NAVAL POLICY

Evening Post, Volume CVIII, Issue 63, 11 September 1924, Page 6

NAVAL POLICY

NEED FOR SINGAPORE BASE

(FIIO3I OOR OWN CORRESPONDENT.) LONDON, 2nd AugustYesterday, when the House considered Civil Service Eestimatcs and a vote of £1,259,000 for the Navy, Mr. L. S.1 Amery said the Vote has been asked for in order to elicit a statement on certain important ' aspects .of Admiralty policy, more particularly the present position with regard to" operations at the Singapore Base, the prospective cruiser programme, and tho pay of the Navy. Together with other colleagues, he had put down a motion to reduce the vote, which they would feel bound to press if they did not elicit a more satisfactory answer to some of those points then they had been able to obtain up to tho present time. He hoped that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty would give the House an assurance that when they met in October he would lay before thorn a plan which would meet the very real demands in respect to pay, and'alleviate the distress of many married naval officers. He asked for an assurance that,' failing some effective scheme" for tho further general limitation of armaments, of which he saw very little immediate prospect, tho Government, would proceed with a definite programme of replacement. Wo ought to lay down at least ten more cruisers in the- next two years. By 1929 the United States would have 122 'submarines, • Japan 73, F,ranee 63, and Great Britain 31. The construction of great fleets of submarines would necessitate a much larger construction of cruisers and destroyers to deal with them. The answer to a submarine was not another submarine. SINGAPORE BASE NECESSARY ' . . FOR DEFENCE. - What was tho Government's real attitude with regard to Singapore? The Prime Minister had made it clear that .the Government recognised that, from 'the point of view of defence, a'Singapore Base was necessary, and-he and the First Lord had made, plain .that if disarmament negotiations were not successful, work on the Singapore Base would be resumed. But with every week that the Government faced tho difficulties of the international situation their idea of an immediate Disarmament Conference was growing more remote; it might be years before a favourable opportunity presented itself. Surely tho Prime Minister's . "gesture" of abandoning ' Singapore should have been made on the eve of negotiations. , ' The Lord Chancellor, who was also the Lord High Strategist of the Government, had described Singapore more as a base of offence than of defence. But the maximum area from, a base that a fleet could dominate'was 1500 miles, which in the case of Singapore represented about 2 per cent, of the Pacific' .To say that Singapore dominated the Pacific appeared absurd to those who gave any consideration to strategical problems. Singapore was simply going backto what was the. normal policy of this country up. to the eve of. the Great War. Singapore was intended only for purely defensive purposes, and its importance lay not in the Pacific but in the Indian Ocean, which was effectively covered against outside intervention if. we had a base, there. Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy said the real naval defence of Australia and New. Zealand against a hypothetical enemy in the Pacific was to have a suitable base in -the North of Australia, or possibly Borneo or New Guinea. . Captain Beamish, in1 a maiden speech; described the Government's decision on Singapore as deplorable.; The creation of a base at Singapore was absolutely vital and essential to our Imperial interests.

Sir G.- Collins urged the right lion, gentleman to return to the policy which ho enunciated when in Opposition, and to bring about an International Conference to consider the question of disarmament. ■ .

Commander Bellairs remarked that wo could not get rid of th& question of war by talking about disarmament. Referring to naval help from the Dominions, ho said, Canada, was not- corning to the assistance of the Empire in'a way commensurate with her population. ■ • ■ Commander Burney,'said the House had listened to speeches which bore, the hall-mark of Liberalism—insincerity and tho wish to depreciate everything British. The question of Singapore was merely the first step in the absolutely certain reorientation of naval power. ■ Captain Viscount Curzon, criticising the manifestoes of the Libferal Party in" regard to naval policy, said that party were out for a "little. Navy." Conservatives wore in favour of disarmament, but they objected to this country being the first to" adopt it. ' SINGAPORE DECISION NOT : FINAL. In his reply, Mr. Ammon (Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty) said the Government intended at the earliest possible moment to call together something in the nature of an ■International■ Conference to se^.if we could not arrive at.an agreement as to disarmament or a reduction of armaments. In the meantime there would be no departure from what was thought to bo the right margin of safety; but - nothing would be done m any way that could be considered of a provocative character' or m any way infringing any of the pacts and agreements that existed between the nations at present. He could not too strongly contradict the,statement that in building five cruisers this country set the pace in another naval anna- I ment race. This was a replacement, and a replacement not at all commensurate with the numbers that had gone out of commission. They saw no reason to revise their decision about, Singapore but | they realised that, should occasion arise they might have.to go on with it if they railed to get a proper understanding | when they came to negotiate with the other nations, in the days'to come. | Tlie House divided and there voted— For the reduction 182 ■, Against 226 ' Government majority 44