IMPERIAL DEFENCE

Evening Post, Volume CV, Issue 109, 9 May 1923, Page 10

IMPERIAL DEFENCE

THE NAVY AND THE AIR

GAMBLING IN BATTLESHIP,

DESIGN

■RESTRICTION OF ■ WASHINGTON

AGEEMENT

As' we look over our; defensive arrangements we find the Navy, cut down to the bone though it has been, in a better situation to carry out its mission than either the Army or the Air Force, declares Lieut.-Colonel Repington in his fourth article on Imperial Defence, published in the.'- Daily Telegraph." The German Navy is either destroyed or limited by. Treaty-in its future construction.''' No other navy in Europe rivals ours. Both France and Italy are financially unable, even if they had the desire, to build against us, except by the modem equivalent of the old guerre de course. With the greatest of our friendly rivals in distant seas we made terms in-Washington, where a standard was set up for us in capital ships. . It is true that we shall be glad when naval experts come to an agreement about the future of battleships, but so long as .other Powers build such ships we must follow them and do the same. We cannot go very- far wrong if we meet like withj like in surface_ craft. We can go very far. wrong, indeed, if we gamble in some new design and make a mistake. In other than capital ships and aircraft carriers Washington did not limit us in numbers, though it did so in displacements and calibres. On the whole, Washington afforded us a great protection: against potential navy wreckers, while it enabled the United States to suspend the onerous competition in,, capital, ships. This statement assumes ratification of the Washington Treaty. AIR ORGANISATION, The one grave defect in the Navy, in the opinion of most Naval officers, is the absence of a Naval Air Service, under the control of the "Admiralty, and both constructed and trained, to cooperate closely and permanently with the Navy. The case for the Navy was admirably put by Rear-Admiral Sir W. R. Hall and Viscount Curzon in the House of Commons, on 16th March of last year, and, as admirably answered for the late Government by Mr. Chamberlain the same day. It is indisputable that an air arm is necessary for the Navy in almost.all conceivable future naval operations, and must be able to carry out everj mission that , the Navy sets it within tha power of the air arm to execute. It is the same for Army work, and therefore both Navy and Army desire to have an Air arm under their own control, and deplore the policy, for it is a policy, which prevents them from having it. On the other hand, for the protection of Britain against/ air raids,- and for the delivery cjf counter-raids, the An- Force may have to play a virtually independent role when it m.ay.be better not to subject it to Navy' or Army controlIt was therefore thought best by the .late Government, to meet all cases, that a trinity in unity should be established, and that tha Air Force (should be autonomous in administration . and education, should be independent in resisting raids and in counter .-raiding, and only be subordinate to naval and military commanders when naval or military operations are undertaken. But as all three of these warlike proceedings,' may occur simultaneously, it is possible that the decision may prove- imperfect,, even if we had^the means for carrying out any one of them, which we have not. If we cannot go farther than state the case in its general terms, it is because the question of naval and air cooperation is 'under examination by the Standing Sub-Committee of the >Committee of Imperial Defence, But here, again, the public will observe, it is, first of all, a question of whether we have the air ann we need,, for, if we have not such st; arm, the duties allotted to it obviously cannot be performed. , COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS. The position in March last, when the Air Estimates were discussed, was that vire had 31£ squadrons, of which 19£ were oversea in'lndia, Iraq, Egypt, Palestine, and the. Mediterranean,- . leaving 12 at home,-only three of which could be devoted to home defence. We have now 32 air squadrons, of which 15 are at home, including the units at Constants nople. The French have 128 squadrons, and the average establishment of our squadrons is 12 machines and of the French 9. The total number of aeroplanes of modern construction and fit for service has not been announced,' nor have the respective programmes of the two countries been given to Parliament. This situation is moat unsatisfactory. In our position nothing but equality with France will serv«. It is troublesome to all of us to have to quote the French figures, and we should be the last to credit hostilities with, our trusty ally. But we are here in presence of a question of principle. In the old days we took foj* our standard of naval strength the two greatest navsl Ppwer«, find no on<? f«Jt any JUwill towards us for doing $o.- Our insuIsy position, our oceanic Empire, and oux small voluuiee* Army placed us in a special position which all recognised. Qur pre*ent naval standard ie equality with any naval Power. But .now. that aii enemy can attack us by way of the air, as wall as by sea-, it is unavoidable that we should ba equal at least in fighting- aircraft to sny Power within raiding, distance of England. No one fighting against us wijl bombard London if the immediate response is the destruction of his own capital. 11l the event that we evade the vexatious duty of rendering this possible we subject our policy to his, and are no longer- mastera of our own destinies. There is. scarcely a single ■miltary operation which is not profoundly affected by the presence of aircraft, whether our own or the enemy's. We need them for attack, for long-distance reconnaissance, for security, and for observation by day; and * night. It is difficult, demoralising, and costly to conduct operations against a foe who has marked superiority in the air, and similarly his ' operations suffer the same inconveniences when the advantage is on our side. The air/arm is peculiarly useful to us, who ] are so often obliged to act quickly in all -parts of the world,- for this arm is tha most mobile that we possess; From a savage enemy, or from one poorly found in aim-aft, our-Air Force withdraws all hope of victory. For all' these reasons, a large and highly efficient Air Force with our armies, is a first necessity. ABOLITION OR EQUALITY. Many will agree with Mr. John Galsworthy that the best way out is to abolish all aircraft, as we have tried to abolish all submarines. That would suit us very well m Europe, though it would hamper us in colonial campaigns and savage warfare. But we should experi; ence great and probably insuperable difficulties with eevcj-a! Power* in veaehing

is to every nation that we do not intend to be outdistanced by any one of them. They might then be more likely to agree to prohibition, hut w« cannot consider that this likelihood is great. The conquest of the air by man is one of the great triumphs of modern science, and from such triumphs -usually there is no going, back. Air power must be regarded as a part of sea power, in the sense that the principle of equality with any single Power must apply. The French will' not readily abandon, the privileged position which they have gained by sacrifice and foresight. We roust not ejpect them to do 60. The air force gives them an alternative means of bringing pressure on States which refuse to carry out the Treaty of Versailles, and we have no right to question their action. Commercial aircraft were, by a lapse of foresight, allowed to Germany under the Versailles Treaty, and may prove capable of adaptation to war and long-distance raids. There ie no limit, under the Treaty, to such construction.

The submarine and tha air arm have, in truth, played the deuce with sea power, and, failing abolition of both, Wf have to revise all our arrangements. Our sailors can be counted upon, with all the experience that war and research have given to them, to meet the submarine; given proper financial provision. So can th& Air Council be counted on to raise and train any air ■ force that the Government may sanction. The country is not going to lo3e its head, but egualb is not going to sit quiet under a polici which places it, owing to the weaknes;. of its air forces, in political subjectior to_ any foreign Power, no matter howfriendly that Power may be. It js use: less to do this thing- by halves. Abolition or equality are the alternatives, anc' there is no other. If the cost exceed; the amount which the Treasury can read ily find, then economy in other directions must be 6ought to balance the account. The Navy, deprived of a new and indispensable arm, is no longer th< sure shield that it was in the past, no can home defence be counted upon without it.