CHANGING GERMANY

Evening Post, Volume CVI, Issue 48, 25 August 1923, Page 19

CHANGING GERMANY

THE EFFECTS OF REVOLUTION.

'The German Revolution and After." By Heinrioh Strobel. London: Jar- -: rolds, Ltd. ;. The author of this history is plainly i Left Socialist; and though he cannot be accused of wilfully presenting a falsa view of events, his judgment upon the course of those events is- certainly coloured by his inclinations. For the Socialist of the Bight (the Majority Socialists) he holds no brief. Indeed, at times, he appears to question their right to the Socialist title; to regard'them more as advanced Liberals or Radicals than as men to when Socialism is^ something ■more than a remote ideal. Their nation> alist policy in the war period he condemns. They were deluded, he holds, by the hope of a speedy German victory, which they fondly believed fwould be the beginning of world reconstruction. In fact, for them-the theory of Socialism had become strangely mixed with Kaiserism, as if Marx had been rewritten and brought up to date by Wilhelm Hohenzollern. The author maintains that, in spite of German propaganda, the war-guilt of the Central Empires and their annexationist aims were bo evident that, no excuse'could be offered for being deceived. For Germany and Austria, it was not a war of selfdefence. Nevertheless, the Majority Socialists supported it, and, though some of their leaders were doubtful and some declaimed their opposition, others voted the war credits and allied themselves with militarist and nationalist parties in organising for victory. u?hß revolution, Herr Strobel main tains, did not cause the German military collapse. The decay and dissolution of the military machine proceeded from the mistakes and abuses perpetrated by the Military Party; and it was only when the machine was smashed by the superior strength of the Allies that popular disappointment and rage found Tent in the" revolution. In the .preparation of the revolution, the Majority^ Socialists had no part; yet the event found them masters' of the situation. For this, in the author's view, they were also unprepared. Right Socialist support of the war policy had widened the gap separating the Right from Left, and the two sections could not sincerely join hands again. ,It is in his judgment upon the steps immediately following the proclamation of the Republic that Herr Strobel chiefly invites criticism. Eight and Left did come together for" a time; but they were never in substantial agreement. The author blames both parties— the extreme proletarian Left, for imagining that the Russian example could be applied to highly industrial Germany without ! modification, and the Eight for failing to consolidate th» revolution and establish the power of the proletariat before summoning- a new constituent assembly. . " :■ ' THE COMMISSARIES. . ; i Immediately. after the revolution, the power of Government;'was in the hands of commissaries, chosen.'from, llight andLeft Socialists. The author holds that this power—virtually a power of dictatorship—should not have been surrendered till the authority of the bureaucracytad been completely broken and measures of Socialism brought "into operation: His judgment,is a- denial of the rights of democracy, for he is compelled to admit that the supporters of Socialism, Eight and Left, -were in a minority. His contention that the elections were held too quickly does not dispose of the fact that when they were held the result 6howed that the Socialist parties combined, had. not an absolute majority, and the Left Socialists mustered only' 2 314,----332 votes out of 30,000,000 polled. But before the election Right and Left had had separated, and the Spartacist revolt Jjad been crushed. For this revolt Herr Strobel blames the extravagant visionaries of the Left, and also the cautious leaders of'the Right. There would have been no menace of Sparta? cism, lie contends, if the Right Socialists had pursued a bold policy. He accuses them instead of compromising with the bourgeois and giving ground for fear that they would allow reactionaries to -triumph/arid regain their old place. Especially he condemns their action in agreeing, after the election, to an alliance with .jthe bourgeois; Centre and Democrat Parties. To the non-party observer such an alliance would appear to have been justified by the popular will as expressedtin-the.elections; but th» author maintains that it.was fatal to the introduction -of socialising measures -■ and encouraged- the revival . o f mil^tar' , ism. : Moreover,'miUtariflm was further encourfe,i^by retaining, armsd ' for °£ under-.ih^leadership.oAhe old. officers because of a'fear of Bolshevism Thefe wereJJrisvolutionary outbreaks; - led by 'ST t° St! v lo*? 38 2 0t 'democratic gov. ernment but the Soviet State- but A rObel £° IdS tbat such o^reaks T™ °'L -c 6n Suarded against not ■oy repressive measures, but by greater progress in Socialism. In a word, he would- have disarmed revolutionaries by giving them something of what they desired, though that something would have been opposed to the. will of the majority of the people. It is possible that the Right Socialists ' did indeedmake a revival of militarism possible; but was; that worse than surrender to a «"nonty. would have been-especially rtf h? d no' more justified- ■?■ * Tv c thl'eats of th« minority to take by violence that to .which .it ww.Bot , entitle d? When militarism did rajse its head in the Kapp Putsch it was speedily suppressed. ■ ' POWER OF INDUSTRIAL MAG- ■-.. ■ • NATES. The author appears to have dropped: history i n 1920 and taken it up afain at intervals and in sections; and Tlis a c count of events of the -later yearsT lacks logical sequence. The passages in which he deals with the eitaatioS a"at the commencement of 1923 may however be consdered apart.- from ZeS Si°" Cal UTTY- **■ l">lds thlt the opposing French and British views of the. state of Germany are both -Sand both wrong-because there are two Geifv^- T-hEre-■■» one- Germany where everything^ roseate, and another Ger! ThT^ hlCh *«Wfcaer fearful m"scry. E r n C, apital ( IStIC CoWlt^ have. ™d°" ;3 cc. ss °f currency. depreciation, de- I veloped to an acuteness in Germany of Tni nZ n "eS With- a healthy.currency ana normal, economic functions can SS«™''; It* is indisputable that German industry is fully employed ■■ Herr, Strobel continues, but ''industrial: monopolies and they are able to use thl currency depreciation for their own eft nchmeDt and the impoverishment of Outworkers, skilled, unskilled, and'pro fessional. As evidence of this impoverishment of the masses, the author quotes some, striking figures showing thaVthfe ihi f'-R^fir ' U0 Ineans assured »at the, Republic is secure from attack by ,

iU internal enemies. Secret organisations flourish, and their aim is the restoration of the Monarchy and an Imperialist policy, especially the war of revenge. Had the Government pursued a bold Eolicy, he says, such organisation's would aye no power. Bold State action also wouldhave stabilsed the finances. The possibilty of stabilising the curency has, he holds, been made much more remote by the French occupation of the Ruhr; That occupation has closed the gulf dividing the industrial workers from the employing classes, and has elevated the magnates into the position of national heroes. y

His remedy for the existing state of affairs, which is bad for Germany and bad for Europe, is Socialism. The fact that Socialists—Right and Left^-had their chance after the revolution does not alter his conviction as to the efficacy of the remedy. . He' says in effect: they did not really try Socialism. And that has been said of other parties in other countries when the new Utopia has not arrived to time-table.