Evening Post. TUESDAY, JULY 26, 1927. THE OTHER SIDE

Evening Post, Volume CIV, Issue 22, 26 July 1927, Page 8

Evening Post. TUESDAY, JULY 26, 1927. THE OTHER SIDE

Describing the Washington Conference as "a model" and Geneva as "by comparison a muddle," Mr. Garvin, in the "Observer," assigns the causes of the muddle with an even-handed severity to Britain and the United Stales. Of Japan, who at one time seemed likely to serve as a reconciling element between the two Englishspeaking Powers which outmanoeuvred her at Washington, Mr. Garvin has nothing to say, but of those other two he writes as follows:— Though ill-prepared beforehand, our delegation was admirably equipped technically, but showed a want of insight into the psychics of the American case. The Americans, on the other hand were not equipped with knowledge even of the elementary conditions of British existence. As the English journalist of the first rank who has perhaps carried the policy of complaisance to the United States to greater lengths, and advocated an Anglo-American Entente with greater enthusiasm, than any other, Mr. Garvin might with advantage have revealed that "insight into the psychics of the American case" which he accuses our delegates at Geneva of lacking, but he does not appear to have done so. It must certainly be admitted that the excellent reports of the Conference cabled to us from London and Geneva, which are likely to be a faithful precis of the fuller information supplied by the British Press, have shed very little light on the problem. The stark unreasonableness of the American demands, the incredible paradox of the Power which convened the Naval Armaments Limitation Conference suggesting that instead of reducing the size of capital ships it may require an increase, and strenuously battling for a policy which would increase the number of the most formidable type of cruiser, has been made painfully clear. But as to why such an attitude should commend itself to the idealism of a peace-lov-ing Government and a peace-loving people, we have been left completely in the dark. In war it is natural and almost inevitable to suppose that our own case is a hundred per cent, right and die other side a hundred per cent, wrong. But in peace, when a difference with a valued friend reveals the same apparent apportionment of merit and demerit, it is generally safe to assume that things are not what they seem, and that there is a catch in the matter somewhere. Illversed as the British delegation may have been in the "psychics" of the American case before it went to Geneva, it cannot have been there very long without getting fresh light on the subject and learning, in part at any rate, where the catcli came in. Yet no inkling of this new light has appeared, so far as we have observed, in the reports, and one's wonder at the strange perversity of the Americans has increased from day to day. Enough had indeed been revealed in the American Press on the eve of the Conference to prepare the Admiralty for the line that was likely to be taken by the United States delegation on one of the vital issues, and the perplexity and irritation which the clash has created throughout the Empire would have been materially mitigated if it had been generally known. About the beginning of June it was stated with. an appearance of authority which has since been in large measure justified that Britain would propose a reduction in the maximum size of cruiser from 10,000 to approximately 6000 tons, and a reduction in the calibre of the guns to be carried on such craft from 8 inches to 6. It was at once pointed out in the United States that owing to her many naval stations scattered all over the world this proposal would work out to the advantage of Britain "by limiting the radius of action of the ships of other Powers through reducing their fuel supply." Subsequent messages from Geneva pointed out that the proposal would give Britain a still greater advantage, which was editorially described as follows in the "Springfield Weekly Republican", of the 9th June:— Tho many large and fast merchant ships flying the British flag could again be armed, as during the World War, with six-inch guns. In some cases they might then be individually more than a match for the light cruisers if tho latter were not only limited in displacement but were also -prohibited from carrying guns larger than six inches in calibre. A 42,000-ton merchantman might conceivably be refitted into a mr-o powerful warship than a 6000-ton cruiser, although the design of the merchant ship limits tho deck space available for gun mounts. The nub of the matter is that a six-inch gun is the largest weapon that can ordinarily be mounted on the deck of a merchantman An eight-inch gun, with its great recoil, would subject tho merchant ship to weights and strains which her deck and hull construction does not lit her to meet with safety. Yet the eightinch gun is so much more powerful that a light cruiser, even if armed with only one or two of that calibre, could batter any merchantman to pieces while remaining outside the range of the latter's six-inch guns. It was pointed out in the same article that the process suggested was exactly what had occurred at the Battle of Coronel. After the two 9-inch guns on the Cape of Good Hope and the Monmouth had been put out of action, the British ships with their 6-inch guns were absolutely at the mercy of the 8-inch guns of the two German armoured cruisers. There is more relative difference, the "Bepublicaa" proceeded, between a aix-

inch and an eight-inch naval cannon than between any two immediately succeeding conventional sizes. ... To do away with any guns above six inches in calibre, except as carried by the battleships of the first line, would be to make potential light cruisers out of most merchantmen capable of making from 15 to 19 knots an hour. Of these there are 300 under the British flag and 50 under the American. It would make still more powerful and effective light cruisers out of merchantmen capable of 20 knots or more. Of these, according to a recent tabulation, Great Britain has 42 and the United States four. The argument admirably illustrates how much depends upon the point of view. To the fears of Britain her immense fleet of merchantmen offer points of attack all over the world to which neither America nor any other Tower presents a parallel. The fears of America see in the pick of-this fleet so many potential cruisers against which she must have an increased supply of large cruisers armed with 8-inch guns by way of protection. The "Springfield Republican" considers the American objection to the abandonment of the Binch gun as well founded unless Britain can offer some compensating sacrifice, such, for instance, as the limitation or abandonment of the right to arm her merchantmen. It will be interesting to learn how the argument fared at Geneva.