Evening Post. TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 1927. TIME FOR ACTION

Evening Post, Volume CXIII, Issue 80, 5 April 1927, Page 8

Evening Post. TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 1927. TIME FOR ACTION

It is about six months since the first session of the present Parliament was brought to a close and the i'rime Minister was temporarily released from local cares and enabled to depart on his Imperial mission to London. It is nearly two months since he returned; the Duke and Uuchess, during whose visit it was only fitting that the ordinary activities of politics should be suspended, have come and gone; and within the next three months Parliament will have met again for what in ordinary course is the most active and.the most important session of the three. It is therefore high time that the Government awoke from its long slumber and gave such unmistakable evidence of the change as to awake the country also. It has often been said that the most dangerous enemy of a democracy is apathy, and anybody who is not prepared to reject this truism must at least admit that the political condition of this country throughout the present recess has been far from wholesome. Except during the War, when political controversy was properly suppressed in the interests of national unity, we have rarely had so prolonged a spell of almost completely flat calm. The ship of State has been, drifting with hardly breeze enough to give her steerage way. The absence of the skipper—the price which every Government must periodically pay for the faithful discharge of one of the most important of its Imperial duties—has been the main cause. But the skipper is on the bridge again, there are unmistakable signs of the unpleasant weather that so often follows an unusually long, period of calm, and he ought to be giving us some idea of the destination he is aiming at and the course he proposes to take.

All that we have had so far from Mr. Coates since his return has been the report on the Imperial Conference which with very praiseworthy promptitude he was able to issue on the very day of his landing. It was a clear and comprehensive summary, but necessarily left much unsaid. A few days later, at Auckland, the Prime Minister rejected the suggestion that he should amplify that statement.

The matters, lie said, are- too vital, and they are far too important for discussion in other but a considered fashion. A wrongly used word or an opinion expressed on the spur of t'ao moment may do infinite harm in conveying an erroneous impression to people not only of this country but of the other partners' in tho Empire.

The reasoning was sound, and it would be well if others whose positions give equal weight to their words would always imitate the caution of Mr. Coates. The course which he proposed to follow was to place all the proceedings of the Conference before his colleagues, and after they had had full time to digest the information and to form their own opinions, to have all the issues discussed by Cabinet. He was able to say that he had already placed his own views and of the Conference on defence before his colleagues, and that in due course the position would be discussed and a policy adopted which would operate for years to come. This was very good news, and as the Prime Minister's views were already so definite we may doubtless assume that by this time Cabinet also has come to a conclusion, at any rate on the principal points. Yet not a hint of the decision has been made public. There may no doubt be details which the Government would prefer to hold back till Parliament meets, but we suggest that it is time for a considered statement on the main principles of the proposals and on other aspects of the work of the Imperial Conference not already covered. It is only by a constant process of information, education, and stimulation that the country can be brought up to the standard of Imperial responsibility which Mr. Coates has in view, and during the next two or three months he has a unique opportunity.

From the standpoint of the political interests of the Government the need for a clear, strong lead on domestic policy is still more urgent. The result of the General Election was to put Mr. Coates into a position very closely resembling that which the British electors had given to Mr. Baldwin about a year before. Mr. Baldwin had the support of a twothirds majority of the House of Commons, and it was based more upon personal confidence and the desire for sound administration than upon the details of a legislative programme. The Liberal Party had been almost annihilated, and a Labour Party representing a quarter of the House was the official Opposition, On all these points Mr. Coates's victory followed Mr. Baldwin's very closely. In both cases discerning friends could see that the main objection to the victory was that it was too sweeping. Though every leader strives to make his majority as large as possible, he makes trouble for himself if he is too successful. A very large majority is apt to be unwieldy and hard to manage. It encourages apathy and self-complac-ency on the part pf the victors, weakens discipline, and removes the stimulus of danger. All these drawbacks have been illustrated in Mr. t ßaitjjyt^jh,fe^]Kieppf^jand the% ha^e

been aggravated by such troubles as the coai strike and the Chinese upheaval, in which fortune has exacted full compensation for her previous favours. Without any aggravations of this kind Mr. Coates's difficulties are following to a large extent the same general lines as Mr. Baldwin's.

It seems to us, therefore, that the time has come for the Government to show a bold front, to abandon the inaction which makes for drift and disintegration, to make up its mind on the domestic programme which it proposes to submit to Parliament, and to take the country into its confidence at once on the main points. How many policy speeches have we had from any member of the Government during the last six months? How many speeches of any kind? It appears to hold the platform as lightly as does Mussolini himself. If the Government is much weaker than it was a year ago, it is not so much from what it has done as from what it has failed to do, and from the general impression that it is not doing anything.