PACIFIC RELATIONS

Evening Post, Volume CX, Issue 50, 27 August 1925, Page 4

PACIFIC RELATIONS

YOUNG CHINA

AND WESTERNISED JAPAN

(BY J. B. CONDLIFFE, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, CANTERBURY COLKEGE.)

11l In two preceding articles of this series Mr. Duncan Hall has dealt with the origin and nature of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and with the part played at tiie Institute by the delegations from the three British Dominions represented there. The Dominions had their place and it was clearly felt that at any future meetings the Motherland must also be represented; but there ia no doubt that the centre of interest in the discussions was always between China and Japan. American immigration policy drew some ci'iticism and interest from the Japanese, but even here it was easy to recognise that the chief fear was that this piece .of American bad manners might inflame" the irritation and . distrust already felt in Japan against the American policy in China. As Mr. Hall has pointed out any.interest displayed in Australian or New Zealand immigration policies was merely polite; Japan does' not seek an outlet in the South Seas, and could not afford in any casa' to run even the remotest risk of alienating the diplomatic support of Great Britain upon which she haa relied for so long. Therefore the Japanese spoke politely of the care which we had taken to avoidi hurting their feelings, recognised our right to control the composition of our own population—and passed on to more important matters. In suggesting the Australian and New Zealand leaders as suitable chairmen for the Round Table discussions on Immigration and the Industrialisation of the Far East, they openly spoke of them as neutrals!

With some relief and a little pique we •were forced to realise that in fact as well as geographically we are on the outskirts of Pacific problems, and to realise also that it was, especially in the case of New Zealand, only through Britain and British interests that we were involved at all. Hence New Zealand pleaded consistently and in the end successfully that in all future meetings the Motherland should be directly represented.

CHINA'S PLEA FOR PATIENCE.

Young China held the floor most of the time and presented a forcible but difficult case in her plea for national freedom. The note was struck at ths first meeting of the Institute. Australia's outlook on the Pacific had been' ably presented and well received, and a well reasoned paper on Hawaii was listened to with, attention. But when T. Z. Koo, fresh from his experiences at the Geneva Opium Conference, slim, boyish, and fascinating in his blue _ silk robe, presented in his graceful winning oratory the plea for patience which. Young China puts before the world, the Institute rose m a great ovation. The Chinese group -of young enthusiasts, only^ one of them above the age of foi'ty, included in their number the finest orators of the conference. Not only Koo, but Chen, the vigourous outspoken Y.M.O.A. secretary from Shanghai; Jimmy Yen, the Director of the Mass Education Sfovement, who has under him more than 30,000 voluntary teachers engaged in the colossal task of attacking China's vast illiteracy; Hin Wong, a Cantonese journalist %vith bis finger on the labour and revolutionary movements fostered by Sun Vat Sen in the souti, Au-Young,' the trained economist from Peking Chang, a Yale lawyer now practising in Hankow—all in their separate ways represented the demand of Young China for freedom and national expression. Politely but firmly they resented missionary proselytising as much ac they fought the treaty provisions which give foreigners a favoured status in the ports; they represented to us that the day haa igone for ever when China could be regarded as a huge melon to be divided between the powers. They, and behind them this tremendous new force of halfawakened China., will try first the passive resistance and patience that has brought China through so many crises in tho past; but they are wide-eyed to the fact that if reason fails they may be driven to the uso of force in the assertion of their national freedom.

A SILENT TUG-OF-WAR.

In reality the Institute was almost wholly a silent tug-of-war between Japan and China. The Japanese delegation was fairly representative.of the liberal movement which, with the adoption of manhood suffrage in the last few months, ■seems certain to dominate Japan in the next generation. The Japanese with one or two notable exceptions were much less free in the English tongue than the Chinese. Only one of their number, Yusuke TsuTumi, son-in-law of Viscount Goto, was the equal of three or four of the Chinese in easy, witty speech. They were also much move restrained, and gave Jhe impression of less frankness and move reserve at least in their public statements. Now and again they spoke frankly enough about America, as when their veteran journalist, Zumoto, spoke of the convenience of the national division of labour -which enabled one group of Americans to pass philanthropic resolutions while having no responsibility for the actual work of government, or when Mr. Tsurumi pleasantly remarked that it was no time to stop playing the old game_ of finds are keeps when those who got in first have appropriated everything worth keeping. Generally speaking however, the Japanese were stronger at keeping difficulties in the background. They had, it must be admitted, a constant thorn in their side in the presence of a Korean delegation, and had to face the possibility that any permanent organisation might include Koreans as a separate national group. This emergency was however tided over and Japanese feelings in the. matter were' salved. The Koreans felt that they had once more been betrayed by a cold world; biit the general feeling of those responsible for the decision was that without. Japan the conference could not go on, and the Japanese had let it be felt, though they had not said, that their presence detjPnded upon their faces being saved on this Korean question.

THE TRUE VITAL QUESTION. And alter ali the vital question of the. Pacific is not Korean independence but the relation of Japan to China, Japan's population increases by nearly 700,0C0 yearly. It is possible that by more'intensive agriculture sho may support a few move millions, but. experts differ and the limit must soon be reached. The Occidental countries have dosed their gales to her immigrants nntl her scope, for immigration to Apia is limited by the. vast numbers already {here. Industrialisation is her last hope; but for industrialisation she must hiivo both the markets and the raw materials of China. Sho has in the past endeavoured to control China by force, but the prolonged economic boycott has taught her a sharp lesson and international diplomatic pres- I sure has made it plain that no further ! extension of political control over China will bo tolerated. Since the Washington Conference sho lias looked rather lo'uconomie, peaceful penetration: but in fuin_e wax or other she mitst h.ivo m-cess to China's raw mutoriiils and opportunities in lior markets. , .iioiuiy Chiua vio>y» licr .with suap.icion.,

The bitter anti-foreign feeling in Chin* at the present time is directed mainly against Japan and Great Britain and against Great Britain mainly because it was her support and alliance that enabled Japan to bring off her scoops in the past. The Chinese are a polite people but they do not disguise their feelings in this matter. On the other hand they look to America with friendship and view her Open Door Policy as defined at the Washington Conference as their salvation. Here then is the real root of whatever difficulties lie ahead in the Pacific. The Dominion delegates had many new points of view presented to them but none perhaps was more illuminating than the words of the oldest and wisest member of the Chinese group. "Poor Japan," he said, "she has few rew materials, she sees economic depression. ahead of her; she has lost most of her markets; if America and Britain make her feel desperate in China she will bo like a man with his back to the wall, and reach for her gun." <