Evening Post. MONDAY, AUGUST 6, 1923. SEEKING ALLIED UNITY

Evening Post, Volume CVI, Issue 31, 6 August 1923, Page 6

Evening Post. MONDAY, AUGUST 6, 1923. SEEKING ALLIED UNITY

The French publication of the reply to Britain adds one more to the many difficulties hindering the search for Allied unity. It was plainly stated by ■ M.^Poincare when the British Note- was received that disclosure of its contents would end the negotiations ; but when Britain asked permission to publish both the Note and the reply France immediately published the reply alone. Thus a onesided statement of the negotiations has been given to the world. The effect of that statement and of the accompanying French comment cannot but be harmful to the Allied cause. Mr. Baldwin may now be compelled to speak plainly in order to counter the effect produced by the French reply. Calm judgment is difficult when such a procedure is adopted; and differences of opinion instead of being removed are magnified.' This latest example of French diplomatic methods is quite in keeping with the precipitate haste displayed in replying to the first German Note. France is profoundly desirous of securing Allied unity; but it must be upon terms' dictated by France. Allied unity, in other words, is interpreted as Allied support of the French policy. The "Journal dcs Debats" considers a fundamental error in Mr. Baldwin's policy is that England considers herself the mediator between France and Germany, instead of one of the signatories of the Versailles Treaty. The retort may well be made that France was the first to forget England's interest in the Treaty. M. Poincare now acts as if France were the only signatory to a document which was merely countersigned by England.

The French reply offers little more hope for the attainment of a commou aim than docs the French procedure: French and Belgian claims are reiterated, and the French point of view is emphasised in terms which leave no way open for compromise. Passive resistance must be ended before conversations with Germany will be resumed, and when these conversations are resumed France will not offer anything which will assist in modifying the reparation terms. The Suggestion for a special commission is, in effect, rejected by insistence that the Reparations Commission has complete power to extend the period or modify the methods of payment. There is no word which may be interpreted .as recognition of the burdens which have fallen upon Britain. The Belgian reply, though generally more moderate in tone than the French; is equally hopeless upon this point.

If it is necessary to consider Germany's capacity to pay (Belgium states) it is necessary that the Allied countries' which have suffered, shall receive corresponding relief, which can only b e found _ in cancelling the Allied debts, ur priority to devastated areas.

Britain may not claim priority as a devastated area, aud (if America be excluded) she is the creditor who will suffer by cancellation oi inter-Allied debts: yet the injury site lias suffered is as real as that inflicted by tlic invasion upon Northern France,, As jSir Eoberfc

Htfrne stated in the debate upon, unemployment, France has re-es-tablished her trade while Britain is still struggling O n with 70 per cent, of what she possessed before the war. But because Britain is paying her debts her creditors assume that her capacity for payment is unlimited.

France is disposed to' regard Britain as too lenient to Germany, but the German view should help to correct this impression. Mr. Baldwin's statement, according to a message from Berlin, has come as a cold douche to the Germans. The references to passive resistance and financial control are mentioned as specially distasteful. German displeasure, however, is rather a cause for satisfaction. Without doubt there has been some lingering hope in Germany that Britain, compelled by circumstances' to adopt drastic remedies, would indirectly aid the German cause. If that hope is shattered Germany may become more reasonable and may offer terms which will be a startingpoint for a new agreement. But what Germany would dread most of all would be re-union of the Allies in the submission of their claims. That re-union cannot; come until France is prepared to adopt a reasoning attitude. Eeiteration of French policy is not the way to re-union; hints that British opposition would be considered _ unfriendly are not the way; nor is the way to be found in M. Poincare's self-assuring assertions that the future will prove that France was right.