Evening Post. TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1926. MUSSOLINI'S THREAT

Evening Post, Volume CXI, Issue 34, 9 February 1926, Page 6

Evening Post. TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1926. MUSSOLINI'S THREAT

In the series of articles which Mr. Hugh Redwood contributed to the "Daily News" in September and October the most surprising result of his investigations of Fascism on the spot related to foreign policy. He described Signor Mussolini as "both mentally and physically sick, and suffering from a malady similar to that of Lenin" —a condition in which, as also in (the case of Woodrow Wilson, a ' predisposition to megalomania seemed to be seriously aggravated by physical weakness. But it was not bo much in the suggested cause of the Dictator's "dangerous dreamings" as in the directions attributed to them that the special interest of Mr. Redwood's diagnosis lay. Mussolini was credited with Napoleonic ambitions in foreign policy and along lines wl\ich previous authorities had not prepared us to expect.

Mussolini, said Mr. Redwood, has made proposals for an alliance with Buisi*, and has endeavoured unsuccessfully to gain Germany's adherence with a view to constituting a new Triple Alliance, directed mainly against' France and also against Britain. Although Italy will be represented" at the Security Conference, Mussolini made strenuous efforts to dissuade Germany from entering into the Pact.

Mr. Redwood added that his statements would be denied, but that he made them on "unquestionable authority." Mr. Redwood's unquestionable authority certainly seemed to be very much open to question when a week or two later Signor Musßolini appeared at Locarno, loyally supported the efforts of Britain and France to come to an understanding with Germany, and by initialling the Treaty committed Italy to an equal liability with Britain as a guarantor.

Another of Mr. Redwood's striking statements was the boast of the Fascisti that 300,000 bayonets were ready to defend Fascism. This was interpreted to mean

that if Fascism is endangered, Mussolini will not scruple to make war, and seek the aggrandisement of Italy to ensure the maintenance of his power.

There waß so little reason for doubting that the power which had shown its quality in the bombardment of Corfu would resort, if necessary, to what' has been a normal device of tyranny in. all ages, that Europe may be thankful that the necessity has not arisen. Fascism has emerged unscathed from the crisis to which Mr. Redwood appeared to be looking forward not without hope,, and the success with which it has extinguished the last vestiges of independence in Parliament and in the Press means that the net result of last year's operations is to leave it more firmly entrenched than ever. The temptation to foreign adventure which might have been offered by domestic unrest is therefore lacking, but the superabundant vitality of a Napoleon or a Mussolini provides plenty of other openings for trouble in the same field. Like Napoleon, Mussolini has higher uses for Empire than as a mere safety-valve for domestic discontent, and, unlike Napoleon, he must be credited even by his detractors with a genuine patriotism which is not a mere alias or cover for an all-devouring egotism. He has great visions for Italy as well as for himself, but what shape they may have taken in his own mind is not yet clear from his vague and cryptic utterances on the subject The old times which he has reproduced in Italy itself by the extinction of liberty must also be imitated in regard to Imperial policy, but how close the imitation is to be we have not yet been told.

At the close of a sitting of the Cabinet Council in November Signor Mussolini announced that "in the calendar of the Fascist revolution one must write down the 14th November, 19*25, in letters of gold." The reference was presumably to the preparation of " the legislative programme, designed to drive the last nail into the coffin of Italian liberty, which was rapidly passed by Parliament shortly afterwards. About the same time Signor Mussolini piqued public curiosity still more by declaring that "a new event" would happen in January. The popular belief that he was proposing, to proclaim Italy as an Empire was confirmed by th« volubility with which he expounded his ideas of Empire about that time. On the 21st December he unfolded his aspirations for an Italian Empire at great length in an interview which an American news agency featured as "exclusive," though it was simultaneously published in London by the "Daily News." After explaining that the word "Empire" had several meanings in the Italian language, ranging from "a form of Government" such as that which dominated the world from Borne in the early days of Christianity to "force, might, dominion, command," the Dictator came to the heart of the matter as follows:—

"When I mention Imperial Italy I- do not anticipate definite territorial conquest; rather an attitude of mind virile and of conduct combative, if necessary, which Italy must observe in tackling international problems. Anybody who sees aggression in such a policy is a fool. ... I am confident Italy won't lack means when the occasion arises of obtaining peacefully that portion which is her due. Other nations would assume grave responsibilities in raising

obstinate resistance to Italy's moderate aspirations as a great Power.

Though this exposition leaves one in the dark as to the precise manner in which Mussolini proposes to set to work, it is quite definite enough to justify the uneasiness expressed by Mr. Redwood in September. The references to virility and force, when interpreted in the light of his domestic policy, make very unpleasant reading, and now the commentary supplied by the speech in the Italian Chamber reported yesterday suggests that the Dictator is eager to give us a taste of his Imperial gospel by makng an example of Germany. Not since the Germans themselves through their spokesman, the Kaiser, used periodically to make the flesh of Europe creep have we had such a display of sabre-rattling as that which has filled Germany with amazement. The German Government is wise to delay its reply.