AGRARIAN RULE

Evening Post, Volume CVI, Issue 30, 4 August 1923, Page 9

AGRARIAN RULE

THE BULGAR REVOLUTION

ITS EFFECT ON EUROPE

M. STAMBOULISKI'S ACHIEVE- , ■ MENTS.

According to a "Manchester Guardian" correspondent, lately resident in the Balkans, M. Stambouliaki's removal means more than the fall of a Government. All the private and official messages that are coming .from Sofia make it clear that, in the minds' of the new, men, the misdeeds of the fallen Government are connected with Agrarian rule. A will to end that rule ia confessed to be the mainspring of the revolt. But if M. Stambouliski'B was the first and only Peasant Government so far, the views and kind of people it represented form a heavy mass throughout the eastern half of the continent. The movement has only acquired strength since the war, with the distribution of land to the peasants, and peasants are not easily organised. But nothing helps more effectively to crystallise a mass of diffuse and inchoate sentiment than a sudden shock. The violent attack, therefore, which has brought that first experiment in Agrarian rule to an abrupt end will most probably be felt by the various peasant parties in Eastern Europe to be an attempt against their own creed and existence, in which case tho fall of M. Stambouliski may prove. a greater stimulus to the Agrarian movement than was his rise.

That effect, if it works through, will far outshine in importance the other consequences of the Sofia revolt. But it will only work out slowly, whereas there are effects that now loom larger because they sprout at once, and they are likely to appear more vividly abroad than at home.

At home M. Stambouliaki achieved little that was startlingly original. The' two characteristic reforms of his Government were the introduction of compulsory labour for all and the distribution of land to the peasants. Compulsory labour was a reform which M. Stambouliski had greatly at heart. When I visited him last year on behalf of the "Manchester Guardian Commercial" to ask for an article and gave him the choice of the subject he at once de cided to write on compulsory labour j in Bulgaria. But however interesting, the experiment will hardly be continued in Bulgaria 'or imitated elsewhere., On the other hand, the granting of land to the peasants has deeply and permanently altered the character and life of the country. Yet this is a reform which j has been enacted everywhere' else in j Eastern and Central Europe, and which any other Government would have had j to enact in Bulgaria* It is not a special achievement of the Agrarian Gov- j erhment. No Government crculd have the daring or the means to (akc the land j away again from the peasants. Whatever i may, therefore, happen to StamVraliski, | it would be exceedingly rash to de- j scribe his fall in the form of an obituary notice of Agrarian rule.

, ; For;the rest, .Stambbuliski'a home policy was seemingly inspired more- by a wish to hurt his'opponents than. to. bless. His supporters. Ho -himself was undoubtedly . moderate. It is significant that at the last reconstruction of the Cabinet ho dropped not only his too Conservative colleagues, like the former Minister of Finance, Tnrlakoff, but also some of his too arduous friends, like Daskaloif. the Minister for Home Affairs. But for the sake of, keeping the party together he frequently had to lend an ear to the ' Agrarian extremists, who,' like people grown old and sour in Opposition, were anxious to assert power rather than a policy. A typical action was the attempt to enforce an. insignificant reform of the Bulgarian alphabet, which resulted in a conflict during which the University of Sofia remained closed for many months... Much, more serious were the prosecutions and heavy sentences against former Ministers, as' responsible for Bulgaria's unfortunate part in the war. Whether it was pure vengeance or a too clever attempt to •cripple the whole Opposition, that relentless persecution has certainly arrayed against the : Peasant Government even those people who had no interest, in politics except the good of their country. M. STAMBOULISKI'S FOREIGN POLICY. Many of Stambbuiiski's opponents were ready to admit that he could claim a considerable achievement in Bulgaria's extornal relations. He had to face not only the enmity which war inevitably leaves behind it, but also the much grimmer enmity which former friends and allies feel against one who has turned against the fold. Twice within » yer iyoii i t I Bpa?c,of time > in 1913 and in 1915, Bulgaria had taken arms against her former friends in the Balkan League, and at the end of the war she found herself hated and suapected on all sides. M. Stambouhski has within four years changed all that. He has secured the goodwi lof the Western Powers. He has also achieved wonders in making confidence flicker again in the thick, poisonous atmosphere or the Balkans. But for the .obstinacy of M. Venizelos he would perhaps even have performed the incredible in reviving some sort of Balkan League at the first Conference of Lav

