BEATEN GERMANY

Evening Post, Volume CII, Issue 35, 10 August 1921, Page 10

BEATEN GERMANY

THE TASK BEFORE HER

PARTY STRIFE MUST STOP,

The following article was dictated in Berlin by Count Bernsfrbrff ' (ex-Ambassador to the United States) to a member of the New ' York Times staff. : ■ The situation to-day demands that party strife be stopped, or that it at least be limited to the smallest possible degree. We hay« now arrived at a new epoch in the history of our Fatherland; we should all be aware of this fact. If party strife is continued as heretofore, we must relinquish all hope of the reconstruction of Germany—our highest political aim. The general complaint in heard that the German people lack political schooling, ■ but no. serious intention is shown of trying to reduce this evil. Especially is evident a lack of regard for the convictions and motives j of our political opponents, as well as a want; of willingness to comply with the constitutional regulations of the organs of State. Both these imponderables form the foundation of Parliamentary democracy in all those ■ countries in which it has continued to .function correctly. . . . ■ The differences regarding the question of the acceptance or'refusal of the ultimatum of the Entente must' cease in order that all classes of our people may work together, for such co-operation is -the essential condition. for the liberation of Germany, from its foreign fetters. In my opinion, in the decision of the 10th of May the financial question played a subordinate part, because it could be said of our offers as well as the demands of the ultimatum that they were impossible to carry out. Who indeed is in a position to estimate the measure 1.of: Germany's ability? Unfortunately we must pay 'as much as we can because we were conquered in the World JWar, and for no other reason. Therefore there is a aertairi progress in the fact that the ultimatum did not maintain as a basis for reparation the hypocritical lie that' Germany alone i^s morally to blame for the war. Here, as in the times of Brennus; the sanie holds true, " Yae victis." Therefore there is no loss of dignity for the Ger-; man people in the acceptance of the ultimatum, only the acknowledgment of. our, defeat, which was unavoidable. If it is permitted to draw' an analogy from history, Stein and Hardenberg would certainly have accepted the ulti: matum, for the execution of the sanctions would have been equivalent to a new war, which we, an unarmed people, could not carry onj especially as the public opinion of the whole world, including the neutrals, was against us. As bitter as this truth may taste to us, still the fact remains that the_ general opinion abroad was that we wished to avoid the consequences of our defeat.. Now we must make an attempt to fulfil the obligations which have been put upon us, arid for this reason we must attain the same idealism as Stein arid Hardenberg. To-day, too, it is a question of, freeing the Fatherland , from foreign domination, although of another sort and in another form than at that time. We can not and do not wish to think of a war of revenge, but of the liberation of Germany through the fulfilment of our obligations. ■ ' In the decision of 10th May it was a question almost entirely of a subjective —that is, an intuitive^— judgment of the foreign poiltical situation. For each individual the question haft to be answered as to how best to meet the Napoleonic policy of' France. The obstinate members of the Reichstag, I suppose, allowed themselves to be v persuaded mainly by the fact that they believed that the French in any case would ■march into the Buhr Valley, and Upper Silesia was lost at all events, so that there was nothing else to do but to allow the French imperialism to run itself to death—which would- occur as ! soon as. it was apparent that reparation could not be obtained by force. We who voted for the acceptance of the ultimatum were > convinced that, cost what it would, the unity of the German people, Upper Silesia, and the Ruhr territory' must be saved. We did not doubt that if the French did advance- they would march as far as , Wurzburg or Bamberg in order to cut South Germany off from the North. Therefore tho refusal of the ultimatum seemed to us to be equivalent to the destruction of the unity of the German people, the loss of the Ruhr Valley for a long, time, and the abandonment of Upper Silesia forever. Under these circumstances the acceptance of tha conditions of the opponents may undoubtedly be considered the lesser evil.

