EMPIRE'S POLICY DECLARED

Evening Post, Volume CIV, Issue 24, 28 July 1927, Page 11

EMPIRE'S POLICY DECLARED

„ Mr. J. 11. Clynes, Deputy-Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party, asked whother an opportunity would bo given to discuss the question when the lious> resumed in November. Sir Auston Chamberlain: "I will undertake on behalf of the Prime Minister that such an opportunity will bo given." "INEXPEDIENT AND IMPROPER." .Replying to Lieutenant-Commander Konworthy, Sir Austen Chamberlain said that the Government regarded as inexpedient and almost improper to enter upon any detailed discussion Mil)lo tho Conference was still sitting. Mr. X Thurtlo (Labour): "Is it not a tact that each Power is going to insist on its own national security, making HRi-ecmont utterly impossible? In the circumstances should not tho protracted farce end at the earliest moment J" •Sir Austen Chamberlain: "1 rcret such a (one and words. Tim Government must dissociate itself expressly ami immediately from xiw.i, rercrences Hie whole basis ot the Conference is to reconcile the limitation of armnmenU with national security, and that is the only basis on w^ich a Conference on tho limitation of firmaments can ever be brought to a successful issue."

In the Government's opinion there was no need for difficulty in arriving at a temporary agreement about the immediate future of cruiser building, but the British Empire could not be asked to give such temporary agreement the appearance of an immuteble principle which might be treated as a precedent. Any other course would inevitably be interpreted in the future as involving the formal surrender by the Empire of maritime equality, the consummation of which the Government were well assured was not part of the present policy.

GLOOMY AMERICAN FORECAST

"FAILURE IS INEVITABLE"

In a statement defining the Government's policy regarding the Geneva Naval Limitation Conference, Sir Austen Chamberlain declares that while there is no need for difficulty in arriving at a temporary agreement about the immediate future of cruiser building the British Empire cannot be asked to give such temporary agreement the appearance of an immutable principle which might be regarded as a precedent. Any other course would inevitably be interpreted in the future as involving the formal surrender by the Empire of maritime equality. American officials are gloomy, predicting the break-up of the Conference without reaching an agreement.

(Received 2Sth July, -10.30 a.in.) LONDON, 27th July. Sir Austen Chamberlain (Ac tingPrime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), replying to a question in the House of Commons, said

that after a full discussion with Cabinet, the Hon. \V. C. Bridgeman (First Lord of the Admiralty and leading British delegate) and Lord Bobert Cpeil had returned to Geneva. Cabinet trusted that the Conference would reach a sueeessSIR A. CHAMBERLAIN. J ul occlusion. In the circumstances it would bo improper to make a detailed exposition of the British position or to comment on the other Powers' proposals. Instead, he proposed to read a written statement designed only to remove misunderstanding, which, if not corrected, might impede the prospects of success.

THE OFFICIAL STATEMENT. Ho went on to read the following statement:— • Despite all the British efforts at Geneva, serious misapprehensions as to Great Britain's aims had prevailed in some quarters. Britain was avon charged with desiring to destroy' equality in sea power between tho United States and the British Empire. There was no foundation for such a suspicion. Cabinet understood Mr. Coolidgo's invitation as based on a desire to develop the Washington Conference by diminishing yet further naval expenditure, and maintaining national security. Cabinet was in complete agreement with that twofold aim, and desired to measure the merit of every proposal by degrees, which would further that twofold purpose.

On this principle Great Britain proposed to diminish the size and also tho armament of battleships, but not altering the numbers fixed, at Washington. For tho same reason it suggested tho limitation of number and also of armament of tho largo fighting cruisers on similar principles to thoso adopted for battleships. This would greatly diminish tho national expenditure without endangering national security. Questions connected with small cruisers wero more complicated. The strengths of fleets could be tested in figures and compared with precision. Their primary function was to fight other ileets. Speaking broadly, they could bo compared to each other. SMALL-CRUISER PROBLEM.

There was no such simple way of looking .it tho subject in the caso of small cruisers employed for polico purposes in peace-time, and for tbo protection of lines of communication in war-time. Tho geographical consideration could not vatiomilly bo ignored. It could hardly be denied, as was clearly staled in accepting air. Oulidgo's invitation, that>sui:h vessel* were a_ vital necessity for a widely-si-ati.uud Kmpirr, whoso most populous parts were dependent for their daily broad on seaborne (rude, which might perish if t'.iey failed to defend the external routes. The sea routes upon which .|:>>iitain's existence depended lay largely., in tho narrow waters of other States.^ That was not Uio case, with the "United States, whose most important lines lay either on land within her own frontiers or seawiso along her own coasts or on tho great oceans. Those considerations, which rocoived duo regard at Washington in J922, had not since lost any of their importanco. While urging that special difficulties woro duo to geographical position, Britain was far from claiming the least right to dictate a smaliercruiser policy to other Powers.

THE PRINCIPLE WE ACCEPT. Slic accepted the principle which sho understood underlay Mr. Cooliilge's policy, that no maritime Tower should maintain a larger navy lluui who required Tor her security. To translate that into figures was for Iho vnasou given more dillicult in the case of small cruisers than in the case of HlO larger type of service vessels. Anything Vcfiemljling a quasi peimauonl. formula adopted for battleships ai: Washington was quite inapplicable and inadequate

for vessels designed for purposes for which the necessity varied with the geographical and economical position of the several Powers concerned. It became even inapplicable when strength was estimated in the terms of gross tonnage, without reference to the numbers or armaments.

Two nations which possessed 100,----000 tons of battleships might be regarded, without serious error, as so far equal in fighting power, but no such statement could reasonably be made about two nations, one having ten 10,000-ton cruisers and the other twenty 5000-touners. It all depended on the circumstances, though rho naval experts would probably agree that, if it came to fighting, the more numerous but smaller vessels would stand a poor chance against the fewer and more powerful vessels. If so, the country which for any reason was obliged to distribute the available tonnage among smaller uuits, would be at a permanent disadvantage compared with one which was able to adopt a different scheme. NOMINAL PARITY, BUT BEAL ■ INEQUALITY. There could be nominal parity, but real inequality. This, of course, was merely an illustration, but sufficed to oxpiaiu why, in the Governmeut's opinion, no provisions open to that kind of criticism, should be given that international authority already possessed by those parts in the Treaty of Washington which dealt with strength and numbers.