_ Europe, no less than Bulgaria., therefore owes .M. Stumbouliski a debt of gratitude for having sacrificed everything to peace, in the face of temptations" dangers, and difficulties. There wTre three points of foreign policy which es pec.ally affected the. immediate life of Bulgaria, The impossible demands for reparations have delayed the recovery of the country for four years, but they nave fortunately been modified at last and need not here be taken further into account. The other two questions concerned the fate of Macedonia and the outlet of the Aegean. Neither the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913 nor the recent treaties of peace havo done anything to solve the nightmare of the Macedonian problem On the contrary, they dispossessed Bulgaria so ruthlessly of n ii her rig ht s in ° the country that all the old wounds bled more profusely than over before Yet even in that matter, which is a national question more than any other in Bulgaria, M. Stambouliski was anxious to dp everything for peace. He could not renounce his claims, but he actually concluded with Jugo-Slavia. a convention at Nish by which he undertook to co-operate in the suppression of the Macedonian terrorist bands. ' They had already murdered some of his friends, and they Irnd condemned him also to death. There is every reason to fear that they have a hand in the events which are now happening in Bulgaria, and that the new rulers, whether out of fear or out of sympathy, will not cross the aims and activities of the Macedonian bands. ■ : •

The question of an outlet to the Aegean has certainly played as great a part in the fall of M. Stambouliski as the Macedonian question. It is an old and urgent problem. It was a main ksue in the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, and it hus never ceased to occupy Bulgarian opinion and diplomacy since the end of the Great ■ War. Tli6 Allies promised

Bulgaria such an outlet by the Treaty of Neuilly. They actually offered the use of Dedeagatch as a free port. But that solution was considered so inadequate by all the Bulgarians that M. Stambouliski could easily have rallied the country behind him if he had attempted to get satisfaction with means of his own. A raid on Dedeagatch in the unsettled state of the Balkans would hav o been exceedingly easy, or M. Stambouliski might have bargained with the Turks when they were in difficulties or with the Greeks after their rout by tho Turks, or he could have put spokes in the wheels of tho first Lausanne Conference. Instead of which he worked unceasingly for Balkan unity in the face of many rebuffs from the Greeks, and patiently waited for the Allies to fulfil their promise.

PROSPECTS OF THE NEW GOV

EKNMENT,

Tho recent decision on Karagatch has finally defeated his pacific policy on that issue. Three months ago I had a hint of what other Bulgarians think on the subject. I happened to be in Bucharest when a Bulgarian diplomatic mission visited that town, and in discussing with one oE its members, who was not a follower of Stambouliski, the points of danger in tho Balkans I mentioned my fear that in case of renewed hostilities between Greeks and Turks the Serbs might occupy Salonika. I frankly confess that I expected my friend to throw up his hands in horror at the thought of such explosive action. But he remained thoughtful for a few moments and then said cjuictly, "That might suit us very well, you know; we-could then occupy Dedoagatch."

I havo found during recent visits to Belgrade and Bucharest that even those people who thought that Bulgaria should be kept a little longer in quarantine regarded StamboulisTii's presence at the head of the Sofia Government'as the best security of peace. In both towns, however, many influential personalities had already been moved by Stambouliski'B policy to support a policy of conciliation towards Bulgaria. Some of them actually advocated that Bulgaria should be given back a part of the territory that had been taken away from her. If there is one effect of the Sofia revolution that one may predict with safety, it is the loss of that goodwill.

The new regime, as I have already suggested, can hardly Achieve any startling change in internal policy. Any effort to satisfy public opinion better than Stambouliski could is bound-to develop in foreign policy. But since the goodwill of Bulgaria's neighbours is sure to be lost to an unfortunate degree, the new men will have no means of carrying further the questions of Macedonia and of the outlet to the Aegean except either by the use of force or by a' reversion to the old competitive alliances. Hence the return of the Turks to Europe; and the revolution at Sofia have brought us back as near to the traditional state of disruption in the Balkans as our worst fears could have suggested.