ITALY'S AMBITION

Evening Post, Volume CV, Issue 121, 24 May 1928, Page 17

ITALY'S AMBITION

A PLACE IN THE WORLD CLAIM TO EXPANSION PREPARED FOR WAR There is no doubt that Italy is very generally regarded, by the ordinary public at least, with mingled fear and suspicion, as the nation whose foreign policy is most likely to lead to -war, writes G. F. T., in Melbourne "Age." Any number of reasons can be found to account for this. Sho makes no secret, for instance, of her dissatisfaction with the .status quo, and frankly claims the right of national expansion. The fact that she is probably tbo only nation in Europe both materially and psychologically prepared for war, 'and that her Government is of an ultra-na-tionalist hue, creates a certain nervousness which* is in no way dissipated by, the habitually truculent language of'her Prime Minister.. Finally the widespread, even i£ wholly erroneous, belief in the/ instability of the Fascist regime inclines people to the suspicion that it will attempt to maintain itself at home by indulging, like Napoleon 111., in military adventures abroad. A certain colour is lent to this rather superficial impression by the somewhat strained relations into which Signor Mussolini has managed to get, at somo time or other, with most of his neighbours.- But a closer examination does not entirely sustain the view of Italy as a menace to the world's peace. As far as .Western Europe is concerned Italy may almost be said to have turned her back upon it. Her policy here is practically identical with that o£ Great Britain—peace, stability, aud an economic recovery. Nor should undue significance be attached to tho recent controversy over the Italianisation of the newly-acquired southern Tyrol. The policy may be oppressive and unjustifiable, but it is essentially a domestic question.. Tho Austrian Government, aftcivits protest, has declared the incident closed and even if Mussolini's, policy is meant, as it probably is, as a challenge to Germanism, it is a. challenge which is not likely to bo taken up as yet. CENTRAL, AND SOUTH-EAST EUROPE. When we enter the central and southeast European region, however, we find Italian foreign policy very active indeed. As. far as Italy's aims in the Balkans are concerned, there is not as yet any reason to attribute to her territorial ambitions. But there is not the slightest doubt that she hopes for a great expansion in this direction which- will place her in a predominant position. In Mussolini's own words, "Italy cau only move in an easterly direction, the fact being that on the west there are national States .which have taken definite form', and to which we can send nothing! but our labour* Therefore the lines for the pacific expansion of Italy lie towards the east." With this aim in view she cannot tolerate the rise of a powerful State on the eastern side of the Adriatic., and consequently the first object of Italian policy must be to circumscribe and limit the power of the only possible Balkan rival, Jugo-Slavia. Thus she, has entered with Albania into the Tirana pacts, which practically reduce the latter country to an Italian protectorate, with the purpose not only of providing herself with a base for further penetration if necessary, but, even more, to prevent the Serbs doing precisely tho same thing. Similarly, she has carefully cultivated the friendship of Rumania, and more lately Greece,/to forestall the formation of an anti-Italian bloc grouped around Jugo-Slavia. In addition, Italy has secondary but broader diplomatic aims in this region. For some years it has' boon becoming increasingly evident that the Little Entente, that alliance of the victors to keep down the vanquished, docs not supply a sufficient basis for tho new State system needed'in.Balkanised East-Central Europe. The break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the weakening of Germany created a region of politically and economically un-co-ordinated States, extending right up to the Prussian frontier, and the now order can only be stabilised by a new system of alliance. What that system will be it is aa yet too soon to determine, but it can hardly be doubted that Italy hopes to have such a hand in the building of it as to leave her in a diplomatically dominant position from Bavaria to the Bosphorus. She expects to win the support of Poland and Rumania by'granting them what they greatly need but cannot get from anybody else—a defensive alliance against Russia. Hungary is tied to her by a treaty concluded last October which provides that unhappy country with her first friend in a hitherto utterly hostileworld. And, judging by the veritable congress assembled in Rome this month, including the Foreign Ministers of Poland, Hungary, Greece, and Turkey, Signor Mussolini has decided that the time is already ripe for general proposals. In all this, the only danger to world peace is the possibility of Franco-Italian rivalry. That it is a possibility cannot be denied, particularly. in the light of the Franco-Jugo-Slav Treaty of last November, and a certain competition for Rumanian favours. But the probabilities can be greatly exaggerated. So long as Italy does not favour the restoration of the Germans to their old position in Central Europe—which she is not in the least likely to do—there is no fundamental conflict of policy. France, so long as Germany remains encircled, has not the same vital interest in the new East European system aa Italy, and, provided she is not entirely excluded and is offered adequate safeguards for her special interests, there is no reason why an amicable agreement should not be reached. That Italy is quite ready to come to such an arrangement has been clearly demonstrated on at least two occasions since tlio. signing of the Franco'-Jugb-Slav Treaty, and indeed Mussolini has announced that he would begin discussions with M. Briand. OUTSIDE EUROPE. Despite her Balkan ambitions, however, Italy's policy of expansion is essentially colonial. Unfortunately^ as a result of her tardy achievement of national unity, she missed the sharing out of colonies amongst the great Powers in the second half of the last century, and now, when she is at the stage .which they reached in the seventies, pressed outwards by an excess of national vigour, by economic needs and by a population problem, she finds the best seats at the table already occupied. In addition, the considerable prospects opened out to her by the treaty of Serres disappeared with its collapse. Naturally she is dissatisfied; and this sometimes leads her statesmen into rather aggressive and threatening declarations. That these represent a very real determination to expand outside Europe, even at the expense of some other nation if necessary, cannot be denied. But on examination it is difficult o find any specific danger in the immediate future, except in the event of the break up of one of the lesser colonial empires. '• First, as to Africa; though she is admittedly inadequately represented by Lybia, Eritrea, and "Italian Somaliland, France and Great Britain are so strongly entrenched throughout the continent as to render territorial expansion at their expense practically inconceivable. The only possible causes of conflict between the groat Powers would be an attempt to squeeze out British and French Somaliland, which separate Eritrea from Italian Somaliland, or another attack upon Abyssinia. That Italy might -some day threaten Britain's position in 'Egypt is conceivable, but beyond the present -horizon. As for tbe two African issues which are the subject of most Italian outbursts,' namely, her demand for an equal share in the international control of Tangier and the treatment of Italian settlera in Tunisia, tbo former is practically settled in her favour, while tho latter derives its very real importance, not from the material interests involved, which-are'slight, but from its character as a i-sort of test of good will between the two nations. It is rnithcr to Asia Minor that Italy looks for elbow room. It must never bo forgotten that by the Tripartite Agreement annexed to -the Treaty of Sevres. Italy wns accorded a luif-e area in southern Anatolia as a "zone of special influence,''' and Unit when tho treaty was abandoned, while Franco and Great Britain saved a good deal out of the wreck, Italy lost practically everything. Something of what she had to

