SINGAPORE BASE

Evening Post, Volume CVI, Issue 126, 24 November 1923, Page 13

SINGAPORE BASE

POLICY AND STRATEGY

THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE

NO GROUND FOR OBJECTION.

"Those Americans who object to the building by the British of a great naval base at Singapore in the Straits Settlements, opposite the southern extreme ity:of the Malay Peninsula, assume a heavy responsibility.*' 'This is the opening sentence of an article'in "Current History" (New York) by Major J: M. Scammell, technical • assistant of the Naval War College ; and he goes on to;show that far from finding the proposal distasteful, Americans can .warmly approve it. ■The China Sea, he writes, is the highway of the nations of the Far East: Its waters wash the territories of the Chinese, Japanese, French, Dutch, British, Portuguese, Siamese, and Americas, and carry their commerce. On its waters and shores the greatest land . and sea Powers.have their possessions; and there the most important commercial interests and trade routes converge. On the north it is bounded by China and the outposts of Japan. On the west French, Indo-China and Siam form its limits.' Southward it. is bounded by the Dutch East Indies. .North-east lie our Philippine possessions; . There, are four mam gates to this sea. Of these, one leads eastward to tho Americas, and , to; Europe via the . Panama Canal:'; ■'.."; it opens. between ■ the American and the.Dutch possessions. A 4 second leads south-east through tlie Dutch East Indies to ;tho Commonwealth of Australia and the Dominion of New Zealand. ,A third opens northward; and it is a double gate—one passage lies between the American possessions and the Japanese outpost of Formosa.; tho other lies between Formosa,and .the. Chinese coast, and it is controlled by the Japanese naval base in' the Pescadores Islands. But the most important door of all is that which unites Europe with the Far Eastr-pthe Strait of Malacca. It is controlled by Singapore. ■'. .

AN ADMIRAL'S- PROBLEM.

The-United States, with' Guam adequately protected and developed, and with her admirable potential bases in the Philippines made into actualities, had it in her power to close the approaches from the eastward. This opportunity to exercise economic pressure,'and even the; abEity to protect her own; or to briDgher military and naval forces into .this area to defend :her liberal policies, the .United Stales surrendered; to end competitive naval building and to create an^era of good feeling in the Pacific. Regardless of the disputed point—whether or-not we attained either of our. objects —the fact remains that Japan was left in potential control of the China Sea. Hector C. Bywater, a distinguished British naval authority,- recently stated :— A British Admiral with whom I was discussing, some two years ago, the strategic situation in the. Pacific, made the following pungent comment:—

. "If America. ever has to fight, Japan before she has got proper fleet bases across the Pacific, the individual least to be envied in the whole:world would he the American Comniaiider-iu-Chief. .He would have no means of forcing a decision, since the initiative would-rest entirely with the enemy, yet lie would command a fleet sufficiently powerful to justify a public clamour for* something to be done with it.i And if he yielded to this clamo.ur and engaged in any active operation, the odds against it sue-' ceeding would be 99 to 1. . Villeneuve, on the eve of Trafalgar; had an easy problem compared with .this. .If I were-ap American naval officer, nothing less than the insistent call of duty would persuade me to command the fleet in a war with Japan, not only, on account of the appalling responsibility, but because it would be practically.impossible to make any active move that was not foredoomed to failure." ..' . •

Subsequently the. United States agreed hot to establish the required naval; bases!.

Referring to the non-fortification clause of : the ! Washington Treaties, Viscount Curzon' recently stated in Parliament:

