"THE FATAL BLUNDER"

Evening Post, Volume CV, Issue 80, 4 April 1923, Page 9

"THE FATAL BLUNDER"

A REPLY TO CRITICISM BLAME FOR THE CORONEL TRAGEDY 'ADMIRAL ORADOCK DEFENDED. ' In a recent chapter of the "secret history" of the Great War, the . author discussed the naval battle of Coronal, in which Admiral Cradock's squadron was destroyed by the German ' Admiral yon ■ Spec. A Wellington writer, "Battle Stations," who has made a close study of the battle and ofsubsequent events, has written a vigorous reply defending Admiral Cradock's reputation. "Battle Stations" quotes as the text.of bis reply the ex-Minister's remarks: "There is therefore no doubt that he (Admiral. Cradock) could have got away untouched," and "was there still time to refuse action? Undoubtedly there was." Among the most surprising events in post-war history (says "Battle Stations") are the excursions into journalism of deposed Emperors, Prims Ministers, and generals the main object, apart from financial gain being, on the part of the ex-Emperors, to prove that they did hot contribute to the cause of the Great War; on the part of Prime Ministers, to prove that they did not bungle or muddle through at the expense of their nations' finances and ill-eq lipment of the men •who fought; and on the part of the generals, to explain their own marvellous strategy that should have won the war if some"one else had not blundered. Each in his own country has received sentence at the great court of world opinion, but ihey continue to publish their written petitions against the justice of their sentences. However, they have not descended* to tha .doubtful methods' carried out by a British ex-Min-ister, of blaming any of' their nations' noble dead for the lack of appreciation they now experience from the living. It . now occurs for the first time in British history that an ex-Minister of the Cabinet publishes letters purporting to give secret history of the Great War, in reality seeking to prove that he was not responsible for certain fatal naval occurrences. If it was: true that Admiral Cradock blundered at Coronel, jt would be only charitable to write nothing of the'matter;' but it was not true; and for the living to attach blame even by innuendo to the' noble dead, who cannot answer the charge, is the most despicable action yet recorded in post-war writings. It therefore behovea the living to defend these who are thus attacked. . | WITHOUT REINFORCEMENTS. The writer proceeds to a detailed analysis of the. forces under Cradock and yon Spec, pointing out the well-known superior qualities of the German ships. Early in September, 1914, Admiral Cradock requested the Admiralty to reinforce his squadron with cruisers capable of destroying the Scharnhorst- and Gneisenau (each of which was a much more powerful ship than Cradock's one large cruiser, the obsolete Good Hope). This fact, he says, is studiously avoided by Mr. Churchill except for th,e statement that the battle-cruiser Indomitable was about this.time instructed to leave the Dardanelles and join Cradock, but was intercepted at Gibraltar and ordered to return owing to the increased tension with Turkey. Instead of her, Cradock was given about the end of September the obsolete battleship Canopus, which was 200 miles away when the action of Coronel ■was fought. With her speed of 15£ knots against the Germans' 26 knots, and old 12in guns, of less value than the Germans' modern Bin guns, the Canopuo could neither fight nor run, and the, suggestion that Cradock should have used her as protection against the superior German force was ridiculous, because, even if the Germano had- been lured towards the Canopus, they would haye stood off and destroyed the Monmouth and the Good Hope by using their superior speed and gun-power. This accounted for Cradock's telegram of 26th October, stating that the Canopus was too slow to assist him in destroying the German squadron as instructed in the Admiralty telegram of 7th October, and that he had ordered the modern cruiser Defence (then with Admiral Stoddart to the south of him) to join him. The Defence was ordered, on 3rd November, three days after Lord Fisher became First Sea Lord, to join Cradock, but Cradock and his squadron had then been destroyed. Cradock's original order to the Defence was countermanded on the authority of Mr. Churchill, and if he had not ako intruded his views of naval warfare on the Sea Lords, Cradock would have had the assistance of the Indomitable, and the'result of Coronel would have been entirely different..

Admiral Cradock, therefore, met yon Spas's squadron without the reinforcement he was entitled to, and fought as instructed by the Admiralty in its cablegram of 7th October. In the action the oood Hope and the Monmouth were sunk ■with their crews fighting to the last and ■with the flag flying, for which they were proud to die. _ An important point in connection with the speed of the German ships is that the Scharnhor6t and Gneisenau, in com- . mon with all the later German cruisers, had a speed from three to five knots in excess of the' generally known designed speed. This vitally important factor was known at that time only to a limited number of senior officers of ths Royal Navy, and was not realised by the inexperienced politician who was intruding his views on the arrangements and disposition made by experienced admirals ashore and afloat. SPEEDS OF THE SQUADRONS. The statement is made in the Churchill letters that Cradock could have refused action and escaped because his speed was 23£ knots, and that o£ the Ji German squadron 22 knots. To counter '■ this statement it is necessary to examine the speed conditions of the battle 'of Falklands in .which Admiral Sturdee, with the Invincible and the Inflexible destroyed yon Spec's force. Mr. Churchill, in another attempt to prove that Cradock could have escaped, says in his letters that the greatest speed during the Falklands batt/le was 20 knots. "Battle Stations" conoludes from an analysis of times and distances that the German ships, during the hour b.efore the first shots were'fired at the Canopus, were using a_ cruising speed of 20 knots. The British battle-cruisers .steaming in pursuit of the Germans, who were using their best efforts, to escape, •worked up to 24 knots before they slowed to 20 knots to allow the other cruisers to come tijv The battle-cruisers in fact worked up during the action to a speed of 29 knots. During the three hours from 9.45 a.m.. when the German squadron was 17,000 yards distant, to 12.45 p.m. when the oider was given to opon fire at 16,500 yards,' the mean speed of the British and German squadrons wae 23 to 24 knots. The ship in range at 16,500 yards was the old light cruiser Liepzig; the larger ci'uiaers were . leading the retreat. Yon Spec had to decide either to leave his old cruisers to

