EFFECT OF MR. HARA'S DEATH

Evening Post, Volume CII, Issue 113, 9 November 1921, Page 5

EFFECT OF MR. HARAS DEATH

WILL JAPAN ALTER HER PROGRAMME?

'AMERICAN THOUGHT DIS

TUBBED.

(OWTID PRBS9 ASSOCIATION.—COPTItieiT.)

(PUILISHBD IN 188 TIMES.)

(Received November 9, 9.30 a.m.)

LONDON, 7th November.

The Times correspondent at Washington states that the assassination of Mr. Hara has had a disturbing effect on American thought regarding the Conference, and has deranged expectations founded on the belief in Mr. Hara's moderate tendencies and the assumption that his. influence might have prevailed over that commonly, attributed to the Japanese Military and General Staff. It is thought possible that tho Japanese official attitude at the Conference may be stiffened. In any case, the crime is a sharp reminder that the success of the Conference may depend less on sayings and doings of statesmen than the out-, come of an obscure domestic struggle in Japan. It is an undoubted fact that an important, and possibly the predominant, section of Japanese opinion holds the moment propitious for an attempt to extend and consolidate Japanese political and economic supremacy in the Far East. It, believes that the strategic superiority on sea and land by Japan, already secured at great cost,-should not be compromised by the limitation of armaments or the internationalisation of control of the Western Pacific or the Asiatic mainland. While the special position .ol Japan in North-eastern Asia should be admitted Without pedantry, it would be futile to forget that there are limits be. yond'which neither the United States nor the other Pacific Powers can _go to meet Japanese wishes. In particular, the British Empire and France have almost fundamentally identical views and interests with the United States therfc. Moreover, there is reason to believe that Japanese statesmen will understand that pusuit of the aims attributed to the Japanese • General Staff would antagonise the British Commonwealth of Nations as .inevitably and swiftly aS the United States itself. The conviction is growing in many quarters that the more general the appreciation of this truth is in Japan, especially in the militarist section of opinion, the clearer will be the perception of the ultimate risk to Japan which an aggressive policy must involve, and consequently the stronger will, be the chances that the Washington Conference may succeed in securing peace through hearty co-operation with Japanese statesmen on a footing of frank equality.