A CRITICAL DISCUSSION

Evening Post, Volume CIV, Issue 25, 29 July 1922, Page 7

A CRITICAL DISCUSSION

PRIZE ESSAY ON AIR POLICY.

In the, June issue of the Royal United Service Institution's Journal the gold medal prize essay for 1921 is published (states The Post's London correspondent). The institution chose "The Air" as the subject for the essay, which has .'been won by Flight Lieutenant Mackay. The author turns. to history ■ and points out that those who maintain that tanks, aircraft, or gas will decide "the next war neglect the historical fact that every new weapon or advance of science in, war is counterbalanced by the production of either a similar class of weapon by other Powers or by a defence device ■ which nullifies to a large decree the advantage that would otherwise lie obtained.

Mr. Mackay presents a picture of England without command of the air being subjected '■ to continual air attack. Destroyed cities and industries; paralysed mobilisation; populations deprived oi-. their daily bread—how long, he asks, could any nation stand such a strain? Most people will agree that in the event of a war with a Continental Power, in the course of which we either lost or were not able to -establish command of the air, we should be subjected to a series of air raids, the scale of which would render those of the late war puny affairs indeed. On the other hand, can we set any limit to what a civilian population will stand in a righteous war? After the experiences of tho Great War it would be hard to answer this question except in the negative; Suppose, though, we also lost the naval command of home waters, by which means the silent unrelaxing pressure of blockade was brought to bear' against us. Human beings can put up with great discomfort: they will face the gravest dangers, but against starvation they are entirely impotent. Aerial attack, then, surely is but an added danger. It is not the principal danger in war. The air affordp a bridge to the British islands; but' our foodstuffs will continue to arrive by sea. The writer suggests that sea power is not now attainable solely by naval power, being of the opinion that it is by a combination of naval and air power that sea power, the spine of Imperial defence, must be maintained. He quotes, but does not criticise, the report of the Joint Board of the United States Army and Navy on the Ostfriesland experiment, the concluding words of which are worth recalling: "The aeroplane/like the submarine, destroyer, and mine, has added to the dangers to which battleships are exposed, but has not made the battleship obsolete. The battleship still remains the greatest factor of naval strength."

As a means of forcing an enemy's fleet to sea, where it can be met and engaged by the British Fleet, aircraft have undoubtedly great potentialities. But such an operation, as Mr. Mackay points out, requires ,the establishment- of a land base within radius of action of the port in which the enemy fleet is sheltered. If no such spot lies within ,our own or allied territory, the aid of the Army must be sought; a combined expedition, in fact, but with an additional arm—the Air. A critical examination of the aerial needs of the Dominions in the essay brings forward an important point: Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa are not, under conditions which it is possible to visualise, open to aerial attack by forces based on hostile territory. Attacking forces must therefore perforce be carried overseas and attack delivered from a seized land base or from aircraft carriers. Such forces must either act by evasion, or the control of local sea communications must first be secured by naval action. It is the case of invasion in a different setting; but sea power remains the determining factor.