Evening Post. MONDAY, JANUARY 29, 1923. BRITAIN'S DILEMMA

Evening Post, Volume CV, Issue 24, 29 January 1923, Page 6

Evening Post. MONDAY, JANUARY 29, 1923. BRITAIN'S DILEMMA

The British Cabinet is reported to have further discussed the Ruhr situation on Saturday. There have probably been very few days during the last two or three weeks of which as much might not have been said. The legality of the? French occupation and the continued presence of British troops on the Rhine are said to have been the subjects discussed, but no indication is given of the conclusions arrived at or even of the'trend of the discussion. In order to avoid complications, and as an indication of her disapproval of the French policy, America withdrew her troops last week. The British Government, which is-, equally afraid of complications: and equally opposed to the action of France, would doubtless,, be thankful if it could safely and honourably follow this lead. But Britain is still the ally of France, which America never was, and Britain does not share America's dream of a complete detachment from the politics of Europe. The dilemma in which the British Government is placed is therefore one of extraordinary difficulty. To withdraw altogether would be to '.mcourage Germany and to give the Entente with France its formal death-blow under conditions which would inflame French suspicion and distrust to fierce resentment. On the other hand, the present ambiguous position is. so certain to lead to misunderstai^dings ?nd entanglements that its indefir.it© continuance is highly undesirable and perhaps impossible. It looks as though, willynilly, Britain would have to go further in or else come right out. She has too,, clearly realised the weakness of America's Yes-No attitude to European problems to think that she can long maintain such an attitude in regard to the French occupation of the Ruhr. A foi-tnight ago Mr. Ronald M'Neill stated the attitude of the Government to the French venture in a friendly and tactful- manner ! which see,med to carry complaisance to the furthest possible-Jimit. Applying the fable of the goose and the golden eggs, he made it clear that Britain objected to the action of France not from any sympathy with the goose but because he believed that tenderer treatment would produce better results. There was nothing intrinsically wrong, said Mr. M'Neill, with the French policy, but we objected, believing that it would defeat its own purpose. Nobody must suppose that it would afford ub any gratification if we were pr°ved right. Sir William Joynson'-Hicks, who is another of the Foreign Minister's Under-Secretaries, has since given a more positive assurance of the Government's sympathy. Although,\he said; we may not agree altogether that France's step, will compel Germany to observe the Treaty of Versailles, and though wo had a different plan, which we believe efficacious, we hope to see the French successful. In expressing this hope, Sir William Joynso^i-Hicks want further than his colleague, and further, we should imagine, than public opinion would approve. The nation heartily approved of Mv, Bonar Law'a em.p.h&Jac djasegt from.. %, Ppiue&re'e,

proposals at the Premiers' Conference, mainly, no .doubt, on the ground stated by Mr. Ronald M'Neill. But the feeling that the policy of France was unjust as well as inexpedient must have been considerably strengthened by v the methods of enforcement to which the French have, perhaps necessarily, resorted, The-nation mus£ be more thankful now than it was three weeks ago that it is free from any moral responsibility for the policy which Mr. Bonar Law did his best to thwart. But whether the British nation shares the hopes of* its Government for the success of the FrencJi policy or not, the benevolent neutrality whiph the Government favours surely.cannot be maintained indefinitely. While "it is understood.that the Government intends as far as possible to adhere to the policy/ 1 and the French "undertake to do their utmost to avoid' doing anything in the British occupied area which would embarrass the British Government," the hands of both Governments are likely to be forced by the rapid progress of events. The arrest by the French of a German, official*at Cologne was an embarrassing incident, which has been satisfactorily settled by his release, but other problems are bound to arise which will not admit of so simple a solution. What, for ■instance, is to be the general attitude of the British military authorities at Cologne to the French' orders for the expulsion of Germafi officials from the British zone ? At first the British military police took a hand in enforcing these orders by arrest, but the practice has been discontinued. The result is thus described by the Essen correspondent of "The Times": A prolongation of the situation is regarded as impossible. Either Britain will have fully to acquiesce in support of the French plans regarding the future of the Ruhr and the Ehineland, or the infliction of penalties must cease, or the British will be obliged to withdraw their forces from the Rhine and give the French a freehand. \s > The ■ same authority reports /ttiat "under these circumstances General Godley has decided not to permit further expulsions and arrests in the British zone, until further in-, structions from London, which have been urgently requested." In refusing to allow the French to exercise' a condominium irrHhe British sphere until it has been expressly authorised by his Government, General Godley took the* only correct course, but the conversion of the British,zone into a sort of "no man's land" must be exceedingly embarrassing for the French. How is the British Government to provide a way out that will not make it a partner in a policy of which it strongly disapproves? Even Mr. Lloyd .George'^ wonderful skilj in devising formulae might have been baffled by the problem, and it will not be surprising if the slower .wits "engaged in the quest a,t Saturday's Cabinet meeting have to confess that they have found the problem insoluble. Unless the Cabinet is prepared to revise its previous decision it will probably best serve France by following the American lead. To do so at the request of France'in order to let her have a fair field for her risky experiment would be free from the unfriendliness that a withdrawal of the British troops immediately after the breach would have displayed.