abandon then through her internal weakness she seeks to recover now in ber moment of strength. But here again, actual territorial expansion hardly seems to be contemplated in the face of a strong Turkish national State under Mustapha Kemal. It is rather an economic hegemony, based on and maintained by a dominating diplomatic position, that is aimed at. There is thus a very close connection between Italy's Balkan and Asia Minor policies, which together may bo summed up by saying that she aspires to the position of dominant Neor'Easteru Power. AN OFFSET TO RUSSIA. Sineo tho gap created by the collapse of the Dual Monarchy, the encirclement 6f Germany aud the temporary retirement of Russia from the East European theatre will have to be filled, there is nothing unreasonable about this nor intrinsically prejudicial to the world's peace. So long as the route to India is left unmenaced, Great Britain will not be disturbed' by Italian hegemony, and she might even welcome it aa an offset to a Eussia with renewed Mediterranean aspirations. The attitude of France, however, is the crux of the situation. Firmly established in Syria, and with a strong cultural hold upon the Levant, she has been credited herself with Near Eastern ambitions. Will, she accept the necessity for Italian expansion? The peace of Europe and the future of the Mediterranean basin hang upon the answer. . It impossible that the two Latin nations will drift into an increasing diplomatic and colonial rivalry which can only end in catastrophe. It is just as possible that they will do what England and France, in circumstances equally difficult, did in 1903—negotiate a general agreement oh all main points of difference and an alliance based.on a fair division of interests. That Italy is ready for such a solution is shown by her offer of the olive branch last December, when, at a critical moment, Signor Mussolini in a communication to the "Depeche Tunisienrie" declared,his faith .in "the community of Latins by which the peace of the world could be assured," and followed it with an inspired statement in. the "Tribuna" that Italy "might consent to recognise and ensure French predominance in the western Mediterranean if France woukl loyally consent to make sacrifices in Italy's favour in. the eastern Mediterranean." '