Evening Post. THURSDAY, AUGUST 11, 1921. SILESIA'S INTEREST-AND FRANCE'S

Evening Post, Volume CII, Issue 36, 11 August 1921, Page 6

Evening Post. THURSDAY, AUGUST 11, 1921. SILESIA'S INTEREST-AND FRANCE'S

Even, when no difficulty arises over the fixing of the self-determin-ing unit, self-determination by plebiscite is not such a simple thing as it looks, because vox populi is often a very uncertain voice. Consider Silesia. In one part the people voted quite definitely for Germany; in another part they voted quite definitely for Poland; in still other parts the voting was Indefinite; and, .worse still, the voting revealed " islands" of German among the Polish and "islands" of Polish among the German. On a total vote slightly in favour of Germany, should Silesia as a whole go to the Germans, carrying with it every 'evidence of a resisting Polish minority ? This course would seem to be most risky; and, as it was not contemplated by the Peace Treaty, the Powers are at liberty to try the other course—partition, with such boundary lines as may separate the German-voting areas from the Polish-voting areas, leaving as few " islands" as possible, and respecting as much as possible economic necessity. A sincere and intelligent effort by the Powers to make stich a partition might secure acquiescence, if not satisfaction, on the part of both German and Pole, and might thus avoid the creation of another Alsace-Lorraine. But; here, unfortunately, interposes the element of selfishness on the part of the Powers—a selfishness that, in the case of France, is in part excused her suffering at the hands of the German colossus. In order to create an atmosphere that will enable them to satisfy one another in the first place, and the German and Pole in the second place, the Powers now in conference on Silesia must .act with correctness and with candour. They must reduce the (element of suspicion that handicaps settlement, and must then produce a settlement reasonably equitable. The principal obstacle—though perhaps not the only obstacle —to this course is France's desire to protect 'herself against Germany by erecting a strong Poland; and France is suspected of a tendency to favour the Poles at the expense of the expressions of opinion recorded by the various Silesian communes and districts at the plebiscite. Is it in France's interest, and in Poland's interest, to push into Poland Ger-man-voting people who will form the nucleus of a new Alsace-Lor-raine? And, secondly, is it in France's interest to follow this plan at the cost of losing Britain's alliance and co-operation? The most hopeful thing in to-day's messages is.M. Briand's answer to the latter question: "Upper Silesia is a small matter compared with the maintenance of the Anglo-French friendship." / If M. Briand acts on that principle—and if the temperamental French Chamber supports him therein — the Silesian question should be finally settled. Mr. Lloyd George's analysis—revealing both sincerity and insight—presents no difficulties that may not be overcome. If France can bring herself into line with an equitable settlement, restoring Entente solidarity, the basis will be laid; and the superstructure of German and Polish assent should sooner or later follow. Without French backing, adventurers like Korfanty will tire, as d'Aimunzio tired. But, while the Powers remain divided, troubleraising exploiters of irredentist sentiment will always be discoverable,