be destroyed, while the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, with their superior speed,escaped, or to turn and fight. He chose to fight; and the reports of the action show that when he made this decision the speed of the Inflexible and Invincible was reduced at 1.30 p.m. to 24 knots as the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau turned to meet them at 13,500 yards, proving that the speed of the German ships was over 25 knots 7,t this time, and not 20 knot« as alleged in the letters under review. ' THE FATAL ACTION. Returning to his discussion of the Battle of. Coronel, "Battle Stations" describes in detail the movements which preceded the action explaining that the Canopus was met by Admiral Cradock as he was leaving his base at Vallanar Roads on 30th October, with an engine breakdown which necessitated her being ordered into port. Cradock later picked up the store-ship Otranto. The British squadron concentrated 50 miles west of Corpnel, and began to sweep northward in search of the enemy, and at 2 p.m. were in the order Good Hope, Monmouth, Otranto, Glasgow, steaming 15 miles apart in heavy seas and squally weather. The smoke of the German squadron was first-sighted at 4.20 p.m. The enemy did not approach from ahead and find the Glasgow and Otranto leading, as suggested in the Churchill letters,-but appeared on the starboard side of the Glasgow, steaming up on an angle from astern that would have cut the Glasgow and the slower Otranto off from the rest of the squadron. On sight of the enemy the Glasgow, Otranto,' and Monmouth turned away at full speed to close with the Good Hope. Cradock was now faced by the superior German forces, to destroy which he had so earnestly, ask.cd for reinforcements.. He did not ninch from his hopeless task; nor did he attempt to escape (as, it ia suggested he should have done), as if he had, he would have been compelled to leave the Otranto to her fate, and the Germans, with their superior speed, would have been in a position to choose their own time for closing the action against the Good Hope and the Monmouth before they could join up with the Canopus. That battleship was then 200 miles away, and steaming at 14 knots. At the time of sighting the British ships the Germans had only steam for 14 knots; but with,in 30 minutes, having the latest boilers, they were.able to work up.to a speed of 22 knots. Realising their speed and power, Cradock decided to strike while the conditions favoured him, and with a speed of 17 knots he manoeuvred ] to place his ships between the enemy and the setting sun. At 6 o'clock, he made a definite attempt with every ounce of steam to engage the enemy before sunset, in order to have the sun in the eyes of the German gunners; but the enemy refused action and used his superior speed to turn away to a range of 18,000 yards. This again proves that the enemy had a superior range of speed, and disproves the statement in the lettero that Cradock, could have escaped. It ie, moreover, admitted in the letters that the enemy were able to evade Cradock's attempt to close the action. Cradock was compelled at 6.47 to reduce speed to 16 knots to cover the Otranto,. which was finding it impossible to keep station owing to the heavy seas, and which then turned away out of range. The sun having set the glow behind Cradock's squadron had turned in the enemy's favour. By their superior speed ' the Germans had thus been able to choose the time of attack most favourable to them, and at 7 p.m: they opened fire at 12,000 yards. - Deadly accuracy, characterised the shooting of the big Germar. ships, which were noted' for their gunnery records; but the British ships, •of old design, had their shooting terribly hampered by the heavy seas. The Good Hope and Monmouth were badly holed, and on fire twenty minutes after the^Action began; and at 7.35, the Good"Kopo" hit by ealvo after ealvo, steered straight" for the German flagship,' possibly with the intention of ramming her. While she was on this course a, terrific explosion occurred at 7.45, and she immediately stopped; and under continued terrific fire she went down with her colours flying. The Monmouth was also put completely out of action,, on fire and sinking; and Yon Spec began a circling movement to attack the Glasgow and the Otranto with the rising moon behind them; but they had now escaped owing to t|le squally weather and the low visibility. At 9 o'clock the German cruiser Nurnberg located the Monmouth, so badly listed and down by the head that she could not fire her port guns. The Monmouth was challenged, but refused to surrender, and was sunk with her flag flying by fire at point blank range. From the facts thus set out, concludes "Battle Stations," the reader can now determine who blundered. "May the Pacific rest gently upon the brave Admiral and his crews who preferred to die fighting against superior forces with the flag of their country flying rather than surrender. Their spirit and traditioni will be cherished as an example for the Fleet, and the spirit of the Navy lives to tell the truth regarding its noble deadi"