Evening Post. TUESDAY, JULY 17, 1923. M. POINCARE'S DRIVE

Evening Post, Volume CVI, Issue 14, 17 July 1923, Page 6

Evening Post. TUESDAY, JULY 17, 1923. M. POINCARE'S DRIVE

M-. Briand's fall from the Premiership of France was mainly due to the feeling that he was too much under the influence of the British Prime Minister, too friendly to Britain, and too conciliatory to Germany. M. Poinc.are is using all care to, avoid! dethronement for similar reasons. It cannot be said of him, after his latest .speech, that he is suffering himself to be led by Mr. Baldwin, or erring in excessive easiness with Germany. Strangely enough it was a small incident which played a great part in precipitating the fall of M. Briand—a golf match which was interpreted as illustrating the careless' trend of French policy. As relaxation frbni the labours of the Supreme Council at Cannes, the French and Italian representatives, M. Briand and Signor Bonomi, were taken to'the links for a golf lesson. As beginners they were allowed only to drive and to putt. All intermediate strokes were played iby other members a of' the party—Mr. Lloyd Geprge, Mr. Bonar Law, Lord Riddel], and Sir Edward Grigg. In approaching the first green, M. Briand drove when he should have putted, and landed a hundred yards from the pin. M. Poincare now appears to have made a similar mistake in diplomacy. He has used a driver when a putting iron would have got the distance. Mr. Baldwin's speech laid all due emphasis upon the value of the AngloFrench understanding and Britain's determination to make Germany pay reparations. It was more vague upon the means to be employed to that end—though British opinion would possibly have welcomed a definite pronouncement. M. Poincare's speech is so far from using- the opportunity afforded for approaching a better understanding that the Quai D'Orsay is now at pains to say that it is not a reply to Mr. Baldwin.

The Quai D'Orsay statement may be quite correct. It may be true that M. Poincare prepared his speech before hearing what Mr. Baldwin had to say. But does this make the position any better? Does it not suggest that the French Prime Minister is resolved to allow no British proposal to modify his policy? The substance of his speech is not that France is willing to meet the views of her British Ally, but that in the end the' Allies will agree that-France is right. This, however, brings us no nearer to the end. M.' Poincare stands firmly on the Treaty of Versailles, and' speaks of France's major interests at stake and ■• her minority representation on the Reparations Commission. The effort to replace the Coniniißsioa by

an International Financial Committee is condemned, though not wholly rejected, as not in the general interests of France! Yet it must be. remembered that if America had accepted the Treaty of Versailles .and taken her share in Us, enforcement, the Reparations Lommission would not have been dominated by the French to the extent that it has been. Indeed there are commentators upon the lreaty who maintain that the American defection destroyed the whole balance and made the Separations Commission, which was intended to be judicial, a mere instrument for exaction. To that extent the Treaty has already been altered by events. ■ - -

M. Poincare speaks quite truly when he lays stress upon his partisanship for the Anglo-French Alliance. As President of France throughout the war he worked unceasingly to maintain and strengthen the Entente, and when he took office as Prime Minister some of the British papersjsaw in it a good omen.. There were, however, one or two voices raised in warning. M. Poincare, they said, should not represent French Nationalism, for Nationalism, disregarding the rights of other nations, had already done France much' harm. In particular, the special correspondent of "The Times" stated that the nationalism of the French representatives at Washington and their failure to appreciate American.opinion had destroyed the possibility of . immediate American aid for Europe. Now M Poincare can think of nothing better to say than that France alone has borne great burdens since the Armistice ; and his only suggestion is to relieve Germany by cancellation of the. inter-Allied debt chiefly at the-expense of Britain and America. It wilf be interesting to see if he • attempts to modify these sentiments when he does reply to Mr. Baldwin. He seems, however, to have made substantial modification of policy impossible.