policy when he> wrote in the "Nineteenth Century" recently:—

There is no need to make the Foreign Office an annexe either of the Quai d'Orsay at Paris or of the State Department at Washington.

Sir Charles Petrie sees in Europe three great problems awaiting settlement: The Rhineland, the Anschluss (Union of Austria with Germany), and the colonial ambitions of Italy. Each of these affects British interests in a different way, and no one formula for the settlement of all tan be laid down.

The three leading powers upon the Continent are dividedl by very acute differences upon the most important problems and to agree with one of them would almost certainly be to alienate the other two.

Yet Sir Charles Petrie would not have Britain turn her back on Europe and make a close understanding with the United States the basis of her foreign policy. That would earn the dislike' of every nation in Europe, make Britain share in the South American unpopularity of the United States which Mr. Hoover tried to mitigate in his recent tour, and increase the suspicion of Japan. Sir Charles Petrie advises, in brief, friendship with.all and alliance with none. A similar conclusion is reached, though by somewhat different reasoning, by an able writer in the December "Round Table." He points out that British foreign policy in Europe has been directed towards finding and maintaining a European peace foundation more stable than either the balance of power or the predominance of any" one nation or group. Both of these systems have been tried in the past and have led to war. Now there is hope of something better and more lasting if the nations are resolved that their differences must not be settled by war and that in due time reason and justice, as applied through the League, shall prevail.

But (adds the writer) it is certain that Great Britain will only be able to help Europe to reach the condition when all her problems can be settled on the basis of reason and justice at Geneva, under the leadership of Franc*, Germany, and herself, if she maintains an attitude both of resolute friendliness and of determined independence with both her neighbours. The method of ontering into special understandings and military or naval ententes with either neighbour must inevitably be fatal to real co-operation with the third.

Such a policy will not be easy to pursue, and the superficial thinker may say: "Why not leave Europe alone and concentrate on friendship with America?" Such a question overlooks the plain fact that the American and the British foreign policies are different. There has not been sufficient frankness in recognising the divergence of inter-

ests and, consequently, there has been failure to provide for that divergence.

In refusing to treat one another as foreign Powers in the normal way (writes Sir Charles Petrie)' they take it for granted that their interests are identical and are consequently' very angry on the occasions in which they find they are not. In fine, a real understanding between Great Britain and the United States will only be possible when both parties realise that, although they once shared the same cradle, it was a century and a half ago. The "Round Table" writer sees the solution for this in a joint resolve to make the Peace Pact the basis for Anglo-American relations.

The naval powers should undertake never to settle their differences by war, but only by pacific means, and. as the inevitable corollary, to use their influence to prevent any international questions whatever being settled by war.

The weakness of the "Round Table" writer's solution is that American opinion does not recognise his corollary as "inevitable." America, from President Wilson's time onwards, has been submitting plans to prevent the settlement of differences by war, and then disowning them when the other nations were ready to adopt them. The Peace Pact narrowly escaped, and the World Court is still hedged with reservations which do not relate, as President Hoover suggested, merely to its minor functions. Until American opinion is ready to accept some responsibility (on the lines of the "inevitable corollary") progress must be slow and painful.