To the United States it renders the Philippines and the mid-Pacific islands absolutely useless, and unless the United States is .able to place supplies of fuel in those places the American fleet cannot possibly cross the Pacific. The Military result was that Japanls potential power was exercised over 2000 miles' to; the southward. This brought her into direct contact with the Dutch and.halt way to. Australia. ■ No longer was there the.menace of Manila oh the Jank. ■ • .-" ..'■■'■• JAPAN'S LIMITATIONS. . ; Japan, is an island empire, semi-indus-trialised and dependent, as is Great Britain, upon her imports for food and raw materials, arid upon her exports for her wealth; : In an endeavour •to control the sources of her raw materials and to care for her expanding population, Japan embarked upon ventures northward, to Sakhalin, westward into Korea, Manchuria, .Siberia, and Shantung; southward into the islands of the Pacific; and eastwai'd, by peaceful penetration, to Hawaii and Pacific- Coast. Of all these ventures,: none was successful; but that eastward alone held promise. Sakhalin, Siberia, and Manchuria' were too cold for, the Japanese settlers. ' In Manchuria arid Korea and Shantung they could riot compete /with the natives who had lower' standards* of living. The Pacific islands proved to be too warm, and 'the official report to the League of Nations shows an actual decrease in the number of Japanese in the last year. This is attributed by the Japanese Government to the withdrawal of naval personnel; but it does not explain the failure of colonists to settle, there.-despite the iaduceirients offered. In short, the Japanese can. thrive only in very favourable climates. They are not and never have- been pioneers. They refuse to : dear and settle new and available areas, in their own islands. Hokkaido is actually thinly populated. But the Japanese could thrive in Hawaii, California, • Mexico, or South America, except that American.policy bars the way; or in Australia and New Zealand, except that, the English-speaking people there, forbid it. Again, Japan in' her. determination to become a great military and naval Power, came to depend largely on resources available only from abroad. Cotton,, for example, is not only the common . material for clothing, but it is a vitaJ necessity for the manufactureof explosives. Oil is necessary for submarines, aircraft, and battleships. Japan has rioue. But there are extensive fields .in the Dutch ■ possessions.. , „ DUTCH PP.ECAUTIONS. ' Japanese needs, and therefore, Japanese ■'■ policy, became a menace to the Dutch and to the British dominions in the Pacific. Australia's policy is "A "White Man's Country." Japanese naval. officers have been too outspoken about the East with which thinly settled, strategically weak, and dangerously isolated Australia could be occupied: In American, Dutch, and British waters, they have been altogether naive and

clumsy in their methods of surveying and gaining military information. Then there was our failure to fortify Manila and Guam, followed by our pledge not to do so. This gave Japan the only base on the.China Sea—the Pescadores—and brought her military power to the shores of the Dutch -possessions, and, potentially, 2000 miles nearer Australia. The ■consequence was that the Dutch, who had in the past relied somewhat nebulously upon the vague expectation of American policy as a defence, immediately took alarm. A Royal resolution, of 21st November, 1922, established a Koyal Commission to look into the matter. It reported, on 7th April, 1923, that it considered the proposed naval base at Tanjong Priok to be "indispensable," saying that "violation of the neutrality of the Dutch East Indian possessions would provide the enemy of the offending Power with a valuable base." Hence the projects of Tanjong Priok, the auxiliary bases at Surabaya and Rhio, the latter opposite Singapore, and a building programme of naval craft designed specially for tropical service. The ships were to cost about 80,000,000 dollars andi the bases about 40,000,000 dollars. ; WHY THE BRITISH PROJECT? Then came the British project. The British naturally disclaimed any intention to build it again Japan. With a blind disregard of common sense the opposition proclaimed: "But a base must be built for a possible use against some one. Are we not on friendly terms with the Japanese?" But it wag forgotten that after a nation becomes an enemy it is too late to build a base or a fleet, or to organise an army. The only sensible time to prepare is when preparation is genera^and can give acute offence to.no one. The fact is, as Mr. Amery said in the House of Commons: '

The Washington Conference brought us down, to a najrowly limited, onepower standard. If so, we must be able to apply-that one-power standard whereever our interests are threatened, and that means .that our fleet must be mobile.

If this analysis is not correct, how are •we to explain, the similar .apprehensions and preparations of the Dutch? How ire we to explain tho remark made in the House of Commons, by Commander Bellairs, to. the effect that the Singapore base might bo useful in the to the-United States, for the defence of the Philippines? Let us recall that Sir lan Hamilton predicted in his latest book that in the event of the non-renewal of tho, Anglo-Japanese alliance the next war would be in the Pacific, with Great Britain and. the United : States on one side and Germany, Russia, and Japan on the other. But even better than all this, let us recall the- debate in the House of Commons, on 19th July, 1923. Commander Bellairs said of Japan: In ten years' time there will be an increase of 3,000,000 in that population. That will be 8,000,000 more, reasons; for expansion, and- the Japanese will not expand into cold climates; they go only to. warm climates.

' Lieutenant-Commander' Kenworthy, who spoke against the project, said: I admit that in a generation, perhaps, the increase in population in Japan and the urge to fill the great spaces in Australia may lead to great trouble between the two Empires—then Singapore is the most important' strategical point in the world.

Mr.• Amery.stated that

Whoever holds the gateway makes' it impossible for any one to come into the Indian Ocean for aggressive purposes or to conduct an.attack upon' Australia' and New .Zealand. .. ... •' ' ';'■'■ : '.. ' ;

Sir C; Kinloch-Cooke.dbservedi that

;./There'..are .-'fifty.-.commercial., lines.,of ocean-going steamers that' pass Singapore and.:vei'y often call there. .■

Singapore flanks the .lines of, approach to Australia and New,-Zealand. . ... .