When at Hamburg on 7th May, before a rather largo meeting of party friends, I spoke for the acceptance of the ultimatum, I thought that I would continue io be in the minority with my opinion. In spite of this I said at the time that in case of a refusal the whole German people must back the decision in order that any possible effect of the refusal on the foreign political situation would not be made illusionary to begin with. It was clear that the French policy could .only run itself' to death if the German people could show a truly heroic atti-i-ude. Just as it would' have been our duty^to submit in case of a refusal of the ultimatum and endure it to the bitter end, it is also the duty of those Germans who were for the refusal to back the Government, so that our Fatherland can be freed as soon as possible from this foreign domination. For this a domestic and foreign policy on broad lines in the spirit of Stein and Hardenberg is necessary.

: The enormous problems of the present cannot possibly be solved by a minority Government. New elections would only embitter tho party strife still more, without* creating a majority which could pursue the reconstruction. It is true that by means of the elections an opportunity would be given for the formation of a new party, which might be called the "Freedom Party" and which would consider as its task the smoothing out of all former differences and to work entirely for the liberation of onr Fatherland by fulfilling our obligations. ..This way does not seem possible, for according to the experiences of other countries the formation of new parties is difficult. Moreover, in Germany, with this continuous lassitude with regard to elections and indifference towards politics, nothing further could be expected from new. elections but a detriment to the democratic thought, as the average citizen wants to hear neither of party strife nor elections. It is also to be supposed that the sold party organisations would make it difficult to fonnd a new party. It is, therefore, very improbable that a "Freedom Party" to be founded in the near future would secure a majority in the Reichstag, and in the end that is what matters. ■

In my opinion the liberation of Germany ca.n only be attamod by a cooperation of the' leaders of all the existent parties to declare peace among the,'parties and' to form a basis for co-operation. If the Extreme Right and the Extroino Left should not join, that would bo unfortunate, but wouldi not hinder the formation of a. majority. In reality the recent large .party differences are absolutely of no importance for us, for in the future the only tiling that matters' for us is to work for the liberation of Germany with the consent of the Entente. That enables ■, all. Socialisation, reaction, and restoration. No ono can have any illusions on that subject who knows, thg avAttajfl jrf t&?

.Entente toward any socialisation and toward the German Monarchy. By the co-operation of the' parties a Cabinet would be formed olf the best experts wlio 'could be found in the co-operatdng Saxties, • and who would have the confience of these parties. In' time, it is to be hoped by the aes* constitutional elections, a large liberal democratic party wonldi. develop from this ■ joint party, . wlhich Germany needa for its political coavaleßcemce and which ooukt only he built up,on an ideal and social basis.

Do not retort that the above tb.pugb.te are Utopian because the German' party differences are inconquerable. The Utopia of yesterday can become the truth of to-morrow, as the world's history has often proved'to us. It is only dependent oi» the leadership and on whether the idea, of unconditional necessity is uppermost. As King Richard li. said^ every German must say: I am the sworn' brother Oi grim need; she and I. Are joined till death. This grim need must create a strong j desire for the liberation of Germany. Lloyd George's recent speech caused •the hope to be liaised that at last, even abroad, the past would be buried' and justice resurrected. It~pro.ves at the same time that the acceigance of the ultimatum waa the correct political decision. '.-... If it is possible to form a strong Grovernment on the broadest possible basis, the composition of a, programme will cause comparatively little difficulty. In short, it would be as follows: Good-will in the fulfilment of our obligations, strong determination for the continuance of German unity, and a consequential foreign policy which will endeavour to ■win the world for the thought of the unity of interests of nation*. We cannot fight any more with weapons, but with ideas wo may hope to convince the public opinion of foreign countries that the Genn-an people demand nothing further than right and justice, especially the right to live, the right to work, and the 'right to reconstruct—which is also necessary, as is well understood, in the interests of all lands. The words which Schleiennaoher called to the Gearman youth shall be our watchword; "Never despair of our Fatherland, and jvlwaya firmly believe that even if times are hard and oppressive the Fatherland will emerge from all trials."