SUBMARINES

Evening Post, Volume CXI, Issue 3, 5 January 1926, Page 9

SUBMARINES

IS ABOLITION PRACTI-

CABLE?

DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY

WHAT IT MIGHT MEAN.

The loss of submarine Ml, with a deplorablo sacrifice of life, has once more directed attention to the proposal that the Powers should, by international agreement, decide to abolish this type of man-of-war, writes Archibald Hurd in the "Daily Telegraph." Mr. Percy G. Mackinnon, chairman of Lloyd's, which is so intimately associated with the mercantile marine, has urged that another attempt should tie made to attain this end. It is, however, at least an interesting matter for exploration whether it is necessary to delay action until all the naval Powers have come into line at some future conference. As the Washington Conference revealed, there is a large measure of agreement between this country—and, indeed, the whole British Empire—and the United States and Japan on this question. Would it be feasible for these three Powers to determine neither to build nor maintain submarines in future, letting it bo known that the large sums which they have hitherto spent on this branch of the naval service, or even larger sums, would be devoted to perfecting the means for destroying submarines, even going to the length of exchanging between themselves the results of research and experiment in or,der to strengthen their defensive position ? Other naval Powers v.-ould be free to' join in this compact, and reap all the advantages which might ensue. That i* a suggestion which merits consideration from the naval, the mercantile, the financial, and the humane points of view.

Most peoplo have forgotten that when the submarine first appeared on the horizon the Board of Admiralty refused, in faco of considerable pressure, to build any of those craft. But, at lust, in view of the action of other Powers, the Admiralty reluctantly gave way.

During the bitter years of the Great War the nation learnt that the problem presented by the submarine was not exclusively a naval problem in the sense that it affected only the officers and men of the Boyal Navy and ,the national interests confided to their charge. Before the. Armistice was signed 14,646 British merchant seamen and fishermen, apart from others serving under Allied and neutral, flags, had been massacred, in many cases their ships being sunk under them at sight. In the whole record of warfare between nation and nation there had never been anything comparable to the terrible experiences of these men, for they were not only itncovenanted to the State, but, until the emergency had developed means of defence, they were absolutely defenceless. Their fate touched the hearf of humanity, and when the Peace Conference assembled at Versailles it was made one of the condi- j tions imposed upon Germany that she should not build or maintain • any submarines in future. She had already paid a heavy price for her submarine campaign, for upwards of 200 submarines were destroyed as soon as the naval authorities, realising the peril, concentrated their attention on defensive measures, of which the convoy proved the most effective, though scores of the enemy craft met their end as a result of the heroic devotion and splendid skill of the Auxiliary Patrol, the barrages successively laid in the Straits of Dover, and the activities of destroyers of tho Royal Navy. By the time the Armistice was concluded the Admiralty could claim that, though their plans had not yet been completely carried into effect, tho .submarine had been mastered. The Grand Fleet, holding the control of the North Sea and every sea, had not been robbed of a single modern unit, and there was an assurance that the peril to merchant shipping had been effectively countered. THE WASHINGTON PROPOSAL. In these circumstances tho Earl of Balfour and Lord Lee of Fareham, First Lord of the Admiralty, urged at the Washington Conference that for financial as well as humane reasons tho submarine should be abolished. Lord Lee advocated this policy on lour main grounds: (1) The war had shown that the submarine was unable to disturb large groups of naval units as the immunity of the Grand Fleet had proved; (2) it was powerless against a big. naval attack; (3) it could not stop tho transportation of troops; and (4) it was suitable only as a weapon against merchantmen. Although th» United States'and Japan were in large mcasuro in agreement with the British standpoint, no decision was taken. But tho Conference, attended by the political representatives as well as the naval advisers of- the United States, the British Empire, Japan, Franco, and Italy, formulated a definite agreement "to ■protect neutrals and non-combatants at sea in time of war." It was laid down generally that submarines were not exempt from the universal rules governing visit and search, and agreed that "any person in the service of any Power who shall violate any of those rules, whether or, not such person is under orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an

act of piracy, and may be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities of any Power within the jurisdiction of which he may be found." That declaration, drawn up by Senator Boot, was accepted by tho whole Conference, and in order that there might be no misapprehension as to its significance another clause was added to the Treaty:—

"The signatory Powers recognise the practical impossibility of using ! submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as they were violated in the recent war of 1914-1918, the requirements universally accepted by- civilised nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and toj;he end that the prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers shall be universally accepted as a part of the law of nations they now accept that prohibition as henceforth binding as between themselves and they invite all other nations to adhere thereto." WHAT WOULD HAPPEN? That is the position at a moment when we, in common with other naval Powers, confront the future. As an offensive . weapon, in Us legitimate

sphere, the exaggerated value which win attached to the submarine no longer exists, and the convoy system has been proved by demonstration to be v an effective counter-measure, even when, in face of the code of humanity, submarines are employed against peaceful merchant shipping. No doubt the naval officer regards the submarine as an auxiliary of a fleet which might prove useful, but *the chairman of Lloyd's, and others who take hi« standpoint, might urge on national grounds that there are higher considerations which cannot be ignored. Of all men-of-war, submarines, in propprtion to their displacement, are the most expensive tb build and the most expensive to maintain, and they involve every nation in most costly an-ti-submarine preparations, as is shown by the fact that by the end: of the war wo had nearly 3000 surface craft engaged in hunting down enemy sub* marines. It is, at least, an interesting matter for speculation what the psychological effects on the naval situation generally would be if the Governments of the British Empire, the United States, and Japan had decided to scrap all their submarines, to build no further vessels, and to devote the money thus saved to improving and developing their defensive organisations against such craft, so long as any were known to be afloat. That would be an offensive policy, and it might have far-reaching influence. After all, our imperfect defence towards the end of the war so broke the spirit of the German crews that vessels could only be maimed with the utmost difficulty.

At Washington the representatives of all the British peoples affirmed that "Great Britain, as the possessor of the largest and probably the most efficient equipment of submarines in the world, Was prepared to scrap the whole of thjs great fleet and disband the personnel, provided that the other Powers would do the same.", That challci ge was not accepted then, but the moans of defence against these craft is much more complete to-day than it was.

Let it not be forgotten that the Americans took away the breath of the world when they offered, nearly five years ago, to ecrap thirty capital ships of 845,740 tons. That gesture led us to abandon nineteen vessels of 583,----375 toils, and Japan consented to destroy ships of 448,928 tons. A month before the Conference met any such proposal would have been regarded as unworthy of. consideration, so impossible would it then have seemed that such an' agreement could be reached. It is, of course, one thing to limit capital ship tonnage, and quite another to abolish submarines. The whole matter resolves itself into one of national safety, and, if-it was seriously proposed to scrap all. existing submarines in the British, American, and Japanese fleets, a variety of considerations, somo, of them naval and yet others commercial, would have to be weighed.