We shall be able -to .give the greatest assistance to our friends ill Australia and New Zealand. They will know that there is safety for them; ...It :is'-a-Very long way.,from' Australia and New Zealand' to Malta. It will give confidence to:p,u'r friends in.Australia and, New Zealand, who fought so well for us in the war. ■ '

A >?OTE FROM JAPAN.

■Then note this from, the Japanese newspaper "Ybnjiyuri" of . 'sth May, 1923: "We take .it that the plan has been laid out through the fear that Japan has territorial ambitions in India and Australia." Captain Masanori Ito, a >retired officer of the • Japanese Navy, is quoted in the New York "Times" of 19th August as having' stated in the "Kaisei-Keizai-Jiho," referring,to Great Britain:

\lt is thus natural that she is'.fullof anxiety as to Australia and New Zealand and is casting suspicious eyes toward Japan. ... . If there is even the slightest connection between the Singapore base and the'naval agreement that exists between Great Britain and the United States, then the situation is serious. ■ 5 Captain Hay,' speaking in -Barliament against tho project, said : There are only two potential enemies against whom you need to fortify Singapore. One is America.. the other is Japan. No matter how'dull arid gross many of the peoplei of this country -may be, I believe there is one thing. they will not stand, and that is war with America, : The. ties "of blood and of relationship are too close between the people here and the people, across the ocean for us -to look forward to such a contingency. Therefore, we are counting upon a war with Japan. A war with Japan is. going to be something greater than the war- between ourselves and Germany, or the war between" Germany and France. It is going to be. a race war. . . ' ;■.•.-..

■This is ■ reminiscent of the remark by Lord Grey of Fallodon in the Houao of Lords on 11th July that if there were a war in the Pacific "it was as certain as anything could be that it would be a, race conflict in which the United States, ,as well as the British Empire, would-be involved'on the "same side." ■■

„ DEFENSIVE POLICY. The policy which the British Empire has.iri mind is, in short, also our policy: That our territories, or territories adjacent .to our frontiers from which the integrity of our Dominions may be menaced, are not open to conquest or colonisation by any. great Power. It is a defensive policy. Members, of Parliament, had this clearly in . mind. Mr. Amery said: .' ' ' • : : ■

Pearl Harbour is just over 3000 milc3 from- Yokohama,' ana that distance is sufficient protection to Japan against any aggression. on the. part of the ■ United States. Singapore is. just '5000 ' miles away from: Japan, and if >« had any aggressive idea, against, Jq.pijn, \y'e should never, have agreed' to a scheme which deprived us of the .effective use of Hongkong. „ '..■•?

Singapore does, not lend itself readily to aggression any more than Tanjon* Priok or Pearl Harbour does,; Ab CouTmander Bellaira put-it: • . . I . think it is a• " fact '' also,' that m the -event, ' of "Japan 'returning to an aggressive policy, such' as she . had; .against China dm™ H l6 .w£ r! .the war sta«s of both Oreat Britain and.Amerida will assure their Governments .that their Governments must combine if they are to exercise successful coercion on Japan ' Another aspect to be taken into consideration is the spirit which animates ?t *T? \ hs B"tish Em Pire and the United States, are not aggressive; they desire only to keep « peace what they

now possess. The naval base at Singapore is not intended for aggression, but to defend British possessions and policies in the Pacific, and these policies are also our policies. While the Japanese base m the Pescadores flanks the China trade routes of Great Britain, menaces Hongkong, Australia, and, the Dutch East India possessions, Singapore is 3000 miles from Japan, and an offensive movement against that country would have to count on passing or reducing the Pescadores. An offensive move would be a hopeless undertaking. But Singapore has a powerful defensive value. It flanks the line of advance to Australia and covers India. It prevents the Japanese tankers in time of war from getting oil from the Dutch Past its doors flows the bulk of the Japanese commerce.

only will the Singapore base have ft decided defensive value, but it also reestablishes the naval equality in the Pacific of the English-speaking peoples; an equality which we Americans renounced when we'gave' up our right to defend the Philippines and Guam. Singapore means that the China Sea shall remain open to the commerce of tho world. The . ability to ■ maintain the open door, in China, which we have renounced, will bfl maintained by. another Power. Had the United States developed, a Suitable naval fcfaso at Manila and provided properly for the defence -of the Philippines, I seriously doubt if theßritish Navy would e'verjiave tried to get—much less succeed in getting— funds .for the Singapore base, so closely are British-American Pacific interests identified. United States naval officers, being students of policy, certainly give no evidence of alarm, but much evidence of satisfaction, with tho b\vlding of the British base in the Pacific.