LAND OR WATER ?

Evening Post, Volume CVII, Issue 82, 5 April 1924, Page 7

LAND OR WATER ?

THE DARDANELLES ATTACK

ADMIRAL'S STORY OF LAST

PHASE

WAR COUNCIL DIFFICULTIES

(UNITED PRESS ASSOCIATION.—COPYRIGHT.) (AUSTRALIAN-NBW ZEALAND CABLE ASSOCIATION.) LONDON, 3rd April.

: The last series of extracts from the Diary of Admiral Lord Webster Wemyss, who commanded, the Allied Fleet at-the Dardanelles, follows :—

Writing in his diary on 22nd-October, Admiral Wemyss mentions that Admiral Keys had gone toXLondon, with Admiral De Robeck's consent, to submit a plan for rushing a squadron through the Dardanelles, though Admiral De Robeck actually did not regard the project favourably. 'On returning from Salonika, Admiral Wemyss found that General Monro, who had succeeded General Sir . lan Hamilton; had reported unfavourably on the military situation, and recommended .immediate evacuation. The deteriorating health of the .troops, induced1 this view, though their morale was unimpaired. Admiral "Wemyss believed a new offensive would have, had an electrifying effect, - „; *

Lord Kitchener arrived on 9th November, and telegraphed a fortnight later recommending . the evacuation o*£ Suvla and Anzac, and the retention of Cape Helios. . ■'■ '* .

Admiral Wemyss flow succeeded Admiral De Eobeck, and pressed afresh the project for rushing., the fleet through. General 'Monro strongly dissented. A long exchange of views ended on Bth December ire the decision to evacuate Anzttc and Suvla. Admiral Wemyss thought the decision a disastrous -mistake, but says; "Evidently the military view prevailed and the'- Western school gained the day. The Admiralty held that the arguments against the fleet project were overwhelming, but favoured the holding of „Cape Helles and the mouth of the Straits as beginning points if a future attack were decided on."' ;. • Admiral Wemyss counter-proposed the capture of Achi Baba, but military opposition triumphed. "This was the .lasteffort nn mx part to shape the 'course of events," he wrote. "My only choice was to bow to the decision of the Governraept.1' . '

Kecapitulaiing the events leading up to the launching of the first attack, Admiral Wemyss mentions that Lord Fisher opposed it, and contemplated resigning but_ lord Kitchener dissuaded hijn. against his' better judgment. Lord Fisher even maintained, iii the War Council discussions, a hostile silence which'Mr. Winston Churchill interpreted as a/isent. ' ,

"It must remain a matter of surprise," says Admiral Wemyss, "that a man of Lord Fisher's autocratic temperament, in an outstanding position did not make greater efforts to give ex-' .pression to his disapproval of a project winch the Council of Defence had previously pronounced unfeasible. Tho blame foi- the failure must be attributed to the system, which places the direction of naval operations in hands devoid ol jail knowledge and experience necessary lor the task, and, moreover, immune from the consequence of their actione "